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Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) is a flexible notation for the propositional and first-
order logical reasoning about periods of time that exist in specifications of hardware
and software systems. ITL is different from other temporal logics since it can deal
with both sequential and parallel composition and provides powerful and extensible
specification and verification methods for reasoning about properties such as safety,
time projection and liveness. Most imperative programming constructs can be seen
as ITL formula that form the basis of an executable framework called Tempura that
is used for the development and testing of ITL specifications.
ITL has only future operators, but the use of past operators make specifications
referring to history more succinct; that is, there are classes of properties that can
be expressed by means of much shorter formulas. What is more, statements are
easier to express (simplicity) when past operators are included. Moreover, using
past operators does not increase the complexity of interval temporal logic regarding
the formula size and the simplicity. This thesis introduces past time of interval
temporal logic (ITLp) where, instead of future time operators Chop, Chopstar, and
Skip, we have past operators past Chop, past Chopstar and past Skip. The syntax
and semantics of past time ITL are given together with its axiom and proof system.
Furthermore, Security Analysis Toolkit for Agents (SANTA) operators such always-
followed-by and the strong version of it has been given history based semantics
using past time operators. In order to evaluate past time interval temporal logic,
the problem of specification, verification of history based access control policies has
been selected. This problem has already been solved using future time of interval
temporal logic ITL but the drawback is that policy rules are not succinct and simple.
However, the use of past time operators of ITL produces simple and succinct policy
rules. The verification technique used to proof the safety property of history based
access control policies is adapted for past time ITL to show that past time operators
of interval temporal logic can specify and verify a security scenario such as history
based access control policy.
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This Chapter introduces the following:
• Background.
• Problem statement.
• Motivation and Research Objectives.
• Research Questions.
• Research Approach.






According to Ambrose Bierce [50], “Logic is the art of thinking and reasoning in
strict accordance with the limitations and incapacities of human misunderstanding”.
When we study ordinary logic, it can be seen from two viewpoints. One of these is
“where logical systems are seen as being self-contained and not meant to model any
real-world objects or actions” [50].
These systems have typically been studied by philosophers and logicians when
they are trying to explore and extend various notions of truth, and provability.
We tend to follow the alternative view of logic, which is “a formalization of some
aspect of the real world”. In this view, some abstraction of objects or actions
that either do or do not occur in real life are being described or modelled logically.
However, we can use another language to describe such aspects: for example the
English language, which has been widely used to describe and reason about problems
and situations. Nonetheless, the disadvantages of the natural language - which
include ambiguities and inconsistencies - must be overcome.
For this reason, a formal language with well-defined semantics, a consistent reasoning
mechanism, and logical systems are required to accurately describe these objects and
actions. However, as more complex or detailed properties are represented, a deeper
logical system must be used as that logic represents a particular abstraction of the
real world [50].
1.1.1 What is Temporal Logic
In classical propositional logic, formula are evaluated within a single fixed world (or
state), which generally supports the reasoning with propositions; that is, with state-
ments to be evaluated as either true or false. However, temporal logic (TL) is the
logic of studied reasoning that focuses on propositions whose truth values depend
on time [120, 46]. Temporal logics, which can be seen as an extension of classical
logic in its simplest form [46], was originally developed in order to represent tense
in natural languages [116].
Another definition of temporal logic is given by Manna et.al. [86], which de-
scribes it as a special branch of logic that deals with the development of situations
in time. Whereas classical logic is adequate for describing a static situation, tem-




In addition, to the timeless logic operators, temporal logic contains additional op-
erators such as (©), which means in the next moment of time, (2), which means at
every future moment of time, and (3), which means at some future moment. These
additional operators allow us to establish formulas that cannot be established with
classical logical operators; for example:
2(try to print⇒ ©(printed ∨ try to print))
this formula means:
“ whenever we try to print a document then, at the next moment in time, either
the document will be printed or we try again to print it ” [48].
Despite the fact that classical logics do not include a time element, temporal logics
characterize changes which depend on time and this makes temporal logics a richer
notation than classical logics.
1.1.2 Why temporal logic?
Formal languages, and their well-defined semantics, are increasingly used to describe
systems behaviour precisely, clearly and unambiguously [48].
For example, it is important to verify that a system behaves as required. These
requirements can be captured as a formal specification in an appropriately cho-
sen formal language with the selected specification providing the basis for formal
verification. Formal verification provides a comprehensive approach to potentially
establishing the correctness of the system in every possible situation. Alternatively,
we may want to use the logical specification of a system in other ways such as treat-
ing it as a program and directly executing it and again the well-developed logical
machinery helps us with this [48].
Temporal logic (TL) within computer science plays a significant role in a number
of areas, particularly the formal specification and verification of concurrent and dis-
tributed systems [111].
Temporal logic has achieved much of its popularity because a number of useful
properties - such as: “safety”, which ensures something bad never happens to the
system; “liveness”, which asserts that something good will eventually happens to
the system; as well as “weak fairness”, which states that any transition that is con-
tinuously enabled eventually happens and “strong fairness”, which states that any




1.1.3 Why past temporal logic?
In computer science, most theoretical studies of temporal logic only use future time
constructs. This contrasts with the temporal logics studied in linguistics, philosophy
and other areas where past time and future time have been on an equal footing [116].
This is a surprising fact as computer scientists recognize that past time constructs
can be very useful when it comes to expressing certain properties. For example,
using “2” for “at all future moments” and “3̂” for “at some past moment”. We can
easily state that “in all cases the occurrence of a problem must have been preceded
by a cause”; namely, “no problem will ever occur without a cause”, which is an
important safety property under some forms. One simply writes:
2(problem ⊃ 3̂ cause) (1.1)
However, it has been shown that formulas using past time constructs can often be
replaced by equivalent pure future formulas [53, 83]. For example, formula (1.1) is
equivalent to formula (1.2):
¬(¬ cause U problem) (1.2)
which uses the “Until” construct U for “the problem holds at the current or a future
position, and the cause has to hold until that position and after that position’s cause
does not have to hold any more”.
These two formulas (1.2) and (1.1) are formally stated as being the same [80]; how-
ever, the second formula (1.2) is more intricate than the first one (1.1). This is even
more obvious when one tries to express a statement like “in all cases the occurrence
of a problem must have been preceded by cause1 and cause1 must have been pre-
ceded by a cause2” as has been shown in (1.3):
2(problem ⊃ 3̂ (cause1 ∧ 3̂ cause2) (1.3)
Formula (1.3) is very complicated when ignoring the past construct as shown in (1.4):
¬(¬(¬cause2 U cause1) U problem) (1.4)
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Clearly, a formulation like (1.3) is much easier to understand than the more intricate
one (1.4).
The practical consideration has a formal counterpart as linear temporal logics with
past time operators are very useful in practice as shown in the given examples.
However, it has been agreed that in various relevant cases such usefulness does
not involve any increase in expressiveness to linear temporal logic, that is, all the
formulations which can be expressed using past time operators can be rewritten
using future pure ones [79, 93, 90].
This research is looking at the possible advantages of using the past time operators of
interval temporal logic to reason about history based access control policy. History-
based policies are a very expressive (not easy to express) class of policies that can
define policy decisions dependent on previously observed behaviours [69]. This class
of policies consists of phases, each phase consists of a sequence of states and ITL
with the introduced past operators ( ; and ∗ specifically ) is a convinced language
to reason about it. Next, we will give an overview of history based access control
policies.
1.1.4 Background of history based access control policy
During the last decade, access control models have been developed in order to protect
important resources from unwanted access. Historically, access control mechanisms
have been rigid; whilst they may be either dynamic, or static, (dependent upon
a particular access or environment), they either deny or grant access consistently.
This is necessary to ensure that the systems’ security is well defined and that it
satisfies given specifications [109].
Several models for access control have been proposed including stack inspection,
adopted by Java and C#. In this model, a policy grants static access rights to the
code, while actual runtime rights depend on the static rights of the code frames on
the call stack. As access controls only rely on the current call stack, stack inspection
suffers from two main weaknesses. First, it is difficult to place the needed checks
at the relevant points in the code, and even more difficult to guarantee that they
suffice for enforcing the intended security policy. Second, stack inspection may fail
to enforce some security constraints, because it relies on the call stack only. Indeed,
the access rights of a certain method are no longer affected by the execution of an
untrusted one, after it has been popped from the call stack [51].
Conversely, as Abadi and Fournet note, stack inspection is not useful in providing
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protection to the caller. Thus, if the trusted code calls the untrusted code and pro-
ceeds with the results returned by the latter using the same permissions it has used
for the call, undesired results may occur: in proceeding with the results returned by
the untrusted code, stack inspection forgets that security may depend on how,(i.e.,
with which permissions) the results were computed in the first place. This is be-
cause the stack frame containing the permissions is popped upon return so that the
permissions are no longer available on the stack.
Abadi and Fournet have introduced a novel access control mechanism called His-
tory Based Access Control (HBAC) which records the history of previously executed
codes [1]. Therefore, each and every code executed before a security-sensitive oper-
ation must be sufficiently authorized to execute that operation.
History based access control considers instead a suitable abstraction of the whole
execution, and the actual rights of the running code depend on the static rights of
all the pieces of code (possibly partially) executed so far.
At runtime, both stack inspection and the history based mechanism involve a set of
currently enabled permissions; it is a subset of the statically authorized permissions
of the class of the currently-executing code. When a method is invoked, the initial
permission set for the method body is the intersection of the caller’s current set and
the static permissions of the called code. Note that it is the class of the dynamically
dispatched code that matters, not the class of the target object. In stack inspection,
the method call has no effect on the current permission set of the caller. In the
history based mechanism, the caller’s permissions become the intersection of their
initial value with the final permissions of the called method.
The typical runtime mechanisms for enforcing history-based policies are reference
(execution) monitors [127]. Usually, policies constrain the behaviour of the refer-
ence monitors in the information system. More precisely, access control policies
determine the choice of the reference monitor to permit or deny the execution of a
request. A complete specification of the reference monitor can be given in the form
of an access control matrix that fully determines the access rights at any point in
time during the system execution. This matrix will depend not only on the current
state of the information system, but also on the history of execution [69].
1.2 Problem statement and research motivation
Reasoning about histories is gaining an increased importance in several areas; for
example, history based access control policies and log file analysis among others.
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The future time operators of interval temporal logic can be used to reason about
histories [69]. The normal approach to reason about history with future time oper-
ators is to go to the final state of the interval and refer from this final state to the
prefix states as history.
The final state in the future interval is σ|σ| and to reach this state you need a tem-
poral operator such as fin . This operator means the final state of this interval and
from this final state we refer to the remaining states which are σ4, σ3, σ2, σ1, σ0, as


















Figure 1.1: Future ITL expressing past
However, when the introduced past time operators of interval temporal logic are
used to reason about history, τ0 is the current state in the past interval, which is
the final state of the future interval, and from this state we can refer to the past
interval which are states τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4, τ|τ | so, we do not need the additional operators

















Figure 1.2: Past ITL expressing past
In addition, the “numbering of states” is changed when the past operators are
used. The normal approach of numbering the states in the future time and the past
time is from the left state to the right state, σ0 · · · i · · ·σ|σ| where i is the current
state in this interval.
However, on our approach the numbering of states is from the right state to the




In this research, we are introducing the past time operators of interval temporal logic
to reason about history based access control policy and compare it with the future
time operators. Depending on the discussion above, the introduced past operators
change the “numbering of states” and reduce the symbols used such as the temporal
operator fin . The introduced past time operators of interval temporal logic give us
two main advantages:
In particular, the change of state numbering makes many past statements easier to
express (simplicity). This is clear because in the introduced “numbering of states”
the current state of the past interval τ0 is the final state of future interval; moreover,
we do not need an additional operator to reach the final state of the future interval
and this reduces the symbols used.
The second advantage is that reasoning about history with past time operators
is more succinct; that is, there are classes of properties which can be expressed by
means of much shorter formulas and less symbols (fin operator in the given example).
When succinctness is achieved, simplicity is achieved; that is, the formula is easier
to express due to the formula being shorter and containing less symbols. This study
is therefore focusing on the benefits of introducing past time operators to investigate
if they resolve the problems identified.
1.3 Research Questions
The first research question, RQ1, is rather global. Answering this question results
in a broad understanding of the aims and results of our research.
RQ1: What are the benefits of the past time operators for interval temporal logic?
RQ2: What are the benefits of the introduced “numbering of states” with past time
to interval temporal logic ITL?
RQ3: Can past time operators be used to reason about and express history based
access control policies?
RQ4: Does the past time operators making the specification and verification process




The adopted research methodology follows the constructive research approach [32],
which refers to the contribution to knowledge being developed as a new solution for
an identified problem.
A formal framework was developed based on past-time ITL for a known problem
which is the formal specification and verification of history-based access control sys-
tems. The methodology of the proposed approach consists of the following six steps:
• Step 1: Literature review :
The research study starts with a critical review of published works on the
following:
– Firstly, the specification in temporal logic.
– Secondly, temporal logic history including the classification of temporal
logic.
– Finally, the history-based access control Section.
• Step 2: Past time interval temporal logic (ITLp):
This step introduces the following:
– Interval temporal logic (ITL), its syntax and semantics.
– Past time interval temporal logic ITLp, its syntax and semantics.
– The propositional axioms and rules of interval temporal logic and past
time interval temporal logic. These axioms and rules have been proven
sound in appendix A.
• Step 3: Past time interval temporal logic (ITLp) to reason about history-based
access control policies:
In this step:
– Justification of our choice of past time interval temporal logic.
– Description of the computational model and its components.
– SANTA Policy language with future time.




– The verification rules.
• Step 4: The scenario:
In this step, in order to evaluate our past time interval temporal logic ITLp
for reasoning about histories.
– Specification of history based access control policies.
– Verifications properties of histories.
• Step 5: Conclusion and future work:
This step draws conclusions about introducing ITLp to reason about history-
based access control policy. Limitations and potential further research are
discussed as well as the future impact of this study.
1.5 Scope
This thesis introduces past time operators of ITL. The syntax and semantics of
past time operators of ITL are given together with its axiom and proof system.
In order to evaluate past time operators of interval temporal logic, the problem
of specification and verification of history based access control policies has been
selected. The reason why we chose history based access control policies are that
they are a class of policies that can define policy decisions dependent on previously
observed behaviours within the system. The past time operators with their history
semantics will be used to specify these previously observed behaviours.
The verification technique used to proof the safety property of history based access
control policies is adapted for past time operators of ITL to show that past time
operators of interval temporal logic can specify and verify a security scenario of




In order to measure the success of our research, the following success criteria have
been formulated:
• The past time operators of interval temporal logic is suitable for reasoning
about and expressing history based access control policies.
• The change of numbering of states with past time operators of interval tem-
poral logic make the reasoning about history easier.
• The formal specification and verification of history based access control policies
when using past time operators of ITL is more succinct and thus easier to
express (simpler).
1.7 Thesis Outline
The PhD thesis outline is as follows:
• Chapter two is the literature review and in the first Section the specification
has been defined, what it is, its advantages and disadvantages. In the second
Section, an overview of temporal logic is given in detail including how we can
classify temporal logic systems and what temporal logic applications are in
general and in computer science in particular.
In the third Section, which is history based access control, the access control
elements, types and categories have been explained. The models used for
history based access control policy are listed to justify our choice of SANTA.
• In Chapter three, the interval temporal logic ITL operators and their syntax
and semantics have been explained with the derived formula and constructs.
Then the past time interval temporal logic operators have been proposed with
their syntax and semantics with the derived formula of past time operators.
The axioms and rules in logic are explained, then the propositional axioms
and rules for ITL and for ITLp are listed here. These axioms and rules have
been proven sound in Appendix A.
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• The fourth Chapter shows how to use ITLp to reason about history based
access control policies. The logic languages and its ability to reason about
history based access control policy is discussed to justify our choice of past
time interval temporal logic ITLp. Then, SANTA and SANTA with past
operators which is given a history based semantics using the past operators,
are used to give the syntax and semantics of policy rules. Additionally, the
formal syntax and semantics of policies and compound policies are explained
in this Chapter. A list of verification rules which are used to verify that a
policy satisfies a certain property is given.
• In the fifth Chapter, to evaluate our work, a General Practice System GPS
scenario is described. An introduction has been given to this scenario, then
a description of General Practice System GPS including the system subjects,
objects and actions. The specification of policies has been listed. The seman-
tics of GPS policies has been described in detail, and has been used with the
proof rules to verify the safety property of GPS policies.
• In Chapter six we will bring to a conclusion the work done in this thesis
and discuss the weaknesses and limitations of this work. Moreover, further
research needed in this area is proposed and the future impact is discussed;







• Temporal logic history.
• History based access control.
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2.1 Introduction
This Chapter gives the background to interval temporal logic and its uses. It dis-
cusses the specification and its uses and the most relevant terms related to specifi-
cation, such as “formal specification” and “formal specification approaches”.
In the second Section temporal logic history, and how we can classify temporal logic,
as well as the temporal logic applications, has been discussed.
In the last Section of the literature review, the access control has been defined, its
elements, types and categories. Finally, the languages that are suitable to express
history based access control policies have been listed and discussed.
2.2 Specification
Specification is a vital activity of the software engineering process since it provides
a conceptual model of the system if there is a description of the required behaviour
of a software system. But the question raised here is what we mean by specification.
What is the difference between requirements and specifications?. To answer this
question we should define requirements and specifications.
There is a distinct difference between requirements and specifications. While require-
ment is a condition needed by a user to solve a problem or achieve an objective, a
specification is a document that specifies the requirements, design and behaviour in
a verifiable, complete and precise manner [132].
Another term that is commonly used in books and papers is requirements specifi-
cation. That is a document that specifies the requirements for a system or com-
ponent. It includes functional requirements, performance requirements, interface
requirements, design requirements, and development standards. Therefore, the re-
quirements specification is simply the requirements written down on paper.
So, the first step toward developing accurate and complete specifications is to es-
tablish correct requirements. This is not an easy task and is more of an art than a
science.
Requirements and specifications are very important components in the development
of any system. Requirements analysis is the first step in the system design pro-
cess, where a user’s requirements should be clarified and documented to generate
the corresponding specifications. While it is a common tendency for designers to
be anxious about starting the design and implementation, discussing requirements
with the customer is a vital activity in the construction of any systems. For ex-
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ample, errors developed during the requirements and specifications stage may lead
to errors in the design stage. When an error is discovered, the engineers must re-
visit the requirements and specifications to fix the problem. This leads not only to
wasted time but also the possibility of other requirements and specifications errors.
For these reasons, software requirements are defined in functional terms, and refined
and updated as the project progresses to the different stages of its life cycle. Correct,
accurate and complete documentation and understanding of software requirements
are the most important factors in the success of meeting the required goals and
achieving the functional validation of the produced software [117].
So, the relation between requirements and specification is that the specification is
a formal documented form of requirements. This document may include, but is not
limited to, drawings, patterns, and an itemized description of the system. The spec-
ification document can be checked for conformity with the set of requirements at any
stage of the software development. Written specifications can be of several types
such as system requirements specification, software requirements specifications, and
software design specifications, etc. These specifications are the design outputs, and
set the criteria to evaluate and verify the system’s behaviours as per given require-
ments [117].
There are three uses of software specification:
1. Statement of user needs: this means that it captures information about the
problem; it does not propose or promise any particular solution.
2. Statements of the implementation requirements: they are also used during the
verification activity to check if the implementation complies with them.
3. Reference during product maintenance where implementations are modified
and consequently their compliance with specifications must be checked.
2.2.1 Formal specification
In the past, specifications may have been written in natural language or informal
language. Because of that, producing formal specifications was not part of common
software engineering practice [71]. Software developers were not usually familiar
with using formal specifications languages, and training in using these languages
was both time consuming and expensive [138]. However, today the specifications
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are written in formal specification languages such as temporal logic, so we are trans-
lating a non mathematical description, such as English and diagrams, into formal
specification language [140]. What is more, the formal specification, which uses
mathematical notation, is used precisely to describes the functionality, structure
and interfaces of software systems. This process does not include the programming
languages details needed to produce an implementation [132].
The reason behind this is that the system developer works at a higher level of ab-
straction than the programmer, so, they have the chance to define system function-
ality concisely without worrying about other aspects of implementation that they
have nothing to do with, such as the functional behaviour of the system, algorithms,
efficiency and memory management [138, 132].
This abstraction decreases the specification error rate and removes the confusion
that such details bring to the specification reader, and allows him to recognize the
defined functionality. This permits the verification of implementation [138, 132].
A formal specification provides a dependable point of reference for researchers who
want to study the customer’s needs, those who execute the programs in order to
ensure that the needs are met, those who evaluate the outcome of the execution,
and those who write instruction manuals for the system. Formal specification of a
system can be concluded in the early stages of program development, since it is not
dependent on the program code. This formal specification has to be modified as the
design progresses and the designers better understand the customer’s needs. But it
is a powerful tool creating a mutual understanding among all parties involved in the
system.
According to Gehani [55], formal specifications are used for several reasons which
are :
• Ambiguities, omissions and contradictions can be found in the informal for-
mulation of the problem throughout the formalisation process.
• The formal model can be proven correct with mathematical methods.
• Analysis can be made to a formally specified system to have or not to have
wanted properties.
• A formal specified system can be embedded within a larger system with more
confidence.
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• The formal model (partly) leads to automated development methods and tools
like simulations.
• Formally specified systems’ designs can be easily compared with each other.
Formal specification approaches:
To write detailed formal specifications for any software systems, five basic approaches
have been used, these are:
• Algebraic approach:
This approach emerged in the mid-70s as a technique to deal with data struc-
tures in an implementation-independent manner. In this approach, we are giv-
ing an implicit definition of operations by relating the behaviour of different
operations without defining state, but no explicit representation of concur-
rency. An example of this approach is OBJ language [56] and PLUSS. In this
sense, equational logic [133], a branch of first-order logic, constitutes that part
which deals exclusively with sentences in the form of identities chosen as the
specification formalism and universal algebra and category theory provided
the underlying semantical techniques [40].
• Model-based approach:
In this approach, we build the system model using familiar mathematical con-
structs such as sets and sequences. The system operations have been defined
as modifications of the systems state [132]. Unlike algebraic specification, the
state of the system is not hidden and the state changes are straightforward
to define, but again there is no explicit representation of concurrency; this is
the approach most widely used by Z notation [35] and Vienna Development
Method (VDM) [81].
• Process Algebraic approach:
This approach is an explicit model of concurrent processes and representing
behaviour by means of constraints on allowable observable communication
between the processes (e.g. π−Calculus [92, 135] and Calculus of Communi-
cating Systems (CCS) [91]).
• Logic-based approach:
Here, we are describing properties of systems, including low-level specification
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of program behaviour and specification of system timing behaviour. An ex-
ample of this approach is Temporal and Interval Temporal Logics [18, 23, 88].
• Net-based approach:
In this approach, we are giving an implicit concurrent model of the system
in terms of (causal) data flow through a network, including the representing
conditions under which data can flow from one node in the net to another. An
example of this approach is Petri nets, and predicate transition nets [135, 21].
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2.3 Temporal Logic (TL)
Temporal logic has become one of the most important formalisms for specifying, ver-
ifying and reasoning about systems that interact with their environment [45]. The
formal language with its proof theory, decision algorithms and associated methods
of practical application, has found many uses in dealing with programs [65].
Temporal logic is considered to be a very suitable formal method for specifying and
verifying concurrent and reactive systems [41, 89, 128]. By ‘temporal logic’ we mean
“ a family of logics and logical techniques which can be applied to a wide range of
problems, both abstract and concrete ” [134]. Temporal logic formulas can describe
sequences of state changes and properties of behaviours, and, hence, can span a wide
range of problems in various fields with a richer notation [74].
As temporal languages are increasingly employed to cover a variety of uses, as men-
tioned above, there is growing interest to include the use of past operators to the
temporal logic languages [80, 79, 93, 90, 37, 49, 57].
In the next Section, we will give an overview of temporal logic starting from the
models of time.
2.3.1 Time in temporal logic
Time has been studied in disciplines such as physics, philosophy and computer sci-
ence. It has been one of the most paradoxical concepts of philosophy throughout
history [128, 74]. The concept of time has been studied in order to introduce a
satisfactory definition of time since there is no common understanding of time that
has been given till now. The main reason is that each definition has covered some
aspects of time whilst excluding others. The time concept has been studied in vari-
ous disciplines in order to introduce a common language for time.
In many science applications such as physics, mathematics and first order predicate
calculus, which is used to reason about expressions containing the time variable,
time has been represented as another variable. Therefore, there is apparently no
need for a special temporal logic [128, 74].
In philosophy, temporal logic has been an important subject, as some of the ancient
philosophers used some form of temporal logic to analyse the structure of time.
Plato defined it as the ‘moving image of eternity’ while Aristotle described it as
‘the number of motion with respect to earlier and later’ [139]. Philosophers found it
useful to introduce special temporal operators for the analysis of temporal connec-
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tives in languages. The verbs ‘incipit’ (it begins) and ‘desinit’ (it ends) are found
in Aristotle’s Physics books 6 and 8[105]. These new operators were soon seen as
potentially valuable in analysing the structure of time [89].
Classical logic deals with timeless propositions, so logic formulas can character-
ize only static states and properties. Temporal propositions typically contain some
reference to time conditions, so temporal logic formulas can be used to describe
sequences of state changes and properties of behaviours. Therefore, temporal logic
can cover a wide range of problems in different fields and areas with richer notations
[74].
The various temporal logics can be used to reason about qualitative temporal prop-
erties:
• Safety: nothing bad happens to the system.
• Liveness: something good eventually happens to the system.
• Fairness: something good happens fairly.
Depending on the view of time (whether time is linear or branching, or whether
time is discrete or continuous) and the types of temporal semantics (interval se-
mantics, point semantics, linear semantics, branching semantics and partial order
semantics), we can classify temporal logic. In the next Section, we will discuss the
classification of temporal logic systems in details. For an appropriate definition of
any temporal logic, the following are necessary:
• Syntax: the language for describing the time or temporal systems;
• Semantics: the model of time to derive the meaning of a logic formula.
The main question we need to ask is what is the system structure of time that should
be used (model of time) [85]
2.3.2 Temporal Logic System classification:
Most temporal logic systems can be classified along a number of axes. We will list
the most popular axes that can be used to classify temporal logic systems which are:
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• Propositional versus first-order;
• Linear versus branching;
• Points (instances) versus intervals;
• Discrete versus continuous; and
• Past versus future tense.
as are shown in the next Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Time Models [75]
Next, the most common criteria to distinguish between temporal logic systems
is described [41, 75].
Propositional versus First order:
Propositional temporal logic is similar to the classical propositional logic. In propo-
sitional temporal logic, problems are expressed in generic language such as the set
of propositional letters, the classical propositional connectives ¬,∨ and ∧ and a set
of temporal operators [41, 75].
When creating a program from formal specifications it is crucial to use propositional
temporal logics since they have the finite model property. The created model is sim-
ilar to a finite state machine; but, the model accepts infinite strings.
First order temporal logic (FOTL) is similar to predicate logic. Different kinds of
FOTL have been suggested; however the generic language consists of predicate sym-
bols, variables, constants, Boolean connectives, quantifiers and temporal operators
[41, 75].
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A difference can also arise as a result of enabling or disabling restrictions on the
interaction of quantifiers and temporal operators. Lack of restrictions or freedom
in some cases might lead to logics that cannot be decided. For instance, enabling
modal operators within the freedom of quantifiers can cause a serious problem. On
the other hand, one can have a restricted FOTL composed of propositional tempo-
ral logic together with a first order language for defining the atomic propositions by
disabling such quantification over temporal operators [41].
Computational versus Linear Time:
There are two main contrasting views that have tried to explain the structure of
time. One view is that the course of time is linear because time flows in only one
direction and the other view is that time has a branching tree like nature. According
to the theory of linear time, at any instant there is only one possible future moment
[74, 41, 128].
According to the branching theory of time, at each moment of time, time can split
into alternate courses portraying different possible futures, which mean that at any
moment, time has many futures but only one linear past[74].
So, if linear temporal logic has the linear structure of time we call it linear time
logic (LTL); however we call it branching (computational) time logic if it has the
branching time structure[74, 128]. Depending on the two views stated above, we
can classify a system of temporal logic as either a linear time logic or a system of
branching time logic.
The nature of time assumed in the semantics is normally reflected in the tem-
poral modalities of a temporal logic system. When it comes to a linear time logic,
the flow of events can be explained along a single time line in temporal modalities.
On the other hand, in branching time logic systems, modalities enable quantifica-
tion over possible futures. We can get different logics by changing the structure of
the language of the logic in both linear and branching time temporal logic systems
[74, 41].
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL):
Linear-time temporal logic, or LTL for short, is a widely accepted formalism for the
specification and verification of concurrent and reactive systems [82]. It models time
as a sequence of states, extending infinitely into the future. This sequence of states
is sometimes called a computation path, or simply a path. In general, the future is
not determined, so we consider several paths, representing different possible futures,
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any one of which might be the actual path that is realized as shown in Figure 2.2
[66, 128].
Figure 2.2: LTL [47]
-Formula of LTL:
The formula in LTL is defined inductively as follows:
• > and ⊥ are formulas.
• All atomic propositions p ∈ FP are linear temporal logic formulas.
• If F is a formula, then ¬F is a formula.
• If F1, ..., Fn are formulas, where n ≥ 2, then (F1 ∧ ... ∧ Fn) and (F1 ∨ ... ∨ Fn)
are formulas.
• If F and G are formulas, then (F → G) and (F ↔ G) are formulas.
• If F is a formula, then ©F , 3F , and 2F are formulas.
• If F and G are formulas, then F U G and F R G are formulas.
The symbols ©,3,2,U ,R are called temporal operators.
Now we explain their meaning informally. The formulas of LTL are true or false
on computation paths, that is sequences of states s0, s1, .... The formula 2F means
that F is true at all states along the path.
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The formula 3F means that F is true at some state on the path. The formula
©F means that F is true at the next state after the initial one, that is, at s1.The
formulas F U G and F R G will be formally defined below because they are a bit
more complex [41, 66, 128].
Any two formula F and G called equivalent (F ≡ G) if for every path σ we have
σ  F if and only if σ  G. Examples of linear time temporal logic formula:
• Liveness: Every request is followed by a grant.
2(request→ ©Grant)
• Safety: p never happens.
2¬p
• Fairness: p happens infinitely often.
(2© p)→ f
• Another natural example, we may want to express that a professor and a
student cannot be borrowers from the library at the same time:
2¬(borrower student ∧ borrower prof)
• 2 (S → 3T )
The informal meaning of this formula is:
Whenever S holds, in the future T is bound to hold [121].
Computational Temporal Logic (CTL):
Computational Temporal Logic, is a branching time logic, which means that its
structure model of time is tree like and has many branches (paths), any one of
which might be the actual computation path. In this model of time we should spec-
ify the path before any computation as shown in Figure 2.3 [66, 128].
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Figure 2.3: CTL [47]
-Formula of CTL:
The formula in CTL is defined in pairs inductively as follows:
-Firstly Path part:
• A: means all paths (inevitably)
• E : means on some path (possibly)
-Formula of LTL:
The formula in CTL has the tree like (branches), if the branch is computed then in-
side the branch it has the same syntax of LTL formula, and it is defined inductively
as follows:
• > and ⊥ are formulas.
• All atomic propositions p ∈ FP are linear temporal logic formulas.
• If F is a formula, then ¬F is a formula.
• If F1, ..., Fn are formulas, where n ≥ 2, then (F1 ∧ ... ∧ Fn) and (F1 ∨ ... ∨ Fn)
are formulas.
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• If F and G are formulas, then (F → G) and (F ↔ G) are formulas.
• If F is a formula, then ©F , 3F , and 2F are formulas.
• If F and G are formulas, then F U G and F R G are formulas.
The symbols ©,3,2,U ,R are called temporal operators.
Now we explain their meaning informally. The formulas of LTL are true or false
on computation paths, that is sequences of states s0, s1, .... The formula 2F means
that F is true at all states along the path.
The formula 3F means that F is true at some state on the path. The formula ©F
means that F is true at the next state after the initial one, that is, at s1. The
formulas F U G and F R G explained in LTL Section [41, 66, 48, 128].
Another example of branching time temporal logic formula:
Safety: bad thing never happens:
A2(¬bad thing)
Fairness: p happens infinitely often.
E(2© p)→ f
E3(P ∧ ¬ q)
Which means: There exists a state where p holds but q does not hold. A2(p → A3 q)
Which means: Whenever p holds, eventually q holds. A2(E3 q)
Which informally means: That at all the paths q holds after some time.
Time Instants (points) versus Intervals:
The choice between time instants and time intervals has been a centre of focus in
philosophy when using temporal logic. Temporal logics normally represent time ei-
ther as point based or intervals. Until the last decade, logic scholars were greatly
interested in point based temporal logics. Prior and Pnueli considered time as a
discrete sequence of points in their model of temporal logic and used it in system
specification and verification [74]. Modelling the refinement of a system specification
is a widely recognized problem when using a point-based temporal logic [44].
However, the interval based approach is more efficient than the point based ap-
proach since it can provide efficient representation of temporal facts. For example,
the interval notion is necessary to show continuous processes and to make temporal
statements in AI applications; because of this, temporal statements are based on
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intervals [74]. In a point based temporal logic model, the formula evaluated as true
or false of points in time is as shown in Figure 2.4.
• • • • · · · •
σ0 σ1 σ2 σ3 σn
Figure 2.4: Points based
However, in interval based temporal logic the formula is evaluated over intervals
of time as shown in Figure 2.5.
| < —f1— > | < —f2— > | < —f3— > |
σ0 σj σk σl
• · · · • · · · • · · · •
Figure 2.5: Interval based
The claim is that use of intervals greatly simplifies the formulation of certain
correctness properties [41].
There are many scientists who proposed use of the interval in many areas; however
when it comes to philosophical logic, Simons and Galton suggested the need for inter-
vals with regard to conceptual structures in natural language [54, 130]. Formal tools
for reasoning in artificial intelligence have sprung up from Interval based temporal
logics. Major contributions in this area were carried out by Allen [2, 3, 4, 5]. Allen
proposed thirteen relations between intervals, called Allen’s relations. He provided
an axiomatisation and representation result of interval structures, and interval-based
theory of actions and events.
Interval based logics have been used in other areas of computer science. One of the
first applications of interval temporal logic (ITL) in computer science for design of
hardware components was developed by Moszkowski [95]. Interval Temporal Logic
is a linear temporal logic over (in)finite time. ITL has been applied in different
problems, from specification and verification of hardware devices [60, 96, 97] and
temporal logic programming [98, 37] to the specification of multimedia documents
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[19] and human computer interaction [17]. Interest in ITL also comes from its natu-
ral notation and expressiveness. Operators such as chop, projection and star support
sequential composition, multiple time granularities and repetitive behaviour in sys-
tem specifications. Additionally, high-level, imperative-like operators such as loops,
conditionals and assignments can easily be defined, and so ITL naturally lends itself
to execution [57]. ITL’s features make this logic an attractive alternative to the
problems faced by conventional point-based temporal logics. It is accepted that the
specification of properties in such point-based temporal logics could be difficult for
non-temporal logic experts. Thus, successful verification of a misformulated prop-
erty may give unjustified confidence in a system design. According to Pnueli and
Vardi [112, 136], specification languages need the full power of regular expressions
which is the term used to describe a codified method of searching, defined by Stephen
Kleene in 1956 [73]. It is known that chop and chopstar bring this expressive power
to ITL [57]. Furthermore, there is an increasing industrial interest in ITL; for ex-
ample, Verisity have adopted ITL concepts in their temporal language [64] and a
temporal logic called Sugar has been introduced by IBM containing ITL (like) oper-
ators and these works targets are making the logic more usable for industrial design
engineers [11].
The nature of interval temporal logic can be viewed from two distinct perspectives,
according to philosophy. Intervals can be viewed as points, which are the only prim-
itive objects, or they are primitive objects in the logic. The majority of interval
based logics construct intervals out of points, for example [2].
The following is an example of instant (points) time temporal logic formula:
(σ, 6)  3(p)
This formula can be defined informally as:
there exists a point where p holds.
The following is an illustration of interval time temporal logic formula:
A ; B
The above formula can be defined as:
The interval decomposed (chopped) into a prefix interval and suffix interval, such
that A holds over the prefix interval and B over the suffix interval, or A holds for
that interval if it is infinite.
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The issue below is linked to the underlying structure of time.
Discrete or Continuous (Dense):
A more fundamental choice is that between Discrete or Continuous of a flow of time.
It implies that it would be composed of a sequence of instances where each non-final
point is followed by another immediate point. We can therefore say that a property
is correct in the following moment and also correct all time or at some future time.
This can be formulated in first-order logic:
∀ x, y(x < y → ∃ z(x < z ∧ z ≤ y ∧ ∀ w(x < w ∧ w ≤ y → z ≤ w)))
Temporal logics mostly used for program reasoning consider time as discrete where
the present instant matches to the program’s present state and by the finite model
property. Hence the temporal structure which matches with a series of states of a
program execution is the non negative integers as it is shown in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Discrete time [47]
Here, each of the black circles represents a classical propositional state, and the
arrows represent the accessibility relation, in our case the ‘step’ to the next moment
in time. Note that we also have one state identified as the ‘start of time’.
Dense refers to a linear ordering in which we can find another different point between
any two distinct points. This can be mathematically represented as:
∀ x, y(x < y → ∃ z(x < z < y))
The idea of the flow of time can be modelled using rational or real numbers, which
can represent the flow of dense time [137, 74, 41] as is shown in Figure 2.7.
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σ0 σn
Figure 2.7: Continuous time
Philosophers have been studying tense logics interpreted over a dense time struc-
ture. Cau [22] proposed the application of dense time temporal logics to reasoning
about concurrent programs. Dense time temporal logics can also be used in real
time programs where strict, quantitative performance requirements are placed on
programs [41].
Past versus Future:
In this Section, we are trying to answer the old question of whether temporal logic
with the past is more succinct than pure-future temporal logic. Logicians have used
temporal modal operators to explain the happening of events both in the past and
future. Also specifications which could be expressed in natural language sometimes
use references to events that happened in the past. In addition the temporal logics
studied by linguists and philosophers are where past and future time have been used
on an equal footing [116]. In temporal logic systems, for reasoning about concur-
rency, past time operators do not enhance the expressive power because program
implementations have a specific starting time and for this reason, these logic systems
usually do not have past time operators [80].
Generally, it can be said that the use of past time operators do not add any expres-
sive power to linear time temporal logic [53]. Also, any past time formulas can be
translated into equivalent pure future ones [52]. So, there is no need to use the past
operators depending on this theorem [79].
Temporal languages are increasingly employed to cover the variety of uses and there
is a growing interest in using past time operators for temporal logic languages
[80, 79, 93, 90, 37, 49, 57, 84].
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Figure 2.8: Past VS Future [47]
At the moment, past time operators play an important role in compositional spec-
ification similar to that of history variables [41]. Finally, the usefulness of past-time
constructs is most apparent in the classification of temporal properties [145, 87, 26].
We adopt the view that past time operators make the specification and verification
of systems much shorter and contain less symbols, hence it is easier to express. Re-
garding succinctness and simplicity, past time operators do add expressive power
to temporal logic, but from a practical point of view not from a theoretical point
of view, as has been shown in many articles such as [79, 93, 90]. All the proposed
works in past time ITL are combining the use of past time operators with the future
time one [37, 19]. However, in this thesis, our work aims to introduce the past time
operators of ITL and use it to reason about history based access control policies
separately.
The following are examples of past time formula:
©̂ (p)
This formula can be defined informally as:
p holds in the previous state.
2̂(grant→ ©̂ request)
The informal meaning for this formula is (every given grant is previously requested).
The following is an example of future time formula:
© (p)
The formula can be defined informally as:
p holds in the next state.
2(request→ © grant)
The informal meaning for this formula is (every request will be granted in the next
state).
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2.3.3 Temporal Logic Application
Generally, temporal logic is applicable in various areas and sciences such as Phi-
losophy, Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence(AI) and natural language [58]. In
philosophy, temporal logic is used as a formalism to clarify philosophical issues about
time; however, in computer Science it is used as a tool for handling the temporal
aspects of the execution of computer programs and in artificial intelligence (AI) as
a language for encoding temporal knowledge and finally, as a framework to define
the semantics of temporal expressions in natural language.
Computer Science Application:
Temporal logic has been used in many areas within Computer Science, including the
specification and verification of reactive systems. Manna and Pnueli [89] recognized
that temporal logic is well-suited for their formal specification and verification of
reactive systems. The range of reactive systems is wide. It comprises embedded sys-
tems, process control systems, and all types of interactive, concurrent or distributed
hardware and software systems.
Generally, temporal logic is applied in computer science in the following areas:
1. Formal specification:
Temporal logic formulas are used to make accurate, formal and mandatory
specification of systems and components [114, 113, 111, 77, 128, 89].
2. Formal verification:
The rules of a temporal logic proof calculus are used to verify the validity of a
temporal logic specification with regard to more abstract system specifications
[113, 128, 89].
3. Requirements description:
In the initial stages of creating a system design, a set of temporal logic formulas
are normally used to express the consequences of the requisites restricting the
functional system behaviour [111].
4. Specification checks:
In case different methods other than temporal logic are used to create the
specifications, temporal logic may also be used to specify the requisites and
plausibility states. At the moment there are several procedures that can work
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with the tool-based checking of formal system specifications concerned with
temporal logic conditions [111].
Also there are uses of temporal logic for the synthesis of programs from temporal
specifications [115, 76], knowledge representation and reasoning [42, 141, 7], and
temporal databases [28, 27, 36].
2.4 Access control policies
In this Section, we will introduce history based access definition, elements, types
and categories. Also, a comparison between set of policy languages is proposed to
express history based access control policy in order to support our choice of policy
language and the computation model used.
2.4.1 Introduction
History-based policies [1] are a special class of policies where the policy decisions
depend on previously observed behaviours within the system. This has some ad-
vantages however it also has some drawbacks, in the next Section we will discuss
this special class of policies and discuss the languages which are suitable to express
these policies.
2.4.2 Access control
Access control is one of the earliest approaches used to implement security policies,
which is still largely practised at present. To give a general description of access
control, it is a process of arbitrating requests to the desired resources and data
maintained by a system and evaluating whether the access should be granted or
denied [123].
In spite of the fact that access control guarantees that every single attempt to
get access to a system or its resources should be controlled, with a set of predefined
policies [123], access control is one of the major security mechanisms used to achieve
confidentiality (information is not disclosed to non permitted persons, processes or
devices [63]), integrity(unauthorized persons, processes or devices cannot modify
information [63]) and privacy(data is protected so that it is used only by authorized
people or for business purposes, based on legal requirements, corporate policies and
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end-user choices [63]) in software systems [43]. An access control system design is
considered by three stage components which are: access control policies, models,
and mechanisms [123].
Access Control Policies
Access control policies are security requirements, that describe how access is man-
aged, and who can access which information, and what shall be the conditions for
the access of this information. These policies are implemented via a mechanism that
arbitrates access requests with the system and makes grant/deny decisions [43]. Ac-
cess control policies are derived from, and must comply with, security requirements
[63].
Access Control Mechanism
Access control mechanisms provides the details of the low level functions for im-
plementation of access control policies.. The access control mechanism must also
work as a reference monitor [123], and a trusted component intercepting every single
request received by the system [63].
Access Control Model
Access control models are a formal representation of an access control system. They
provide the mechanism of how to reason about the supported policies, and provide
the proof of the security policies of the access control system. Access control models
provide a level of abstraction between policies and mechanisms, enabling the design
of implementation mechanisms to enforce multiple policies in various computing
environments [123].
Several proposed models exist to represent access control. For example, one of the
main models is the stack inspection run using Java and C#. This model represents
the policy to grant static access rights to the code, while the actual run-time rights
depend upon the static rights of the code frames in the stack. One of the other
main access control models is history-based access control. In this access control
method proposed by Abadi and Fournett, consideration is taken into account of the
entire process execution, and the actual rights of the running code depend upon the
static rights of all parts of the code executed in time. The mechanisms that are used
in order to enforce history-based policies are execution (reference) monitors which
observe computations and abort them if policy is at risk of violation [1].
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2.4.3 Access Control Policies elements
An access control policy is comprised of a set of access control rules. A rule can
have various modes for example allow, deny and oblige. The work in this dissertation
focuses on rules related to allow and deny mode. An allow rule authorizes to perform
an action on an object, deny rules are used to restrict a subject to perform an action
on an object. When a request is generated by a subject, enforcement authority uses
these to assess and make decisions. A typical access rule is expressed as a 3-tuple
(subject, object, action), such as a subject can perform an action on an object [34].
An access control policy may require satisfying some supplementary requirements
before access is granted to a request. For example, in case of health care, the
location of the originated request might affect the grant or deny decision [34]. If a
particular request can only be allowed access if it is made from an emergency room,
hence location (emergency room) can be specified as a condition for the access
control rule. In requirements specification, we are concerned with the actions for
which each actor (subject) is responsible, the conditions under which each action
can occur (constraints and preconditions). Each of these access control elements
can be mapped to a requirements specification element. This mapping suggests it
is possible to derive access control policies from requirements to ensure that access
control policies comply with the requirements.
2.4.4 Access Control Policies types
Access control policies are typically categorized into two main approach types which
are dynamic and static. The dynamic approach type is where access control to
protected resources is supervised by an execution (reference) monitor. An execution
(reference) monitor is defined as a software component that is used to supervise the
execution of programs, and thereby decide whether or not authorisation to use a
resource is granted or not according to the security policy in place. In contrast in
the static approach type, we attempt to determine at a compile time if a program
obeys the security policy [9].
Stack Inspection Access Control
Stack inspection is an access control mechanism which grants authorisations based
on the contents of the runtime call stack. The Current implementations of stack
inspection uses a lazy evaluation approach; this limits the stack inspection to the
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point when stack inspection tests are performed. This is done by retrieving and
inspecting call stack data. This conventional strategy appears to be quite efficient,
because the security state needs not be updated upon method invocations. However,
this strategy has a few drawbacks such as during the runtime inspection the run-
time overheads may grow to a large extent; secondly, inter procedural program
transformation may be prevented because these optimizations may change the call
stack structure [9].
History-based Access Control Policy
History-based policies [1], are an expressive class of policies that can define policy
decisions dependent on previously observed behaviours within the system. Abadi
and Fournet advocates history based access control as a suitable alternative to stack
inspection. History based access control is considered as more expressive than con-
ventional methods such as stack inspection [69]. The motivation behind this is that
history-based access control overcomes some of the known weaknesses of stack in-
spection such as imprecise records of the execution history, unclear security goals
attained, and invalidation of interprocedural optimizations. Another motivation
which makes history based access more attractive is based on some efficient tech-
niques, which illustrate some choices that can be made while re-implementing the
access control mechanism of Java and the Common Language Runtime (CLR) [20]
to deal with execution histories, rather than with call stacks. Discussion on two
high-level programming constructs, that permit changing the set of current access
rights, is also provided. First of these language constructs is called grant, which
amplifies the rights of the callee, by yielding the static access rights of the caller;
this method is similar to Java’s privileged method calls. The second language con-
struct is accept, in which a caller entrusts its callee, by restoring, when the callee
returns its set of rights before the call is made. Also, worth mentioning is that this
construct can be used for recovering of the stack inspection, while providing history
based access control [9].
2.4.5 Access Control policies categories
To ensure security and what should and what should not be allowed, various access
control policies can be applied. There are different definitions of what security means
and so many different criteria can be applied. Access control policies are grouped
by three different criteria:
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Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
Discretionary Access Control (DAC)(authorisation-based) provides access depend-
ing upon the identity of the initiator of the request, and on access rules which state
which requestors are allowed or not [123]. These are Discretionary privileges as users
have the facility of passing their privileges to other users; the granting and removal
of the privileges is regulated by an administrative policy. Early discretionary ac-
cess control models, such as the access control matrix model [78, 59] and the HRU
model [62], provide a basic framework for describing DAC policies. The HRU model
has been formalised by Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullmann for analysing the complexity
of access control policies and they identify six primitive operations that describe
changes to the state of a system [123].
A more specific assessment of the access control problem indicates the benefits of
separating users from non-users. Users are inert entities for whom authorisations
are specified with specifics of who can and cannot connect to the system. Once con-
nected to the system, users originate processes (subjects) that execute on their behalf
and, accordingly, submit requests to the system. This is different for discretionary
policies which do not provide this distinction and treat each process (submitted on
behalf of a user) based on the user’s authorisation rights. This is a drawback of the
discretionary policies as they are vulnerable to malicious programs, which can run
processes based on authorisation rights of other users, such as Trojan Horses can
bypass these authorisations as they are embedded in programs.
Trojan horse is a malicious program with apparent useful functionality but actually
has harmful functions embedded inside, which use the authorisations of the invoking
processes. Trojans could even delete all files of the users (this destructive behaviour
is not uncommon in the case of viruses) [123].
Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
Mandatory security policies enforce access control on the basis of regulations man-
dated by a central authority [123]. The most common form of mandatory policy
is the multilevel security policy, based on the classifications of subjects and objects
in the system. Objects are passive entities storing information. Subjects are active
entities that request access to the objects. Note that there is a distinction between
subjects of the mandatory policy and the authorisation subjects considered in the
discretionary policies. While authorisation subjects typically correspond to users (or
groups thereof), mandatory policies make a distinction between users and subjects.
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Users are human beings who can access the system, while subjects are processes
(i.e., programs in execution) operating on behalf of users. This distinction allows the
policy to control the indirect accesses (leakages or modifications) caused by the exe-
cution of processes [123]. An example of MAC policy is the lattice-based multilevel
security policy [33], policies represented by the Bell-LaPadula model [12, 13, 122]
and the Biba model [15, 122] are MAC policies. MAC policies protect indirect in-
formation leakages (e.g., Trojan Horse attacks), but are still vulnerable to covert
channel attacks [123, 110]. Covert channels are channels that are not intended for
normal communication, but can still be exploited to infer information [123, 129].
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
The RBAC model is an alternative to traditional DAC and MAC models and has
received increased attention in commercial applications, such as the Oracle 9i DBMS
[119]. The concept of role-based access control (RBAC) began with multi-user and
multi-application on-line systems pioneered in the 1970s. The central notion of
RBAC is that permissions are associated with roles, and users are assigned to ap-
propriate roles. This greatly simplifies management of permissions [43, 125]. Roles
are created for the various job functions in an organisation and users are assigned
roles based on their responsibilities and qualifications. Users can be easily reassigned
from one role to another. Roles can be granted new permissions as new applications
and systems are incorporated, and permissions can be revoked from roles as needed.
A role is properly viewed as a semantic construct around which access control policy
is formulated. The particular collection of users and permissions brought together
by a role is transitory. The role is more stable because an organisation’s activities
or functions usually change less frequently [125, 123].
2.4.6 History based access control policy languages
In the next Section, we will now discuss the proposed policy language to be used for
history based access control. As the name suggests, the history-based language will
deal with the history of the execution and will not only depend upon the current
state of the system. A rule-based approach will specify the access control rights in
relation to the policy rights.
According to Becker et al. [10] a policy language is expected to be:
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• Expressive::
A policy language can be judged on its ability to express informal requirements.
A good policy language will be easy to use and provides simple statements to
express specific requirements.
• Clear and Readable:
The language syntax should be humanly readable, and must be as simple as
possible making it easier to learn. Becker et al. [10] in his work reasons that
most of the logic based languages are too difficult to read and thus make it
difficult to learn; he mentioned about XML-based languages, that they are too
verbose making them programmer-unfriendly.
• Intuitive and Unambiguous Semantics:
The statements written in the policy language must have a concise meaning.
Any good policy language shall allow the user to write statements in a clear
way and with a concise meaning. Languages without formal foundation nor-
mally struggle to provide clear meaning of their statements as, for example,
natural language descriptions are mostly ambiguous making them unsuitable
for writing specifications and requirements.
• Effective Decision Procedure:
A policy language must evaluate the query efficiently and provide accurate
decisions.
• Extensibility:
Any policy language must provide ease of extensions to its existing syntax to
cater for any additional language. Also, it is important that the extension
procedures must be simple and not too difficult as to discourage extensibility.
The main technical features of what a policy language is expected to be is listed
above. Now we introduce and test the ability of policy languages to express history-
based access control policies in order to support our choice of SANTA policy lan-
guage with the proposed model to reason about history-based access control policies.
Flexible authorization manager authorization language (FAM)
According to Jajodia et al. [67], most policy languages specify two specific types of
policies:
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• Open Policies: The access is allowed to anyone unless denied. An example of
this type is blacklist.
• Closed Policies: The access is denied to anyone unless explicitly allowed. An
example of this type is the E-mail.
The positive and negative authorisations rule has been proposed as well as the de-
cision rules by Jajodia et al. [67]. These decision rules are normally used to resolve
the conflicts between authorisations. Also, they introduce the rule-based Flexible
Authorization Manager (FAM) authorization language, where positive and negative
authorisations for a subject (or group) to perform an action on a specific object can
be expressed. Next, we will give an example of positive and negative authorization
rules with the informal meaning:
cando(mail, faculty,+read)
This authorisation states that faculty is a subject authorised to execute read which
is an action on the object mail.
cando(personal, faculty,−read)
This authorisation states that faculty is a subject not authorised to execute the
action read on the object personal. An authorisation is a triple of the form:
(o, s, 〈sign〉 a) where o ∈ AO, s ∈ AS, a ∈ A and “sign” is “+” or “-”.
What is more, FAM also allows expressing authorisations based on a previous ac-
cess using so-called done rules (history access). These are essentially facts that are
created by the system (FAM) during runtime and reflect the access executed by a
user. However, the final decision of granting access or denying it is resolved by a
decision rule introduced before. To explain this, assume the following rule:
do(file, s,+a)← dercando(file, s,+a)&¬dercando(file, s,−a)
This specifies that if it can be derived that s is allowed to perform action a on
file, and it cannot be derived that s is denied to perform action a on file, then
s is effectively allowed to perform a on file. In FAM, despite there being no no-
tion of time or temporal dependency between the done events, the history-based
access control requirements is nevertheless supported and can be expressed. In the
architecture of authorisation framework there is a component called history table,
and in this table each row shows a single executed access. A row is structured as
(Object, User, Role, Action, T ime).
The history is represented formally by the predicate done with a matching list of
parameters. However, it is not clear how the history table is actually updated. The
temporal relations are difficult to express at a higher level of abstraction because the
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time is represented explicitly. So, it can be concluded that Flexible authorization
manager authorization language is not suitable to reason about history based access
control policies.
Temporal role-based access control
Role-based Access Control (RBAC) defines a role as a set of privileges associated
with a specific position within an organisation. Authorizations are assigned to roles
which are then assigned to users. This user is allowed to execute all accesses for
which the role is authorized. The policy management when using this mechanism is
much easier regarding the separation of assigning the roles to users and the authorisa-
tions to roles, so these assignments can be manipulated independently. The model
which addresses temporal constraints for an Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
is then proposed [14] and known as Temporal Role-Based Access Control (TR-
BAC). In these constraints ,the users can be restricted to execute roles at certain
time periods represented by using a countable set of contiguous intervals called cal-
endars; these calendars are numbered by integers called indexes of the intervals.
Hours,Days,Weeks,Months, and Y ears, are examples of calenders. Moreover,
we can combine these calenders to represent more general periodic expressions, for
example, the set of Sundays or the set of The second hour of the ninth day of each
month.
The Role Enabling Base (REB) is a Role that contains temporal constraints on the
enabling time. This Role is enabled or disabled at run-time by means of Run-time
Request Expressions of the form p : E (prioritized event expression) after duration
expression ∆t only. A system trace is modelled as a sequence of snapshots which
correspond to the current set of events and the status of roles. Some Role Enabling
Base (REB) specifications may be ambiguous and they may lead to states where
there is no unique way of deciding which roles are enabled because of the expressive
power provided by TRBAC. Therefore, to ensure that the specifications are unam-
biguous and consistent, a notion of safeness is introduced as well as a polynomial
algorithm to test the safety of REB specifications [14].
The differences between the proposed SANTA and TRBAC is clear. Firstly, TR-
BAC is mainly concerned with the assignment of roles; however, SANTA is con-
cerned with the assignment of authorisations. Secondly, TRBAC uses explicit time
to model temporal dependencies and incorporates temporal constraints on the role
enabling only.
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It can be concluded that TRBAC is not suitable to express history based access
control policies due to the following reasons:
Firstly, TRBAC is mainly concerned with the assignment of roles and not concerned
with the assignment of authorisations. Secondly, TRBAC uses explicit time to model
temporal dependencies and incorporates temporal constraints on the role enabling
only.
Usage control model
We are going to give an overview of the Usage Control Model (UCON):
The Usage Control (UCON) Model [107, 144] is a session-based model where, be-
tween the start of the session and its termination, the user is allowed to perform a
usage request which consists of a number of actions. This model supports autho-
risation (concerned with the authorisation of a subject to exercise a specific right),
obligation (concerned with actions the user must perform) and conditions (deter-
mine the access of a subject depending on the environment of the usage process).
The novelty of the approach is that it addresses mutable attributes [108] and the
continuity of the enforcement. Mutable attributes are associated with the subjects,
objects or the system and are updated as side-effects of usage processes. They can
be used for example to count the number of times a resource has been accessed.
The continuity of enforcement means that a UCON process can be revoked based
on conditions that are expressed in terms of attributes. The UCON model has been
first formalised using an extension of the temporal logic of actions (TLA) [77] by
Zhang et al. [143, 142]. Here a single usage process is described in the form of a
state diagram. System and user actions represent the transitions in the diagram.
UCON policies are then defined as logical formula that postulate temporal relation-
ships between system and user actions of a single usage process. The formalization,
however, makes a strong assumption in that only a single usage process is specified.
It is assumed that the time-line is finite, i.e., it starts with the beginning of the
single usage request and ends with the subsequent usage request. This makes it
difficult to reason about the interactions of several concurrent usage requests, or
even sequences of usage requests, thus complicating the formal analysis of policies.
The (side)effects of a usage process are captured in mutable attributes which are
assumed to be persistent over usage processes and can influence subsequent usage
control decisions.
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A UCON usage process is characterized by the triplet (s, o, r), where s is the subject
that exercises its right r on the object o. The usage process can be in one of the
following states: initial, requesting, denied, accessing, revoked or end. The current
state is described by Zhang et al. as a function state mapping from the triplet
(s, o, r) to one of these states. A single usage process is defined by the state diagram
in Fig. 2.9.
Figure 2.9: Usage control from [142]
53 Sami Alsarhani
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In the initial state the subject s performs the action tryaccess(s, o, r) initiating
the usage process. The enforcement mechanism, for example a reference monitor
(RM), either denies the access (denyaccess(s, o, r)) or proceeds by executing ac-
tions to update those attributes, which must be updated before the usage process
commences. After the RM has updated the relevant attributes (preupdate(s, o, r)),
it permits the access (permitaccess(s, o, r)) and continues to perform all required up-
date actions that must be performed during the ongoing usage process (onupdate(s, o, r)).
Alternatively the RM may revoke the access if any of the constraints of the UCON
model are violated. The subject may end the usage process using the endaccess(s, o, r)
action. In both cases, the post update actions (postupdate(s, o, r)) are performed
to change any mutable attributes that require modification. UCON policies define
the enforcement of protection requirements at a relatively low level of abstraction.
Janicke et al. [70] have presented an alternative formalisation of the UCON model
[107]. They have used Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) for the formalisation which
they said it is a more natural logic to express this model than the extended Tempo-
ral Logic of Actions (TLA) [142].
In UCON, the time line is assumed to be finite, for instance, it starts with the
beginning of the single usage request and ends with the subsequent usage request.
So, the interactions of several concurrent usage requests or even sequences of usage
requests are difficult to reason about, which makes the formal analysis of policies
very complicated. Also, the (side)effects of a usage process are captured in mutable
attributes which are assumed to be persistent over usage processes, and can influence
subsequent usage control decisions.
Finally, the UCON policies define the enforcement of protection requirements at a
relatively low level of abstraction. Because of the above, it can be concluded that
UCON is not suitable to express history based access control policies.
SANTA
Security Analysis Toolkit for Agents (SANTA) is a technology to address the arising
complexity and its implication on the security of the system [126]. A security policy
conveys the safety requirements of the system in an exact and clear way. SANTA
provides policies, which are linked to obligations, access control and integrity of a
system, and relate the entities with framing of constrains on their interaction. Access
control requirements in this model are authorisation requirements, viz. constraints
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on the actions that a subject can perform on objects, or delegation requirements,
namely which subject can delegate which right to another subject. Obligation re-
quirements express that subjects must perform specific actions. Integrity require-
ments define constraints on the effect that the execution of an action has on subjects
and objects. The aim of policies is to express these requirements at a high level of
abstraction, hiding the details of the implementation that is necessary for their en-
forcement. In SANTA, policy rules are used as the basis for policy specifications.
Rule-based languages are well established and well suited because most of these
requirements are already informally expressed in the form of conditions and conse-
quences. Each rule is expressed in terms of subjects, objects and actions. Subjects
are the actors in the system. They can request access to objects that represent the
available resources. The term action is used to denote the mode of access [68, 129].
Policy specification expresses the casual protection requirements for the policy lan-
guage. One of the major tasks of SANTA policy specification is the development
of policy rules that precisely elicit the informal requirements. When dealing with
complex requirements the accurate capturing of requirements is not a trivial task.
For example it is not simple to specify the state of the system or dependencies on
the history of the execution. The SANTA policy language provides support for both
state and history based dependencies [68].
The advantage of policies specified using SANTA over the majority of other policy
languages is that policies can be specified in smaller units, and also these policies
are defined using a rich set of SANTA operators. The provided operators allow the
policies to be composed along a temporal and structural axis.
Temporal Composition
Siewe [68, 129] first introduced the temporal composition of policies. Temporal com-
position leads to policies that change dynamically over time or on the occurrence
of events and it allows independent specifications of policies for a particular situa-
tion. The composition operators are then used to define the conditions of the policy
change [68, 129].
Structural Composition
Large-scale systems spanning a large number of organizations, are controlled by the
use of policies.. In this case, the composition along the structural axis can effec-
tively elicit the requirements for each unit of the organisation for, e.g., organisation,
department, project-group, etc as an individual policy. The policies for the smaller
units are then used to compose the overall policy of the larger system. However,
there are issues with this compositional approach as conflicts can easily arise in poli-
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cies due to either common resource sharing or a particular individual placed under
more than one policy. In addition, the resolution of these conflicts is difficult because
of the dynamics of the system. A specific policy can only be applied to a subset
of subject, objects and actions and this forms the basis of structural composition.
These sets are referred to as the scope of the policy [68].
Policies in SANTA
Policies in SANTA are an integral part of the system specification. A policy rule
is the smallest part of the policy specification, where each rule captures a discrete
requirement, such as, “allow member to register”.
The Authorisation rules demonstrate the access control requirements. Three differ-
ent rules are related with authorization such as positive and negative authorization
and finally the decision rule.
Authorisation Rules We use a rule-based approach and specify sets of access con-
trol rights in terms of policy Authorisation rules and their compositions. A simple
access control policy consists of three types of Authorisation rules:
1. Positive authorisation rules are statements that indicate under which condition
an access request should be granted. It is important to note that it is only
an indication, which is taken into account for the final access decision of the
policy.
2. Negative authorisation rules are statements that indicate under which condi-
tion an access request should be denied. Similar to positive authorisations,
they are only an indication, which are taken into account for the final access
decision of the policy.
3. Decision Rules and Conflict Resolution specify the final access control decision
of a policy. Any policy should contain at least one decision rule, as otherwise no
access will be granted by the policy. The alternative term “conflict resolution
rule” originates from the fact that this rule de-conflicts the policy if a positive
and negative authorisation is derived for a specific access. The term decision
rule describes more accurately the fact that any access control decision defined
by the policy is decided by one or more of these rules, not only decisions in
the conflicting case [68, 69].
These simple access control rules are combined to form larger units called simple
policies; where simple policies are implemented concurrently. The simple policies
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are used to define for example the protection requirement applied during a certain
phase or situation of the system execution. In the following, we provide the syntax
of SANTA policy language.
Subjects
su ::= Si | cs
Objects
ob ::= Oi | co
Actions
ac ::= Ai | ca(e1, ..., en)
Premise of rule
pr ::= pr1 chop pr2 | pr1 and pr2 | pr1or pr2 |
always pr | sometime pr | not pr | next pr |
if be then pr1 else pr2 | exists x in se : pr |
forall x in se : pr | last(e) : pr | e : pr | be
Rules
ru ::= [rn ::] allow(su, ob, ac)when pr |
[rn ::] deny(su, ob, ac)when pr |
[rn ::] decide(su, ob, ac)when pr
Policies
po ::= (ru1...run)|po2 policy pn :: po end|
po2 chop po1|if be then po1 else po2|
aslongas be : po
Figure 2.10: Syntax of SANTA [69]
Figure 2.10 summarizes the syntax of our policy language where e is an expres-
sion, be a Boolean expression, and se a Set expression with their usual operators
and semantics. Si is a subject variable, where i is a arbitrary name, similarly Oi is
an object variable, Ai is an action variable and pn is a name for a policy; rn is a
name for a rule (optional). Let Subjects, Objects and Actions be, respectively, the
universal set of subjects, objects and actions. These can be used as part of SANTA
expressions. Let cs ∈ Subjects be a subject, co ∈ Object be an object and ca(v) ∈
Actions be an action with interface v.
It can be concluded that SANTA has the advantage over the majority of other pol-
icy Languages; that is the policies can be specified in smaller units, and also these
policies are defined using a rich set of SANTA operators. So SANTA policy lan-
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guage is appropriate to express history based access control policies. We will show
in Chapter 5, that we will give new semantics to SANTA operators using past time
operators of ITL. These operators with the new semantics will be used to reason
about history based access control policies in the Scenario Chapter.
In the next Section, we will describe the computational model used with SANTA
policy language, its components and how these components interact together; this
model has been introduced by Cau et al. [24].
Computational model
In a policy based management approach [8, 131], the specification and enforcement
of these constraints are loosely coupled from the system.
In Figure 2.11, we proposed the computational model used with SANTA policy
language, in this model, the behaviour of the Policy Decision Point (PDP) is de-
termined by the policy, so the specification and verification of policy is crucial for
the administration of the system. Policy-based management can be implemented by
many real-world implementations that use the Policy Decision Point (PDP)/Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP) architecture. The computational model used (which de-
scribes the system entities, their behaviour and interactions) represents a suitable
abstraction for these real world implementations. The external observation of sys-
tem behaviour is sufficient for specification, verification and analysis purposes of
dynamic security policies. Therefore, the implementation details of the domain-
dependent interactions between users and system is not used.
In our system, we have three different entities: subjects, objects and reference mon-
itors. The subject can be defined as any entity that performs actions on objects and
it could be a human user, a group or role or a program acting on behalf of a user.
The object is any passive entity that represents a shared data structure in the in-
formation system. The main function of reference monitors is to control the subject
access to objects and whether the subject can perform an action on an object or
not. The security policy specifies the concrete conditions under which a reference
monitor permits or denies an execution request. The security policy represents an
abstract specification of constraints that govern the relation between the subjects
and objects in the system. However, the reference monitor behaviour is refines the
abstract specification constructively in such a way that the overall system satisfies
the policy. If the reference monitor implementation is correct, the properties of the
policy are preserved by the system.
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In Figure 2.11, in the reference monitor part a description of the reference moni-
tor behaviour and other system components and how they interact with each other
is given as a Statechart [61]. Statecharts constitute an extensive generalization
of state-transition diagrams. They allow for multilevel states decomposed in an
And/Or fashion, and thus support economical specification of concurrency and en-
capsulation. Concurrency is represented by a dashed line that separates components
of a parallel system. The labels on the transitions in Statecharts are of the form
Trigger[Condition]/Action, where Trigger determines if and when a transition will
be taken and Action is performed when a transition is taken and the Condition is
true. An action includes the generation of events [24, 69].
Figure 2.11: Computational model [24]
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User model
The process (represented by subject s) in the user model acts on behalf of a user




The initial state of user process s is assumed to be in its idle state. When the event
Req(s, o, a) is raised, this mean that the process s requests the execution of action a
on the system object o and transitions to the state wait(s, o, a). The waiting state
remains until it is either denied and the event Deny(s, o, a) is raised or the request
is executed and the event Exec(s, o, a) is raised before transitioning to the state
access(s, o, a) (see user process in Figure 2.11) [24, 69].
Reference monitor model
The behaviour of the reference monitor is represented as:
Initially, the reference monitor (RM) process is in its idle state. During a user
request Req(s, o, a), the RM move to the state process(s, o, a) and the policy spec-
ifies its behaviour. The event Permit(s, o, a) is raised if the policy grants access
(Aut(s, o, a)istrue), however the event Deny(s, o, a) is raised if it denies the access
(Aut(s, o, a)isfalse) and then the RM returns to its idle state consequently ( see
Figure 2.11) [24].
System model
The access to the objects is facilitated by the system process, depicted in Figure 2.11.
We assume that the system is initially in the state idle(s, o, a). In the event that
the controller permits the execution, it will transition to the state execute(s, o, a)
and raise the event Exec(s, o, a) that synchronizes the state access(s,o,a) of the user
process and the state execute(s, o, a) of the system. The concrete behaviour of the
user process and the system in these states are not explicitly defined; however, we
will assume for the analysis of information flow that every pairing of these states
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can be characterized into the categories read, write and read + write. The com-
putational model represents a simplification of real information systems, where not
only subjects can concurrently make requests, but also the reference monitors and
the system facilitating access to the shared objects are distributed and can exhibit
concurrent behaviour [24, 69]
Policy rules
History based access control models express a policy in terms of authorization and
denial and decision rules. This use of rules makes the specification clearer and easier
to understand. A rule typically expresses a single security requirement and forms
the basic building block of a policy.
Rules consist of a premise and a consequence. The premise describes a set of system
behaviour, which lead to the consequence that represents an assertion on the current
system state, such as allowing or denying a particular access. The consequence of
a rule defines the decision taken by the reference monitor. The set of system be-
haviour in the premise is matched against the history of the system execution. Rules
therefore can refer to sequences of previously observed states in the system execu-
tion, allowing for the expression of history-based policies and dynamic separation of
duty constraints. The key idea is to associate a transaction control expression with
each information object. This expression constrains the transactions which can be
applied to that object to occur in the specified pattern. As operations are actually
executed the transaction control expression gets converted to a history. This his-
tory serves to enforce separation of duties [124]. Events that can be referred to in
the premise of rules are those defined in the computational model (Figure 2.11) or
external events that are observable by the RM process.
Authorization defines the access to resources in the system. With respect to the
computational model they define whether the execution of an action is permissible.
An authorization rule defines the condition under which a subject is allowed to per-
form an action on an object. In the following we will describe the syntactic elements
of the language informally [69].
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2.5 Chapter summary
This Chapter has been divided in to four main sections:
• In the specification Section, the definition of software specification is given and
enumerates the purposes of software specification. The formal specification
definition and approaches have been described, and why informal specifications
have been used in the past. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of
formal specifications have been listed.
• Next, an overview of temporal logic is given and the axes along which temporal
logic systems can be classified. Temporal logic classification axes have been
discussed in detail here, and the application of temporal logic in general and
specifically for computer science applications.
• In the last Section of this Chapter, access control policies, mechanism and
models have been explained, and what are the elements and types of access
control policies have been described in detail.
An explanation of stack inspection and history-based access control policy
has been given in this Section. The categories of access control policies are
listed here; Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control
(MAC), Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). The description also includes
the advantages and disadvantages of each model. Finally, history based ac-
cess control policy languages (Flexible authorization manager authorization
language (FAM), Temporal role-based access control (TRBAC),Usage control
model (UCON) and Security Analysis Toolkit for Agents (SANTA)) have been
introduced and discussed with their models.
This Chapter contributes basic information about our research such as speci-
fication, temporal logic and history based access control policies. This infor-
mation constructs the basis of our research and gives a good background to





• Interval temporal logic, syntax and semantics.
• Past time interval temporal logic, syntax and se-
mantics.
• Axioms and Rules for ITLp
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3.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, an overview of interval Temporal Logic (ITL), its syntax and seman-
tics as well as the derived constructs are given. In addition, the main contribution
of this thesis which is the past time operators of ITL (ITLp) is proposed, with the
syntax and the semantics of these operators as well as the derived formula and con-
structs. Since the introduced ITLp uses the past time operators only, new axioms
and rules need to be introduced. Therefore, the axioms and rules for Propositional
ITLp have been introduced and listed in this Chapter, while the soundness proofs
of these axioms and rules have been given in Appendix A.
3.2 Interval Temporal Logic (ITL)
Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) is a flexible notation for both propositional and first-
order reasoning about periods of time found in descriptions of hardware and software
systems. Unlike most temporal logics, ITL can handle both sequential and parallel
composition and offers powerful and extensible specification and proof techniques
for reasoning about properties involving safety, liveness and projected time [99].
Timing constraints are expressible and furthermore most imperative programming
constructs can be viewed as formulas in a slightly modified version of ITL [25].
Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) is
• discrete
• linear temporal logic
• for (in)finite time which includes
• a basic construct for sequential composition and
• an analog of Kleene star.
3.2.1 Syntax of ITL
The key notion of ITL is an interval. An interval σ is considered to be a (in)finite
sequence of states σ0, σ1 . . ., where a state σi is a mapping from the set of variables
Var to the set of values Val. The length |σ| of an interval σ0 . . . σn is equal to n
which is one less than the number of states in the interval (this has always been a
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convention in ITL), i.e., a one state interval has length 0.
- Future intervals:
The semantics of future interval is as shown in Figure 3.1:
• • · · ·· · · •
σ0 σ1 σ|σ|
Figure 3.1: Future interval
The syntax of ITL is defined in Table 3.1 where
z is an integer value,
a is a static integer variable (does not change within an interval),
A is a state integer variable (can change within an interval),
v a static or state integer variable,
g is a integer function symbol,
q is a static Boolean variable (does not change within an interval),
Q is a state Boolean variable (can change within an interval),
p is a predicate symbol.
Expressions e ::= z | a | A | g(e1, . . . , en)| ©A | fin A
Formula f ::= true| q | Q | p(e1, . . . , en)| ¬f | f1 ∧ f2| ∀v.f | skip| f1 ; f2| f∗
Table 3.1: Syntax of ITL
Expressions
The syntax is explained with some examples below:
Expressions are built inductively as follows:
• Constants (z):
We denote Constants by letters of the form z for examples: z0, z1 to denote
values like 0,4,9 and so on.
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• Individual variables:
- By convention, capital letters are used to denote state variables which are
variables whose values can change within an interval for example A,B,C, ....
- Small letters to denote static variables which are variables whose values does
not change within an interval for example a, b, c, ....
- Letters of the form v are used to denote a variable which can either be a
static or a state variable.
• Functions :
-g(e0, e1, e2, .., ek) where k ≥ 0 and e0, e1, e2, ..., ek are expressions.
-+ and mod are among common functions used.
-Constants (such as 0,1 etc.) are treated as zero place functions.
- Next: © e, where e is an expression.
- Fin: fin e, where e is an expression.
Examples include: A+B, a− b, A+ a, v mod C and so on.
Some examples of syntactically legal expressions are given below:
I + (© J + 2)
This expression adds the value of I in the current state, the value of J in the next
state and the constant 2.
I + (© J)− (© I)
This expression adds the value of I in the current state to the value of J in the next
state and subtracts the value of I in the next state from the result [98, 23].
Formula
Formulas are built inductively as follows:
• Predicates p(e0, e1, e2, .., ek) where k ≥ 0 and e0, e1, e2, ..., ek are expressions. Pred-
icates include ≤ and other basic relations.
• Equality: e1 = e2; where e1 and e2 are expressions.
• Logical connectives:¬f and f1 ∧ f2, where f , f1 and f2 are formulas.
• Universal Quantifier : ∀v.f where f is formula.
• Skip: skip is true on an interval σ iff σ has length 1 (unit interval).
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• Chop: f1 ; f2, where f1 and f2 are a formulas.
• Chopstar: f ∗, where f is a formula.
Some examples of syntactically legal formulas are given below:
-(J = 2) ∧ (K = 4)
This formula states that the value of J is 2 in the current state and the value of K
is 4 in the current state.
-(I = 2) ∧ (© J = I + 2)
This formula states that the formula is true if I equal to 2 in the current and the
value of J in the next state would be I+2.
Note that the operator © can be used both for expressions (e.g.,© I ) and for for-
mulas, e.g., ©(I = 5) [98, 23].
3.2.2 Semantics
The informal semantics of the most interesting constructs are as follows:
• ©A: if interval is non-empty then the value of A in the next state of that
interval else an arbitrary value.
• fin A: if interval is finite then the value of A in the final state of that interval
else an arbitrary value.
• ¬f : f does not holds for that interval.
• f1 ∧ f2: f1 holds for that interval and f2 holds for that interval.
• skip unit interval (length 1).
• f1 ; f2 holds if the interval can be decomposed (“chopped”) into a prefix and
suffix interval, such that f1 holds over the prefix and f2 over the suffix, or if
the interval is infinite and f1 holds for that interval.
• f ∗ holds if the interval is decomposable into a finite number of intervals such
that for each of them f holds, or the interval is infinite and can be decomposed
into an infinite number of finite intervals for which f holds.
To define the formal semantics, we introduce the following notations:
• Σ denotes the set of sequences of states.
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• Σω denotes the set of infinite sequences of states.
• Σ+ denotes the set of non-empty finite sequences of states.
• σi→j for 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |σ| denotes a subinterval σiσi+1 · · ·σj.
Let EσJ. . .K be the “meaning” (semantic) function from (Σ+ ∪Σω)× Expressions
to Val and letMσ[[. . .]] be the “meaning” function from (Σ+∪Σω)× Formula to Bool
(set of Boolean values, {tt,ff}) and let σ = σ0σ1 . . . be an interval from (Σ+ ∪ Σω).
We write σ ∼v σ′ if the intervals σ and σ′ are identical with the possible exception
of their mappings for the variable v.
The formal semantics of ITL, except the chop and chopstar operators, is listed in
Table 3.2.
EσJzK = z
EσJaK = σ0(a) and for all 0 < i ≤ |σ|, σi(a) = σ0(a)
EσJAK = σ0(A)
EσJg(e1, . . . , en)K = g(EσJe1K, . . . , EσJenK)
EσJ©AK =
{




σ|σ|(A) if σ is finite
choose-any-from(V al) otherwise
Mσ[[true]] = tt
Mσ[[q]] = σ0(q) and for all 0 < i ≤ |σ|, σi(q) = σ0(q)
Mσ[[Q]] = σ0(Q)
Mσ[[p(e1, . . . , en)]] = tt iff p(EσJe1K, . . . , EσJenK)
Mσ[[¬f ]] = tt iff not (Mσ[[f ]] = tt)
Mσ[[f1 ∧ f2]] = tt iff (Mσ[[f1]] = tt) and (Mσ[[f2]] = tt)
Mσ[[skip]] = tt iff |σ| = 1
Mσ[[∀v q f ]] = tt iff (for all σ′ s.t. σ ∼v σ′,Mσ[[f ]] = tt)
Table 3.2: Semantics of ITL
- Chop (;):
The semantics of chop (;) is as follows:
Mσ[[f1 ; f2]] = tt iff
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exists k, such that 0 ≤ k ≤ |σ|, and
Mσ0→σk [[f1]] = tt and Mσk→σ|σ| [[f2]] = tt.
Future interval σ is a fusion of two future intervals, the first interval σ0. . .σk satisfies
f1 and the second interval σk. . .σ|σ| satisfies f2
| < —f1— > | < —f2— > |
σ0 σk σ|σ|
• • •
Figure 3.2: Chop of finite interval
or the interval is infinite and
Mσ[[f1]] = tt
Future interval σ is infinite and satisfies f , so f2 is irrelevant.
| < —f1— >
σ0
• · · · · · ·
Figure 3.3: Chop of infinite interval
- Chopstar (f ∗):
The semantics of chopstar (f ∗) is as follows:
Mσ[[f ∗]] = tt iff
if σ is finite then exists l0,....ln, such that l0 = 0 ∧ ln = |σ|
∧ for all 0 ≤ i <n, li≤ li+1 ∧ Mσli→σli+1 [[f ]] . . . = tt.
Finite future interval σ is the fusion of a finite number of finite intervals in the future
each satisfying f.
| < —f— > | · · · | < —f— > | · · · | < —f— > |
σl0 σl1 σli σli+1 σln−1 σln
• • · · · • • · · · • •
Figure 3.4: Chopstar of finite interval
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Else exists l0,....ln, such that l0 = 0 ∧ Mσln→σ|σ| [[f ]] = tt
∧ for all 0 ≤ i <n, li≤ li+1 ∧ Mσli→σli+1 [[f ]] . . . = tt.
Infinite future interval σ is the fusion of a finite number of sub-intervals in the future
each satisfying f.
Each future sub-interval is finite except the last one which is infinite.
| < —f— > | · · · | < —f— > | < —f— >
σl0 σl1 σln−1 σln
• • · · · • • •
Figure 3.5: Chopstar of finite interval final infinite
or there exists an infinite number of li such that l0 = 0 ∧ for all 0 ≤ i ,li≤ li+1
and Mσli→σli+1 [[f ]] = tt.
| < —f— > | < · · · · · · > | < —f— > | < · · · · · · >
σl0 σl1 σli σli+1
• · · · • · · · • · · · • · · ·
Figure 3.6: Chopstar of infinite interval
Infinite future interval σ is the fusion of an infinite number of finite sub intervals




Mσ[[skip]] = tt iff |σ| = 1.
Skip (skip), is an interval with only two states.
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- Next (©f):
© f =̂ skip ; f
Mσ[[© f ]] = tt iff |σ| >0 ∧ Mσ1→σ|σ| [[f ]] . . . = tt.
Next (©f) holds in the next state of the future interval:




- Weak Next (©w f):
©w f =̂ ¬©¬f
Mσ[[©w f ]] = tt iff |σ| = 0 ∨ Mσ1→σ|σ| [[f ]] . . . = tt.
Weak Next (©w f), holds if the future interval has only one state:
σ0
•
Figure 3.8: Weak Next with one state interval
or f holds in the next state of the future interval:
| | < —f— >
σ0 σ1
• •
Figure 3.9: Weak Next with more than one state interval
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- Sometimes (3f):
3f =̂ finite ; f
Mσ[[3f ]] = tt iff exists k where 0 ≤ k ≤ |σ|, such that Mσk→σ|σ| [[f ]] = tt.
Sometime (3f), holds if there exists a suffix interval in the future satisfying f.
¬f ¬f f
σ0 σ1 · · · σk · · · σ|σ|




Mσ[[2f ]] = tt iff for all 0 ≤ k ≤ |σ|, such that Mσk→σ|σ| [[f ]] = tt.
Always (2f), holds if all the suffix intervals in the future are satisfying f.
f f f f
σ0 σ1 · · · σk · · · σ|σ|
• • · · · • · · · •
Figure 3.11: Always
- More (more):
more =̂ © true
Mσ[[moref ]] = tt iff |σ| >0.
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Mσ[[empty]] = tt iff |σ| = 0.
Empty (empty) holds if there is a future interval with only one state.
- Infinite (inf):
inf =̂ true ; false
Mσ[[inf]] = tt iff σ is infinite.
inf holds if there is a future interval with an infinite number of states.
- Finite(finite):
finite =̂ ¬inf
Mσ[[finite]] = tt iff σ is finite.
finite holds if there is a future interval with a finite number of states.
- Diamond-i (3i f):
3i f =̂ f ; true
Mσ[[3i f ]] = tt iff
exists k, such that 0 ≤ k ≤ |σ|, and Mσ0→σk [[f ]] = tt.
Diamond-i (3i f) holds if there exists a prefix interval in the future that satisfies f.
- Box-i (2i f):
2i f =̂ ¬(3i ¬f)
Mσ[[3i f ]] = tt iff
for all k, that 0 ≤ k ≤ |σ|, and Mσ0→σk [[f ]] = tt.
Box-i (2i f) holds if all the prefix intervals in the future are satisfying f.
- Diamond-a (3a f):
3a f =̂ finite ; f ; true
Mσ[[3a f ]] = tt iff
exists l, k, such that 0 ≤ l ≤ k ≤ |σ|, and Mσl→σk [[f ]] = tt.
Diamond-a (3a f) holds if there exists a sub interval in the future that satisfies f.
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- Box-a (2a f):
2a f =̂ ¬(3a ¬f)
Mσ[[3a f ]] = tt iff
for all l, k, that 0 ≤ l ≤ k ≤ |σ|, and Mσl→σk [[f ]] = tt.
Box-a (2a f) holds if all the sub intervals in the future are satisfying f.
3.2.3 Derived formula
Now, we are using the basic operators such as ; and skip and true to derive and
define a new formula, in order to help us in formulating and constructing a logical
argument or proof.
The common derived formula listed in Table 3.3 is as follow:
false =̂ ¬true false value
© f =̂ skip ; f next
©w f =̂ ¬©¬f weak next
more =̂ © true interval with ≥ 2 states
empty =̂ ¬more one state interval
inf =̂ true ; false infinite interval
finite =̂ ¬inf finite interval
3f =̂ finite ; f sometimes in the future
2f =̂ ¬3¬f always in the future
3i f =̂ f ; true some initial future subinterval
2i f =̂ ¬(3i ¬f) all initial future subintervals
3a f =̂ finite ; f ; true some subinterval
2a f =̂ ¬(3a ¬f) all subintervals
Table 3.3: Derived formula
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Frequently used concrete derived constructs
In this part, the concrete derived constructs are introduced in Table 3.4 as follow:
if f0 then f1 else f2 =̂ (f0 ∧ f1) ∨ (¬f0 ∧ f2) if then else
if f0 then f1 =̂ if f0 then f1 else true if then
fin f =̂ 2(empty ⊃ f) final state
halt f =̂ 2(empty ≡ f) terminate interval when
keep f =̂ 2a (skip ⊃ f) all unit subintervals
while f0 do f1 =̂ (f0 ∧ f1)∗ ∧ fin ¬f0 while loop
repeat f0 until f1 =̂ f0 ; (while ¬f1 do f0) repeat loop
Table 3.4: Frequently used concrete derived constructs
Frequently used derived constructs related to expressions
In this part, the derived constructs related to expressions are introduced in Table
3.5 as follow:
A := exp =̂ ©A = exp assignment
A ≈ exp =̂ 2(A = exp) equal in interval
A← exp =̂ finite ∧ (fin A) = exp temporal assignment
A gets exp =̂ keep (A← exp) gets
stable A =̂ A gets A stability
len(exp) =̂ ∃I q (I = 0) ∧ (I gets I + 1) ∧ (I ← exp) interval length
Table 3.5: Frequently used derived constructs related to expressions
75 Sami Alsarhani
CHAPTER 3. PAST TIME INTERVAL TEMPORAL LOGIC
3.3 Past Time Interval Temporal Logic
Past Time Interval Temporal Logic (ITLp) is a flexible notation that uses past time
operators only. Past Time Interval Temporal Logic is the main contribution of this
thesis, therefore what are the differences between past time interval temporal logic
and future time interval temporal logic. Next, we will answer this question and
discuss the main differences between ITLp and ITL.
3.3.1 ITLp versus ITL
There are many differences between ITLp and ITL, the first one is that ITLp
uses the past constructs only while, ITL uses future time constructs. The second
difference is that past time operators are interpreted over a finite interval because
the history interval is assumed to be finite. However, ITL can be interpreted over
finite and infinite interval. A part of the contribution introduced in this thesis is
that the introduced past time operators change the “numbering of states”; that is
the current state of the past interval is the most rights of this interval τ0 and the
remaining states are τ|τ |....., τ2, τ1 as has been shown in the Figure 3.12:
• · · ·· · · • •
τ|τ | τ1 τ0
Figure 3.12: States in past interval
However, the “numbering of states” of the future interval is from left to right so,
the current state is σ0 and the remaining states are σ1, σ2, .....σ|σ| or graphically as
has been shown in the Figure 3.13:
• • · · ·· · · •
σ0 σ1 σ|σ|
Figure 3.13: States in future interval
This reflects on the interpretation of ITLp formula being from right to left which
opposes the interpretation of ITL formula which is from left to right.
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Finally, if the interval has expanded, there is a new state added σ4 to the interval
then, in the future interval, only the final state is changed, so, states σ0, σ1, σ2 and
σ3 do not change as shown in Figure 3.14.
Figure 3.14: Future changed states
However if the past interval has expanded and a new state τ0 is added, all the
states in this interval will be changed, state τ0 in the top of the Figure is changed to
τ1 in the bottom of the Figure and so on, state τ1 is changed to τ2 in the expanded
interval, so the interval states τ0, τ1, τ2 and τ3 are changed to τ1, τ2, τ3 and τ4
respectively as shown in Figure 3.15.
Figure 3.15: Past changed states
Past time interval temporal logic ITLp is:
77 Sami Alsarhani
CHAPTER 3. PAST TIME INTERVAL TEMPORAL LOGIC
• discrete
• linear temporal logic
• for history finite time which includes
• a basic construct for sequential composition and
• an analog of Kleene star
3.3.2 Syntax of ITLp
The key notion of ITLp is a history interval. A history interval τ is considered to
be a finite sequence of states, τ0, τ1, . . . τn where a state τi is a mapping from the
set of variables V ar to the set of values V al. The length |τ | of an interval τ0 . . . τn
is equal to n (one less than the number of states in the history interval, i.e., a one
state history interval has length 0).
The semantics of historical interval is shown in in Figure 3.16:
• · · · • •
τ|τ | τ1 τ0
Figure 3.16: Historical interval
The syntax of ITLp is defined in Table 3.3 where:
z is an integer value,
a is a static integer variable (does not change within an interval),
A is a state integer variable (can change within an interval),
v a static or state integer variable,
g is a integer function symbol,
q is a static Boolean variable (does not change within an interval),
Q is a state Boolean variable (can change within an interval),
p is a predicate symbol.
Expressions e ::= z | a | A | g(e1, . . . , en)| ©̂A | fîn A
Formula f ::= t̂rue| q | Q | p(e1, . . . , en)| ¬h| h1 ∧ h2| ∀v.h| ŝkip| h2 ;̂ h1| h∗̂
Table 3.6: Syntax of ITLp
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3.3.3 Semantics of ITLp
The informal semantics of the most interesting constructs are as follows:
• ©̂ A: if the history interval is non-empty then the value of A in the previous
state of that history interval has an arbitrary value.
• fîn A : The value of A in the final state of that history interval.
• ŝkip : is a history interval (sequence) of 2 states.
• h1 ;̂h2: is called ‘h1 past chop h2’ and denotes sequential composition of two his-
tory intervals, i.e., h1 ;̂h2 holds if the interval can be decomposed (“chopped”)
into a prefix and suffix interval, such that h1 holds over the prefix and h2 holds
over the suffix.
• h∗̂: is called ‘h past chopstar’ and denotes finite iteration of a history interval,
i.e., h∗̂ holds if the interval is decomposable into a finite number of intervals
such that for each of them h holds.
In order to define the formal semantics, the following notions are introduced:
• ∆ denotes the set of states.
• ∆+ denotes the set of history non-empty finite sequences of states.
• τ is a history interval, τ ∈ ∆+.
• |τ | denotes length of τ and is defined as number of states minus 1.
• τj←i for 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |τ | denotes a history subinterval τj · · · τi+1τi.
Let EτJ. . .K be the “meaning” (semantic) function from V al to (Expressions×
∆+) and let Mτ [[. . .]] be the “meaning” function from Formula×∆+ to Bool (set
of Boolean values, {tt,ff}) and let τ = τ|τ | . . . τ0 be a history interval.
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We write τ ∼v τ
′
if the intervals are identical with the possible exception of their
mappings for the variable.
The formal semantics of ITLp, except the past chop and past chopstar, are listed in
Table 3.7.
Eτ JzK = z
Eτ JaK = τ0(a) and for all 0 < i ≤ |τ |, τi(a) = τ0(a)
Eτ JAK = τ0(A)
Eτ Jg(e1, . . . , en)K = g(Eτ Je1K, . . . , Eτ JenK)
Eτ J©̂AK =
{
τ1(A) if |τ | > 0
undefined otherwise
Eτ Jfîn AK = τ|τ |(A)
Mτ [[t̂rue]] = tt
Mτ [[q]] = τ0(q) and for all 0 < i ≤ |τ |, τi(q) = τ0(q)
Mτ [[Q]] = τ0(Q)
Mτ [[p(e1, . . . , en)]] = tt iff p(Eτ Je1K, . . . , Eτ JenK)
Mτ [[¬h]] = tt iff not (Mτ [[h]] = tt)
Mτ [[h1 ∧ h2]] = tt iff (Mτ [[h1]] = tt) and (Mτ [[h2]] = tt)
Mτ [[ŝkip]] = tt iff |τ | = 1
Mτ [[∀v q h]] = tt iff (for all τ ′ s.t. τ ∼v τ ′,Mτ [[h]] = tt)
Table 3.7: Semantics of ITLp
-Past Chop (̂;)
The semantics of past Chop (̂;) is as follows:
Mτ [[h2 ;̂ h1]] = tt iff
exists k where0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t. Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2]] = tt and Mτk←τ0 [[h1]] = tt.
History interval τ is finite, then interval τ is a fusion of two past intervals, the
first interval τ0 . . . τksatisfies h1 and the second interval τk. . . τ|τ | satisfies h2.
State τk is shared by both.
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| < —h2— > | < —h1— > |
• · · · • · · · •
τ|τ | τk τ0
Figure 3.17: Semantics of past Chop
- Past Chopstar(h ∗̂)
The semantics of past Chopstar(h ∗̂) is as follows:
Mτ [[h∗̂]] = tt iff
τ is finite then exists l0,....ln, such that l0 = 0 ∧ ln = |τ |
∧ for all 0 ≤ i <n, li≤ li+1 ∧ Mτli→τli+1 [[h]] . . . = tt.
Finite past interval τ is the fusion of a finite number of finite past intervals each
satisfying h.
| < —h— > | · · · | < —h— > | · · · | < —h— > |
τln τln−1 τli+1 τli τl1 τl0
• • · · · • • · · · • •
Figure 3.18: Semantics of past Chopstar
- Past Skip (ŝkip):
Mτ [[ŝkip]] = tt iff |τ | = 1.
Past Skip (ŝkip) is a past interval with only two states.
- Previous (©̂ h):
©̂h =̂ h ;̂ ŝkip
Mτ [[©̂h]] = tt iff 0 <|τ | ∧ Mτ|τ |←τ1 [[h]] . . . = tt.
Previous (©̂h) holds if the previous state of the past interval holds:
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- Weak Previous (©̂w h):
©̂wh =̂ ¬ ©̂¬h
Mτ [[©̂wh]] = tt iff |τ | = 0.
Weak Previous (©̂wh) holds if the past interval has only one state.
h
•
Figure 3.20: Weak Previous with one state interval
∨ Mτ|τ |←τ1 [[h]] . . . = tt.
or h holds in the previous state of the past interval:
< —h— > | |
τ1 τ0
• •
Figure 3.21: Weak Previous with more than one state interval
- Past Sometimes (3̂ h):
3̂h =̂ h ;̂ fînite
Mτ [[3̂h]] = tt iff exists k where 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, such that Mτ|τ |←τk [[h]] = tt.
Past Sometime (3̂ h) holds if there exists a suffix interval in the past which is sat-
isfying h.
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< —h— > | |
τ1 τ0
• •
Figure 3.22: Past Sometime
- Past Always (2̂h):
2̂h =̂ ¬3̂¬h
Mτ [[2̂h]] = tt iff for all 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, such that Mτ|τ |←τk [[h]] = tt.
Past Always (2̂f) holds if all the suffix intervals in the past are satisfying h.
| < · · ·h· · · | · · ·h· · · | < —h— > |
τ|τ | · · · τk · · · τ1 τ0
• · · · • · · · • •
Figure 3.23: Past Always
- Past More (m̂ore):
m̂ore =̂ ©̂ true
Mτ [[m̂ore]] = tt iff |τ | >0.
Past More (m̂ore) holds if there is a past interval with at least two states.
- Past Empty (êmpty):
êmpty =̂ ¬m̂ore
Mτ [[êmpty]] = tt iff |τ | = 0.
Past Empty (êmpty) holds if there is a past interval with only one state.
- Past Diamond-i (3̂i h):
3̂i h =̂ true ;̂ h
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Mτ [[3̂i h]] = tt iff
exists k, such that 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, and Mτk←τ0 [[h]] = tt.
Past Diamond-i (3̂i h) holds if there exists a prefix interval in the past that satisfies
h.
- Past Box-i (2̂i h):
2̂i h =̂ ¬(3̂i ¬h)
Mτ [[2̂i h]] = tt iff
for all k, that 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, and Mτk←τ0 [[h]] = tt.
Past Box-i (2̂i h) holds if all the prefix intervals in the past are satisfying h.
- Past Diamond-a (3̂a h):
3̂a h =̂ true ;̂ h ;̂ true
Mσ[[3̂a h]] = tt iff
(exists l, k, such that 0 ≤ l ≤ k ≤ |τ |, and Mτk←τl [[h]] = tt).
Past Diamond-a (3̂a h, holds if there exists a sub interval in the past that satisfies h.
- Past Box-a (2̂a h):
2̂a h =̂ ¬(3̂a ¬h)
Mτ [[2̂a h]] = tt iff
(for all l, k, that 0 ≤ l ≤ k ≤ |τ |, and Mτk←τl [[h]] = tt).
Past Box-a (2̂a h) holds if all the sub intervals in the past are satisfying h.
2̂a h =̂ ¬(3̂a ¬h)
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- Past halt ĥalt h:
This operator can be used, in the form ĥalt h, to specify that a formula h becomes
true only at the end of the past interval.
ĥalt h =̂ 2̂(êmpty ≡ h)
- Past Fin (fîn h):
fîn h =̂ 2̂(êmpty ⊃ h)
The value of h in the final state of that history interval.
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3.3.4 Derived formula
A list of ITL derived formula has been shown in Table 3.3. However, in this Section,
the derived formula for ITLp will be introduced and listed in Table 3.8.
©̂h =̂ h ;̂ ŝkip previous
©̂wh =̂ ¬ ©̂¬h weak previous
m̂ore =̂ ©̂ true history interval with ≥ 2 states
êmpty =̂ ¬m̂ore one state history interval
3̂h =̂ h ;̂ true all history unit subintervals
2̂h =̂ ¬3̂¬h always in the history
3̂i h =̂ true ;̂ h some initial history subinterval
2̂i h =̂ ¬(3̂i ¬h) all initial history subintervals
3̂a h =̂ true ;̂ h ;̂ true some history subinterval
2̂a h =̂ ¬(3̂a ¬h) all history subintervals
Table 3.8: Derived formula for ITLp
The frequently used concrete derived constructs
The frequently used concrete derived constructs is shown in Table 3.9:
if w0 then h1 else h2 =̂ (w0 ∧ h1) ∨ (¬w0 ∧ h2) if then else
if w0 then h1 =̂ if w0 then h1 else t̂rue if then
fîn h =̂ 2̂(êmpty ⊃ h) final state
ĥalth =̂ 2̂(êmpty ≡ h) terminate interval when
k̂eeph =̂ 2̂a (ŝkip ⊃ h) all unit subintervals
ŵhilew0d̂oh1 =̂ fîn ¬w0 ∧ (w0 ∧ h1)∗̂ while loop
r̂epeath0 until h1 =̂ (ŵhile¬h1 do h0) ;̂ h0 repeat loop
Table 3.9: Frequently used concrete derived constructs
Frequently used derived constructs related to expressions
The frequently used concrete derived constructs related to expressions is shown in
Table 3.10:
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A =: exp =̂ ©̂A = exp past assignment
A≈̂ exp =̂ 2̂(A = exp) equal in history interval
A←̂ exp =̂ fîn A = exp history temporal assignment
Aĝets exp =̂ k̂eep (A←̂ exp) past gets
ŝtableA =̂ A ĝets A stability
l̂en(exp) =̂ ∃I q (I = 0) ∧ (I ĝetsI + 1) ∧ (I←̂exp) interval length
Table 3.10: Frequently used derived constructs related to expressions
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3.4 Relation between past and future time using
time reversal
We have shown in Section 3.3.1 the differences between the future time interval
temporal logic (ITL) and the past time interval temporal logic (ITLp); however,
we need to know the relation between these two versions of interval temporal logic.
To answer this question, we should introduce the time reversal which was used by
Moszkowski to verify certain properties expressed in PITL [102].
Time reversal is related to mirror images [116] used for temporal logics to obtain
a rule for past-time operators from an analogous one for future-time operators by
means of time symmetry [24]. To explain this, let formula f r denotes the time re-
versed version of f . Let the time reversed interval of a finite interval σ be denoted
by reverse(σ) and be defined as:
reverse(σ0 · · ·σ|σ|) =̂ σ|σ| · · ·σ0
The semantics of time reversal is defined as
Jf rKσ = tt iff JfKreverse(σ) = tt
In addition, the time reversal can be used if the semantics of interval temporal Logic
is defined over finite intervals only like the past time interval temporal logic. So, it
can be said that:
τ = reverse(σ)
Therefore, we have three versions of temporal logic which are future time, past time
and time reversal. To clarify the relation between these three versions of ITL lets
have the future formula:
f1 ; f2
The semantics of this formula for finite time is as follows:
Mσ[[f1 ; f2]] = tt iff
exists k, such that 0 ≤ k ≤ |σ|, and
Mσ0→σk [[f1]] = tt and Mσk→σ|σ| [[f2]] = tt.
Which is if the future interval σ is a fusion of two future intervals, the first interval
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σ0 . . . σk satisfies f1 and the second interval σk . . . σ|σ| satisfies f2
| < —f1— > | < —f2— > |
σ0 σk σ|σ|
• • •
Figure 3.24: Chop future formula





The semantics of this formula is as follows:
Mσ[[(f1 ; f2)r]] =Mσ[[(f2)r ; (f1)r]] = tt iff
exists k, such that 0 ≤ k ≤ |σ|, and
Mσk←0[[f1]] = tt and Mσ|σ|←k[[f2]] = tt.
Which is if the interval σ is a fusion of two intervals, the first interval σ0 . . . σk
satisfies f2 and the second interval σk . . . σ|σ| satisfies f1
| < —f2— > | < —f1— > |
σ|σ| σk σ0
• • •
Figure 3.25: Chop with reversal time
When the past time operators are used for the same formula we have:
f2 ;̂ f1
The semantics of past Chop (̂;) is as follows:
Mτ [[f2 ;̂ f1]] = tt iff
exists k where0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t. Mτ|τ |←τk [[f2]] = tt and Mτk←τ0 [[f1]] = tt.
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History interval τ is finite, then interval τ is a fusion of two past intervals, the
first interval τ0 . . . τksatisfies f1 and the second interval τk. . . τ|τ | satisfies f2.
State τk is shared by both.
| < —f2— > | < —f1— > |
• · · · • · · · •
τ|τ | τk τ0
Figure 3.26: Past Chop formula
If we compare Figure 3.25 for the time reversal with Figure 3.26 for the past
time formula we can see the two formula are the same.
It can thus be said that the time reversal of interval temporal logic ITLr can be
used to transform the future time interval temporal logic ITL to past time interval
temporal logic ITLp
ITL
USING→ ITLr PRODUCE→ ITLp
and at the same time, the time reversal ITLr can be used to transform past time
interval temporal logic ITLp to the future time interval temporal logic ITL
ITLp
USING→ ITLr PRODUCE→ ITL
It can be concluded that the time reversal plays an important role in transforming
the past time formula to future time formula and vice versa. The importance of
this relation between the past time operators and the future time is that the ITLp
has the same expressive power of ITL depending on the fact that any future time
formula ITL can be transformed to past time formula ITLp using the time reversal.
Next, in table 3.11, we will list future time operators of interval temporal logic with
the time reversal and the produced past time operators of interval temporal logic.
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r f2 ;̂ f1
(f ∗)r = (f r)∗ f ∗̂
(skip)r ŝkip
(© f)r ©̂ f
(©w f)r ©̂w f
(3f)r 3̂f
(2f)r 2̂ f
(3i f)r 3̂i f
(2i f)r 2̂i f
(3a f)r 3̂a f
(2a f)r 2̂a f
Table 3.11: Future and past operators relation list
3.5 Axioms and Rules in Logic
Several temporal languages have been proposed for the specification and verification
of concurrent systems in the last three decades, such as Linear Temporal Logic [88],
Computation Tree Logic [30], Interval Temporal Logic [99, 100], Temporal Logic
of Actions [77], and many others. In practice, there are two popular verification
approaches, the first is model checking and the second is theorem proving.
Model checking is an automatic verification approach based on model theory for con-
current systems that are finite state or have finite state abstractions. This approach
was developed independently in the early 1980’s by Clarke and Emerson [29] and by
Queille and Sifakis [118] and it has been applied successfully to computer hardware
and many aspects of software verification. The advantage of model checking is that
the verification can be done automatically. However, it suffers from the well-known
problem called state explosion [38]. As the number of state variables in the system
increases, the size of the system state space grows exponentially. For example, con-
sider a system composed of n processes, each having m states. The asynchronous
composition of these processes may have mn states. In model checking we refer to
this problem as the state explosion problem [31].
With the theorem proving approach [16], we assume we have the system S and the
property P; to verify whether or not a system S satisfies a property P is to prove
whether or not S ⊃ P is a theorem within the proof system. The advantage is that
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theorem proving avoids the state explosion problem and can verify both finite and
infinite systems, and can be done semi-automatically; therefore, it is also suitable
for data intensive applications. However, within the verification process, lots of as-
sertions need to be inserted in the context of the program modelling the system.
So, the use of theorem prover requires considerable expertise to guide and assist the
verification process and one of the famous theorem provers is PVS [106].
There are many axiom and proof systems for different temporal logic languages,
each of these axiom systems providing a set of basic theorems together with infer-
ence rules for generating new theorems.
Theorems describe the universal truths of a formal language, and are typically de-
fined as formula prefixed by the “`” symbol [48], for example:
` true thing
Logical axioms (or axiomatisation) are certain formulas in a formal language that are
universally valid; these formulas provide rules for generating new universal truths
[48], and can be used to prove that a given temporal formula is valid over a given
program or in another meaning, used for proving properties of programs [72].
The expressive power (the greater variety and quantity of ideas that can be repre-
sented by) of ITL is stronger than these logics (Linear Temporal Logic, Computation
Tree Logic, Temporal Logic of Actions) because ITL uses chop (;) and chop-star (∗),
so it is a useful and powerful formalism for specification and verification of reactive
systems [38].
Within the interval based TL community, several researchers have investigated ax-
iom systems with different extensions [39]. Moszkowski [99] presented axiom systems
over finite intervals for PITL and first order ITL. The propositional part was claimed
to be complete but only an outline of a proof was given. Later he extended this
for chop and chop-star with infinite time [100]. Recently, he presented [103] a com-
plete axiom system for Propositional Interval Temporal Logic with infinite time and
proven completeness by a reduction to his earlier complete Propositional Interval
Temporal Logic axiom system for finite time [101] and conventional propositional
linear-time temporal logic (PTL). ITLp which contains temporal operators ;̂ and ∗̂ is
proposed in Chapter 3, therefore in this Section, the axioms and proof rules suitable
for ITLp are proposed and have been proven sound.
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3.5.1 Propositional Axioms and Rules for ITL
In Table 3.12 we list the propositional axioms and rules for ITL.
ChopAssoc ` (f0; f1); f2 ≡ f0; (f1; f2)
OrChopImp ` (f0 ∨ f1); f2 ⊃ (f0; f2) ∨ (f1; f2)
ChopOrImp ` f0; (f1 ∨ f2) ⊃ (f0; f1) ∨ (f0; f2)
EmptyChop ` empty; f1 ≡ f1
ChopEmpty ` f1; empty ≡ f1
BiBoxChopImpChop ` 2i (f0 ⊃ f1) ∧ 2(f2 ⊃ f3) ⊃ (f0; f2) ⊃ (f1; f3)
StateImpBi ` w ⊃ 2i w
NextImpNotNextNot ` © f0 ⊃ ¬©¬f0
KeepnowImpNotKeepnowNot ` keepnow (f0) ⊃ ¬ keepnow (¬f0)
BoxInduct ` f0 ∧ 2(f0 ⊃ ©w f0) ⊃ 2f0
InfChop ` (f0 ∧ inf) ; f1 ≡ (f0 ∧ inf)
ChopStarEqv ` f ∗0 ≡ (empty ∨ ((f0 ∧ more) ; f ∗0 ))
ChopstarInduct ` (inf ∧ f0 ∧ 2(f0 ⊃ (f1 ∧ fmore) ; f0)) ⊃ f ∗1
MP ` f0 ⊃ f1, ` f0 ⇒ ` f1
BoxGen ` f0 ⇒ ` 2f0
BiGen ` f0 ⇒ ` 2i f0
Table 3.12: Axioms and Rules for Propositional ITL
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3.5.2 Propositional Axioms and Rules for ITLp
In Table 3.13 we list the propositional axioms and rules valid for ITLp.
PastChopAssoc ` (h0 ;̂ h1) ;̂ h2 ≡ h0 ;̂ (h1 ;̂ h2)
PastOrChopImp ` h2 ;̂ (h1 ∨ h0) ⊃ (h2 ;̂ h1) ∨ (h2 ;̂ h0)
PastChopOrImp ` (h2 ∨ h1) ;̂ h0 ⊃ (h1 ;̂ h0) ∨ (h2 ;̂ h0)
PastEmptyChop ` h ;̂ êmpty ≡ h
PastChopEmpty ` êmpty ;̂ h ≡ h
PastBiBoxChopImpChop ` 2̂i (h0 ⊃ h1) ∧ 2̂(h2 ⊃ h3) ⊃ (h2 ;̂ h0) ⊃ (h3 ;̂ h1)
PastStateImpBi ` w ⊃ 2̂i w
PastNextImpNotNextNot ` ©̂h ⊃ ¬ ©̂¬h
BoxInduct ` h0 ∧ 2̂(h0 ⊃ ©̂wh0) ⊃ 2̂h0
PastChopStarEqv ` h∗̂0 ≡ ((h∗̂0 ;̂ (h0 ∧ m̂ore)) ∨ êmpty)
MP ` h0 ⊃ h1, ` h0 ⇒ ` h1
PastBoxGen ` h0 ⊃ ` 2̂h0
PastBiGen ` h0 ⊃ ` 2̂i h0
PastChopEmptyAnd ` h ∧ w0 ≡ h ;̂ (êmpty ∧ w0)
Table 3.13: Axioms and Rules for Propositional ITLp.
Where w is a state formula, the propositional axioms and rules of ITLp are as-
sumed to be complete according to Moszkowski introducing the complete axioms
system of ITL [104], and we used the axioms and rules with finite time to generate
the axioms and rules for ITLp and proof it for past time, thus, it can be said that
we have a complete axioms and rules of ITLp.
The soundness proof of axioms and rules of ITLp is given and listed in Appendix
A.
3.6 Chapter Summary
This Chapter mainly discusses:
ITL, its syntax and semantics and provides a discussion on past time ITL. Section
wise detail of topics covered in this Chapter is:
94 Sami Alsarhani
CHAPTER 3. PAST TIME INTERVAL TEMPORAL LOGIC
• The start of this Chapter introduces ITL (Interval temporal language) and its
formal definitions.
• The next Section covers the syntax and semantics of Interval temporal logic,
these have been explained with the help of examples.
• Past time interval logic, its semantics and syntax, is explained with the help
of related examples; a detailed discussion on the past time operators is also
presented.
• The last Section of this Chapter introduces an overview of axioms in logic. The
axioms and rules for both propositional ITL and its past time counterpart i.e.
Propositional ITLp are listed, and these axioms and rules are proved sound.
This Chapter introduces past time ITLp, its syntax and semantics, which is the
main contribution of this thesis. Past time operators of ITLp will be used in the
next Chapter to give SANTA operators history based semantics.
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4.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, a set of temporal languages has been investigated to express history
based policies. To represent policy rules formally, the semantic model for the always-
followed-by operator will be given in order to investigate the suitability of these
languages to reason about history based policies. SANTA policy language has been
introduced in Chapter 2, however, in this Chapter, we will redefine SANTA operators
and use it to introduce the semantics of individual rules and the semantics of policies
as well as the semantics of compound policies. Also, we will list refinement rules
used to refine compound policies but we will not use it. What is more, a description
of the verification rules used to verify properties is given and we will show how
the compositional specification of policies can be exploited using proof-rules that
simplify the verification tasks by splitting the proof of a property for a complete
specification of rules to proofs of individual weak rules. The refinement rules into
enforcer are introduced, these rules can be used to construct an enforcer E for the
compound policies.
4.2 Choice of temporal logic
In this next Section, we will investigate a chosen set of temporal languages to ex-
press history based access control policies. A formal semantic model for the always-
followed-by operator (used to represent policy rules) will be used for this investi-
gation.
4.2.1 Formal semantics of policy rules
The semantic model needs to model sequences of “snapshots” of a system. These
sequences represent the behaviour of the system. We model these snapshots via a
state mapping. A state is a mapping from the set of propositional variables V ar to
the set of values {tt, ff}.
An interval (behaviour) is a finite sequence of one or more states σ0σ1σ2 . . . σ|σ| where
|σ| denotes the length of an interval σ and is equal to the number of states minus 1.
Let Σ denote the set of all possible intervals. Let σ = σ0σ1 . . . σ|σ| be an interval.
Then σ0 . . . σk (where 0 ≤ k ≤ |σ|) denotes a prefix interval of σ, σk . . . σ|σ| (where
0 ≤ k ≤ |σ|) denotes a suffix interval of σ and σk . . . σl (where 0 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ |σ|)
denotes a subinterval of σ.
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Let [[...]] be the “meaning” function from policy rule language ×Σ to {tt, ff}. The
formal semantics of the always-followed-by operator Pre 7→ W , where Pre is a
formula denoting the history and W is an access control variable.
The semantics [[Pre 7→ W ]]σ of the always-followed-by operator is as follows:
for all k, (where 0 ≤ k ≤ |σ| and [[Pre]]σ0...σk= tt) implies[[W ]]σk = tt.
Notice that the implication in the semantics of an individual rule means that W
can be true in a state even if Pre does not hold in the prefix of that interval.
However, for verification purposes, we need to know the value of W in any state of
the interval. This is exactly what the strong always-followed-by operator does,
it explicitly specifies the conditions under which the access decision is false [32,
61]. This operator will be used in the verification of properties on policy rules and
is defined as:
Pre↔ W =̂ Pre 7→ W ∧ ¬Pre 7→ ¬W.
If Pre holds in the prefix interval, then W must hold in the last state of that prefix
interval, otherwise W must not hold in that state.
We will discuss the suitability of Propositional Interval Temporal Logic (PITL) [97],
Propositional Linear Temporal Logic (PLTL) [88] and the proposed ITLp to show
that ITLp is the right choice to express history-based access control policies.
4.2.2 Propositional interval temporal logic
Propositional Interval Temporal Logic (PITL) [97] is a temporal logic with a basic
construct for the sequential composition of two formula as well as an analogue of
Kleene star. Within PITL one can express both finite-state automata and regular
expressions. The syntax of PITL is as follow:
Note that the operator © can be used both for expressions (e.g.,© J ) and for
Formula f ::= true| q | Q | p(e1, . . . , en)| ¬f | f1 ∧ f2| ∀v.f | skip| f1 ; f2| f∗
formulas, e.g., ©(I = 3) [98].
Semantics
The informal semantics of the most interesting constructs are as follows:
• ¬f : f does not holds for that interval.
• f1 ∧ f2: f1 holds for that interval and f2 holds for that interval.
• skip unit interval (length 1).
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• f1 ; f2 holds if the interval can be decomposed (“chopped”) into a prefix and
suffix interval, such that f1 holds over the prefix and f2 over the suffix, or if
the interval is infinite and f1 holds for that interval.
• f ∗ holds if the interval is decomposable into a finite number of intervals such
that for each of them f holds, or the interval is infinite and can be decomposed
into an infinite number of finite intervals for which f holds.
The formal semantics of PITL is as follows:
Let [[...]] be the “meaning” function from PITL formula ×Σ to {tt, ff}.
• [[p]]σ = tt iff σ0(p)=tt.
• [[¬f ]]σ = tt iff not [[f ]]σ=tt.
• [[f1 ∨ f2]]σ = tt iff [[f1]]σ=tt or [[f2]]σ=tt.
• [[skip]]σ = tt iff |σ|=1.
• [[f1 ; f2]]σ = tt iff (exists k s.t. ([[f1]]σ0...σk= tt and [[f2]]σk...σ|σ| = tt)).
• [[f ∗]]σ = tt iff (exists l0 . . . ln s.t. l0 = 0 and ln = |σ| and for all 0 ≤ < n,
li < li+i and [[f ]]σli ...σli+1 = tt).
Now, we need to introduce the following operators in order to help us in expressing
the policy rule:
• more =̂ skip ; true which is an interval with two or more states.
• empty =̂ ¬more which is an interval with one state only.
• 3i f =̂ f ; true a prefix interval for which f holds.
• 2i f =̂ ¬(3i ¬ f )
Now, always-followed-by and strong-always-followed operator are introduced as fol-
lows:
always-followed-by (Pre 7→ W )
Pre 7→ W =̂ 2i (¬(Pre ; ((¬W ) ∧ empty)))
strong-always-followed-by (Pre ↔ W )
99 Sami Alsarhani
CHAPTER 4. ITLP TO REASON ABOUT HISTORY-BASED ACCESS
CONTROL POLICIES
Pre ↔ W =̂ 2i (¬(Pre ; ((¬W ) ∧ empty))) ∧ 2i (¬(¬ Pre ; (W ∧ empty)))
As we see above when introducing always followed by and strong always followed
by operators, PITL is suffering from non-elementary complexity. The development
of efficient PITL-based verification tools is very difficult due to this problem. So, it
can be said that PITL is not a good choice to reason about history based policies.
4.2.3 Propositional linear temporal logic (PLTL)
In the next part, we will investigate whether PLTL [88] is suitable to express history-
based access control rules.
The syntax of PLTL formula f is introduced follows:
Formula f ::= true|p|f1 ∨ f2|¬f |© f |2f |f1 U f2
Until operator has the semantics:
-[[f1 U f2]]σ = tt iff there exists k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |σ|, [[f2]]σk...σ|σ|= tt and for all j : 0 ≤
j < k, [[f1]]σj ...σ|σ| =tt.
Therefore the semantics of ¬(f1Uf2) is:
[[¬(f1 U ¬f2)]]σ = tt iff there exists a k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |σ|, [[f2]]σk...σ|σ|= tt or not for all
j : 0 ≤ j < k, [[f1]]σj ...σ|σ| =tt.
which is almost the always-followed-by operator, i.e., if the formulas f1 and f2
are restricted to be state formula then ¬(f1 U ¬f2) corresponds to (2f1) 7→ f2.
It is clear from above that the premise in Propositional linear temporal logic can only
be an always type of property. Hence, the sequential composition of, for example,
two phases cannot be expressed in the normal way. Therefore, the sequential access
and cardinality on history policy rules are hard to express [24].
4.2.4 Interval Temporal Logic (ITL)
In Chapter 3, Interval temporal logic operators were introduced and now we will use
these operators to define SANTA operators always-followed-by and strong-always-
followed-by, and use these operators to express history based policies.
Always-followed-by (7→):
The operator always-followed-by denoted by the symbol( 7→) is defined as follows:
f 7→ w =̂ 2i (f ⊃ fin (w))
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where f stands for any ITL formula, and w is a state formula. The intuition of the
operator(f 7→ w) is that whenever the formula f holds for a prefix interval then
the state formula must w holds in the final state of that interval, that is, f is always
followed by w as shown in Figure 4.1:
f 7→ w =̂ 2i (f ⊃ fin (w))
iff for all k such that(0 ≤ k ≤ |σ| ∧Mσ
k→|σ|





















This operator always-followed-by (7→) will be used in the scenario Chapter to
express security policy rules of general practice system (GPS).
Strong-always-followed-by (↔):
The operator strong always-followed-by, denoted by the symbol (f ↔ w) is defined
as follows:
f ↔ w =̂ 2i (f ≡ fin (w))
where f stands for any ITL formula, and w is a state formula.
iff for all k such that(0 ≤ k ≤ |σ| ∧Mσ
k→|σ|
[[h]] = tt) iff Mσ|σ| [[fin (w)]] = tt
The intuition of the operator strong always-followed-by (f ↔ w) determines in
any state the value of the state formula w. If f holds in the prefix of the reference
interval, then w must hold in that state otherwise w must not hold in that state as
shown in Figure 4.2, where each bullet represents a state.
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This operator will be used in the Scenario Chapter to express security policy
rules of general practice system (GPS).
As we show above, the two operators always-followed-by (Figure 4.1) and strong-
always-followed-by (Figure 4.2) have been defined from the future time operators of
ITL. In the following sections and in the GPS scenario, we will use these operators
to reason about history based access control policies and compare it with the existing
work.
Syntax of SANTA with future time
In the following, we provide the syntax of access control policies.
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Subjects
su ::= Si | cs
Objects
ob ::= Oi | co
Actions
ac ::= Ai | ca(e1, ..., en)
Premise of rule
pr ::= pr1 chop pr2 | pr1 and pr2 | pr1or pr2 |
always pr | sometime pr | not pr | next pr |
if be then pr1 else pr2 | exists x in se : pr |
forall x in se : pr | last(e) : pr | e : pr | be
Rules
ru ::= [rn ::] allow(su, ob, ac)when pr |
[rn ::] deny(su, ob, ac)when pr |
[rn ::] decide(su, ob, ac)when pr
Policies
po ::= (ru1...run)|po2 policy pn :: po end|
po2 chop po1|if be then po1 else po2|
aslongas be : po
Figure 4.3: Syntax of SANTA policy language
Figure 4.3 above summarizes the syntax of our policy language where e is an ex-
pression, be a Boolean expression, and se a Set expression with their usual operators
and semantics. Si is a subject variable, where i is a arbitrary name, similarly Oi is
an object variable, Ai is an action variable and pn is a name for a policy; rn is a
name for a rule (optional). Let Subjects, Objects and Actions be, respectively, the
universal set of subjects, objects and actions. These can be used as part of SANTA
expressions. Let cs ∈ Subjects be a subject, co ∈ Object be an object and ca(v) ∈
Actions be an action with interface v [69].
The syntax of policy rule will be explained informally in the next Section.
Policy rules
A rule typically expresses a single security requirement and forms the basic building
block of a policy. Rules consist of a premise and a consequence. The premise
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describes a set of system behaviours, which lead to the consequence that represents
an assertion on the current system state, such as allowing or denying a particular
access. The consequence of a rule defines the decision taken by the reference monitor.
The set of system behaviours in the premise is matched against the history of the
system execution. Rules therefore can refer to sequences of previously observed
states in the system execution, allowing for the expression of history-based policies
[1] and dynamic separation of duty constraints [124]. Events that can be referred to
in the premise of rules are those defined in the computational model represented in
the Literature Review Chapter in Figure 2.11 or external events that are observable
by the RM process. Authorization defines the access to resources in the system.
With respect to the computational model they define whether the execution of an
action is permissible. An authorization rule defines the condition under which a
subject is allowed to perform an action on an object [69].
Now, we will explain the formal semantics of SANTA.
Formal semantics of SANTA with future time
As SANTA is using a compositional approach to the specification of policies, its un-
derlying formalism should therefore also express specifications of system behaviour
compositionally.
In the following we will provides the formal semantics for SANTA.
Semantics of rules:
Policy rules define the behaviour of the access control variables. The consequence of
a rule determines the type of the rule and the subjects, objects and actions the rule
applies to. The operator always-followed-by is used to capture the relation between
the premise of a rule and its consequence.
Let us first define the semantics of a premise. The syntax that is used in the premise
is actually a subset of ITL formula.
The semantics of a rule premise is then as follows:
Jpr1 chop pr2K =̂ Jpr1K ; Jpr2K
Jpr1 and pr2K =̂ Jpr1K ∧ Jpr2K
Jpr1 or pr2K =̂ Jpr1K ∨ Jpr2K
Jnot prK =̂ ¬J prK
Jsometime prK =̂ 3J prK
Jalways prK =̂ 2J prK
Jnext prK =̂ skip ; J prK
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Jif be then pr1 else pr2K =̂ ((be ∧ Jpr1K) ∨ (¬be ∧ Jpr2K))
Jexists x in se : prK =̂ ∃x.x ∈ se ∧ JprK
Jforall x in se : prK =̂ ∀x.x ∈ se ⊃ JprK
Jlast(e)prK =̂ (2(empty ∧ ¬JprK) ; skip ; (empty ∧ JprK))n
Je : prK =̂ finite ; (len(e) ∧ J pr K)
The semantics of e : pr 7→ w includes t̂rue ;̂ to obtain the “history” h of length
e from the point where w holds. The operator always-followed-by ( 7→) which has
been defined in Section 5.2.4 will be used to define the semantics of individual rules.
The semantics of individual rules is defined as follows:
Jallow(su, ob, ac) when prK =̂
∀ vs ∈ Subjects. ∀ vo ∈ Objects. ∀ va ∈ Actions.
J prK 7→ Aut+(su, ob, ac)
Jdeny(su, ob, ac) when prK =̂
∀ vs ∈ Subjects. ∀ vo ∈ Objects. ∀ va ∈ Actions.
J prK 7→ Aut−(su, ob, ac)
Jdecide(su, ob, ac) when prK =̂
∀ vs ∈ Subjects. ∀ vo ∈ Objects. ∀ va ∈ Actions.
J prK 7→ Aut(su, ob, ac)
Let vs ∈ frees(r); vo ∈ freeo(r); and va ∈ freea(r) be the free variables (sub-
ject, object and action, respectively) in the rule r. The propositional state variable
Aut+(su, ob, ac) captures positive authorisations. If its value is true the policy
defines a positive authorization for the subject su to perform action ac on object
ob. Similarly Aut−(su, ob, ac) captures negative authorisations. The propositional
state variable Aut(su, ob, ac) defines the access control decision taken by the ref-
erence monitor [69].
Semantics of policies:
We first define the semantics of a policy that consists of a collection of rules. The
implication, in the semantics of an individual rule, (f ⊃ fin (w)) means that the
state formula w holds in the final state of interval if and only if the formula f holds
in some prefix of that interval.
Policies (at semantic level), define the access decision in every state of the reference
monitor and are important for its verification.
We adopt a refinement approach using the “strong-always-followed-by” operator de-
noted by (↔) to obtain a complete policy specification.
The operator strong-always-followed-by (↔) is defined as follows:
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in this operator, a rule of the form (f ↔ fin (w)) determines in any state the value
of the state formula w.
If w holds in the final state of the interval, then f must hold in this interval and
if w does not holds in the final state of the interval, then f must not hold in this
interval.
The motivation of using a refinement approach is that if we can show that a system
satisfies f ↔ fin (w) then it also satisfies f 7→ fin (w).
Thus, by rewriting the policy specification using the algorithm presented below [69]
we strengthen the specification by adding default rules such that the specification
is complete.
By this, we mean that the specification defines the value of Aut+(s, o, a),Aut−(s, o, a)
and Aut(s, o, a) in each state of the system and thus can be enforced by the refer-
ence monitor.
The semantics of a policy of the form ru1....run is a semantically completely speci-
fied formula, i.e., the following formula:
∧
(f(s, o, a)↔ Aut+(s, o, a))∧
s ∈ Subjects (g(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
o ∈ Objects (h(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a)),
a ∈ Actions
where, for each s ∈ Subjects, o ∈ Objects and a ∈ Actions,
1. f(s, o, a) =̂
∨l
i=1J priK and pri appears as a premise in an allow rule of
ru1....run. If there are no allow (s, o, a) rules in ru1....run, then f(s, o, a) =
false.
2. g(s, o, a) =̂
∨m
i=1J priK and pri appears as a premise in a deny rule of ru1....run.
If there are no deny(s, o, a) rules in ru1....run, then g(s, o, a) = false.
3. h(s, o, a) =̂
∨k
i=1J priK and pri appears as a premise in a decide rule of
ru1....run. If there are no decide (s, o, a) rules in ru1....run, then h(s, o, a) =
false.
For each triple (s, o, a) ∈ Subjects × Objects × Actions, the formula Jru1....runK
contains exactly one rule of the form f(s, o, a) ↔ Aut+(s, o, a), one rule of the
form g(s, o, a) ↔ Aut−(s, o, a) and one rule of the form h(s, o, a) ↔ Aut(s, o, a).
Therefore, it fully determines the value of Aut(s, o, a) at each state of the system.
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Default rules are automatically provided. For example, if the policy po does not
contain a rule for Aut+(s, o, a), for some subject s, object o and action a, then it
defaults to a rule of the form false↔ Aut+(s, o, a) in Jru1...runK.
Similarly for Aut−(s, o, a) and Aut(s, o, a) if there are no explicit rules for them in
ru1...run. As such, Jru1...runK grants every right granted by (ru1...run) and denies
everything else [69].
4.2.5 Interval Temporal Logic with past time (ITLp)
In Chapter 3, the past time operators of ITLp have been introduced, and in the
following Section, we will use these operators to give the SANTA operators always-
followed-by and strong-always-followed-by a history based semantics, in order to
support our choice of ITLp to express history based policies.
Always-followed-by (7→):
The operator past always-followed-by(7→) is defined as follows:
h 7→ w =̂ 2̂(h ⊃ (w))
where h stands for any ITLp formula, and w is a state formula. The definition of
always-followed-by with the history semantics (7→) is as follow:
h 7→ w =̂ 2̂(h ⊃ w)
iff for all k such that(0 ≤ k ≤ |τ | ∧Mτ|τ |←τk [[h]] = tt) ⊃ Mτk [[w]] = tt
The intuition of the operator(h 7→ w) is that w holds in the initial state of history
interval then f must hold previously in the past interval. We only know that w
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Strong-always-followed-by (↔):
The operator past always-followed-by (h ↔ w) is defined as follows:
h ↔ w =̂ 2̂(h ≡ w)
where h stands for any ITLp formula, and w is a state formula. The definition of
always-followed-by with the history semantics (h ↔ w) is as follow:
iff for all k such that(0 ≤ k ≤ |τ | ∧Mτ|τ |←τk [[h]] = tt) iff Mτk [[w]] = tt
The intuition of the operator (h ↔ w) determines in any state the value of the
state formula w.
If w holds in the initial state of the past reference interval, then h must hold for all




























In conclusion, as we show above, the two operators always-followed-by (Figure
4.4) and strong-always-followed-by (Figure 4.5) can be given a history semantics
using the past time operators of ITLp and we will show in the Scenario Chapter that
these operators can be used to reason about history based access control policies.
Syntax of SANTA with past time
In the following, we provide the syntax of access control policies.
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Subjects
su ::= Si | cs
Objects
ob ::= Oi | co
Actions
ac ::= Ai | ca(e1, ..., en)
Premise of rule
pr ::= pr1 chop pr2 | pr1 and pr2 | pr1or pr2 |
always pr | sometime pr | not pr | next pr |
if be then pr1 else pr2 | exists x in se : pr |
forall x in se : pr | last(e) : pr | e : pr | be
Rules
ru ::= [rn ::] allow(su, ob, ac)when pr |
[rn ::] deny(su, ob, ac)when pr |
[rn ::] decide(su, ob, ac)when pr
Policies
po ::= (ru1...run)|po2 policy pn :: po end|
po2 chop po1|if be then po1 else po2|
aslongas be : po
Figure 4.6: Syntax of SANTA policy language with past time
Figure 4.6 above summarizes the syntax of our policy language where e is an ex-
pression, be a Boolean expression, and se a Set expression with their usual operators
and semantics. Si is a subject variable, where i is a arbitrary name, similarly Oi is
an object variable, Ai is an action variable and pn is a name for a policy; rn is a
name for a rule (optional). Let Subjects, Objects and Actions be, respectively, the
universal set of subjects, objects and actions. These can be used as part of SANTA
expressions. Let cs ∈ Subjects be a subject, co ∈ Object be an object and ca(v) ∈
Actions be an action with interface v.
The following subsections will explain the semantics of SANTA formally [69].
Formal semantics of SANTA with past time
As SANTA is using a compositional approach to the specification of policies, its un-
derlying formalism should therefore also express specifications of system behaviour
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compositionally.
In the following we will provide the formal semantics for SANTA.
Semantics of rules:
Policy rules define the behaviour of the access control variables however, the conse-
quence of a rule determines the type of rule and the subjects, objects and actions
which the rule applies to. The operator always-followed-by is used to capture the
relation between the premise of a rule and its consequence.
The syntax that is used in the premise is actually a subset of ITLp formula, so, a
definition of the premise semantics is needed. The semantics of a rule premise is
then as follows:
Jpr2 chop pr1K =̂ Jpr2K ;̂ Jpr1K
Jpr1 and pr2K =̂ Jpr1K ∧ Jpr2K
Jpr1 or pr2K =̂ Jpr1K ∨ Jpr2K
Jnot prK =̂ ¬J prK
Jsometime prK =̂ 3̂i J prK
Jalways prK =̂ 2̂i J prK
Jnext prK =̂ ŝkip ;̂ J prK
Jif be then pr1 else pr2K =̂ ((be ∧ Jpr1K) ∨ (¬be ∧ Jpr2K))
Jexists x in se : prK =̂ ∃x.x ∈ se ∧ JprK
Jforall x in se : prK =̂ ∀x.x ∈ se ⊃ JprK
Jlast(e)prK =̂ (2̂(êmpty ∧ ¬JprK) ;̂ ŝkip ;̂ (êmpty ∧ JprK))n
Je : prK =̂ t̂rue ;̂ (len(e) ∧ J pr K)
The following operators sometimep, alwaysp and nextp are the introduced oper-
ators; these operators have been given a history based semantics using past time
operators and they will help us to reason about history based access control policy
in the GPS scenario. The first introduced operator sometimep is needed if an
incident happened sometime in the past while alwaysp operator is needed if the
incident happened continuously to the end of this interval however, the operator
nextp is used to express that the incident happened in the previous state in the
historical interval.
The following operators, which has been added to SANTA language: has the fol-
lowing semantics:
Jsometimep prK =̂ 3̂J prK
Jalwaysp prK =̂ 2̂J prK
Jnextp prK =̂ ©̂J prK
The semantics of e : pr 7→ w includes t̂rue ;̂ to obtain the “history” h of length
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e from the point where w holds. The operator always-followed-by ( 7→) which has
been defined in Section 5.2.4 will be used to define the semantics of individual rules.
The semantics of individual rules is defined as follows:
Jallow(su, ob, ac) when prK =̂
∀ vs ∈ Subjects. ∀ vo ∈ Objects. ∀ va ∈ Actions.
J prK 7→ Aut+(su, ob, ac)
Jdeny(su, ob, ac) when prK =̂
∀ vs ∈ Subjects. ∀ vo ∈ Objects. ∀ va ∈ Actions.
J prK 7→ Aut−(su, ob, ac)
Jdecide(su, ob, ac) when prK =̂
∀ vs ∈ Subjects. ∀ vo ∈ Objects. ∀ va ∈ Actions.
J prK 7→ Aut(su, ob, ac)
Let vs ∈ frees(r); vo ∈ freeo(r); and va ∈ freea(r) be the free variables (sub-
ject, object and action, respectively) in the rule r. The propositional state variable
Aut+(su, ob, ac) captures positive authorisations. If its value is true the policy
defines a positive authorization for the subject su to perform action ac on object
ob. Similarly Aut−(su, ob, ac) captures negative authorisations. The propositional
state variable Aut(su, ob, ac) defines the access control decision taken by the ref-
erence monitor [69].
Semantics of policies: We first define the semantics of a policy that consists
of a collection of rules. The implication, in the semantics of an individual rule,
(h ⊃ w) means that w can be true in the initial state of past interval even if h did
not hold in the suffix of that past interval.
Policies (at semantic level) define the access decision in every state of the reference
monitor and are important for its verification.
We adopt a refinement approach using the “strong-always-followed-by” operator de-
noted by (↔) : to obtain a complete policy specification.
The operator strong-always-followed-by (↔) is defined as follows:
in this operator, a rule of the form (h ↔ w) determines in any state the value of
the state formula w.
If w holds in the initial state of the past interval, then h must holds in this interval
and if w not holds in the initial state of the past interval, then h must not hold in
this interval.
The motivation of using a refinement approach is that if we can show that a system
satisfies h ↔ w then it also satisfies h 7→ w.
Thus, by rewriting the policy specification using the algorithm presented below [69]
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we strengthen the specification by adding default rules such that the specification
is complete.
By this we mean that the specification defines the value of Aut+(s, o, a),Aut−(s, o, a)
and Aut(s, o, a) in each state of the system and thus can be enforced by the refer-
ence monitor.
The semantics of a policy of the form ru1....run is a semantically completely speci-
fied formula, i.e., the following formula:
∧
(f(s, o, a)↔ Aut+(s, o, a))∧
s ∈ Subjects (g(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
o ∈ Objects (h(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a)),
a ∈ Actions
where, for each s ∈ Subjects, o ∈ Objects and a ∈ Actions,
1. f(s, o, a) =̂
∨l
i=1J priK and pri appears as a premise in an allow rule of
ru1....run. If there are no allow (s, o, a) rules in ru1....run, then f(s, o, a) =
false.
2. g(s, o, a) =̂
∨m
i=1J priK and pri appears as a premise in a deny rule of ru1....run.
If there are no deny(s, o, a) rules in ru1....run, then g(s, o, a) = false.
3. h(s, o, a) =̂
∨k
i=1J priK and pri appears as a premise in a decide rule of
ru1....run. If there are no decide (s, o, a) rules in ru1....run, then h(s, o, a) =
false.
For each triple (s, o, a) ∈ Subjects × Objects × Actions, the formula Jru1....runK
contains exactly one rule of the form f(s, o, a) ↔ Aut+(s, o, a), one rule of the
form g(s, o, a) ↔ Aut−(s, o, a) and one rule of the form h(s, o, a) ↔ Aut(s, o, a).
Therefore, it fully determines the value of Aut(s, o, a) at each state of the system.
Default rules are automatically provided. For example, if the policy po does not
contain a rule for Aut+(s, o, a), for some subject s, object o and action a, then it
defaults to a rule of the form false↔ Aut+(s, o, a) in Jru1...runK.
Similarly for Aut−(s, o, a) and Aut(s, o, a) if there are no explicit rules for them in
ru1...run. As such, Jru1...runK grants every right granted by (ru1...run) and denies
everything else [69].
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Semantics of compound policies
The semantics of the other policy construct is as follows: Let Subjects, Objects, Actions
be, respectively, the universal set of subjects, objects and actions. Note the SANTA
construct policy pn : po end gives policy po a name pn, i.e. it acts as an abbrevi-
ation for po so we do not need to give a semantics to this construct.
Jpo2 chop po1K =̂ Jpo2K ;̂ Jpo1K
Jif be then po1 else po2K =̂ ((be ∧ Jpo1K) ∨ (¬be ∧ Jpo2K))
Jaslongas be : poK =̂ (êmpty ∧ ¬be) ∨ (fîn ¬be ∧ (ŝkip ;̂ (JpoK ∧ 2̂ be)))
4.3 Verification Rules
We will describe the verification of properties and show how the compositional spec-
ification of policies can be exploited using compositional proof-rules that simplify
the verification tasks.
The following definition states when a policy satisfies a property.
Definition: We say that a policy po satisfies a property f if and only if JpoK ⊃ f
is valid.
A safety property informally expresses that nothing bad will happen during exe-
cution of a program; however, Alpern and Schneider [6] have defined formally the
safety property in a future time temporal logic as:
ψ =̂ 2f
Because we proposed past time operators of ITLp we will redefine the safety prop-
erty to be informally expressed that nothing bad happened during execution of a
program using history information and that can be written formally as:
ψ =̂ 2̂ f
Before the second formula is used in our work, we want to show that it is also a
safety property.
Let us take this formula:
ψ =̂ 2f
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it means that f is holds over the future interval, so this future formula looks from
the end of the future interval σ|σ| for every prefix intervals to the current state σ0,


















Figure 4.7: Safety property always
Now, let us take this formula:
ψ =̂ 2̂i f
it means that f holds over the past initial intervals, so this past formula means that
we are looking from the current state of the past interval τ0 for every suffix interval

















Figure 4.8: Safety property past box-i
As we see from the two figures that the two formula is equivalent and it can be
written:
ψ =̂ 2f =̂ 2̂i f
Also, we want to show the relation between the operators past always 2̂ f and the
operators 2i f and wither the two operators are equal and also a safety property.
Let us take this formula:
ψ =̂ 2̂ f
it means that f is holds over the past interval, so this past formula look from the
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end of the past interval τ|τ | for every prefix intervals to the current state τ0, or



















Figure 4.9: Safety property past always
Now, let us take this formula:
ψ =̂ 2i f
it means that f holds over the future initial intervals, so this future formula
means that we are looking from the current state of the future interval σ0 for every




















Figure 4.10: Safety property future box-i
As we see from the two Figures 4.9 and 4.10 that the two formulas are equivalent
and it can be written:
ψ =̂ 2̂ f =̂ 2i f




ψ =̂ 2̂i f
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are equal and can be used as safety property.
Also, we have shown that the two formulas:
ψ =̂ 2̂ f
and
ψ =̂ 2i f
are equal as we have shown in the two Figures 4.9 and 4.10 and can be used as a
safety property as well.
4.3.1 Proof Rules:
The following proof rule splits the proof of a property for a complete specification
of rules to proofs of individual weak rules. This rule is used when the weak rules
have enough information to deduce the property [69].
Proof Rule 1:
Jru1K ⊃ prop, ..., JrunK ⊃ prop
Jru1...runK ⊃ prop
In case the weak rules does not has enough information, we can use the following
stronger rule.
Proof Rule 2:





 (f(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(g(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
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4.4 Chapter Summary
This Chapter presents a part of our contribution, which is the past time operators
and also presents a comparison of existing work.
As part of the preliminaries, we provide an informal description of the underlying
computational model of the policies specifications of our work, and put this model
into the context of the well-known PDP/PEP model. Security Analysis toolkit
(SANTA) policy language and compositions are next introduced and then formal
syntax of the language is given with an informal explanation of the syntax. Further,
we give a formal semantics to SANTA and define the semantics of individual rules
as well as the use of always-followed-by operator and the operator strong-always-
followed-by.
The verification rules which are used to verify that a system satisfies properties
are given in this Chapter, also how compositional specifications of policies can be
exploited using these proof-rules. This will simplify the verification tasks by splitting
the proof of a property for a complete specification of rules, to individual proofs of
weak rules.
The proposed past time operators of ITLp used to give the SANTA operators a
history-based semantics, and then the existing SANTA and SANTA with history
semantics will be used in the Scenario Chapter in order to show that SANTA with







In this case study:
• System description.
• Access control policy specification using ITLp.
• Semantics of GPS policies using ITLp.
• Safety property with ITLp.
• Summary of proof
• Access control policy specification ITL.
• Semantics of GPS policies using ITL.
• Safety property with ITL.
• evaluation of existed SANTA and SANTA with
ITLp.
• Summary of proof
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CHAPTER 5. SCENARIO:
GENERAL PRACTICE SYSTEM (GPS)
5.1 Introduction
The current and the following chapters will present two case studies related to our
work presented in the previous chapters (3,4 and 5). In this chapters the case study
presented is of a General Practice System. Past time Interval Temporal Logic ITLp
is used for defining the syntax and semantics of GPS policies and to reason about
them.
We illustrate our approach with a detailed case-study of a General Practice System
(GPS) showing the compositional verification of safety. The GPS case study is
based on Janicke et al.’s paper “Dynamic Access Control Policies:Specification and
Verification” [69]. The GPS case study consists of two sections: Specification, and
Verification. In the Specification Section, one specifies a GPS by a set of history-
based access control rules. In the Verification Section, one takes this set of rules
together with properties that need to hold and check whether this set of rules satisfies
these properties.
5.2 System description:
A General Practice System GPS is available to the public via a web interface so
users such as doctor, patient, and nurse should register before they can use the sys-
tem.
Before the first entry to the system, the patient must sign a consent form and legal
agreement to allow the General Practice to legally collect and use the personal in-
formation of the patient.
After the registration and signing of the consent form and legal agreement, the
patient can book an appointment with the chosen doctor if (s)he has not an ap-
pointment before, and (s)he can update his/her personal information stored in the
system about him/her however, (s)he cannot alter his/her medical records in the
system, (s)he can view them only.
A nurse can view the patient medical records if the patient is admitted, but she can-
not sign a legal agreement on behalf of any patient. Also (s)he cannot subsequently
alter the patient’s medical records and doctor’s notes.
A doctor can view the personal information and alter the medical records of
his patient, also he can add private notes about this patient. However, the doctor
cannot treat a patient who is not his patient unless there is a requirement to do so,
and this can only be done if the patients has agreed.
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5.2.1 Subjects description table
We will list and give a description for all the subjects in the GPS:
S is a member of GPS:
SNURSE: a nurse.
SPATIENT : a patient.
SDOCTOR: a doctor.
5.2.2 Objects description table
In table 5.1, we will list all the objects in the GPS and give a description for it:
Object Description
GPS General Practice System
O any object in the system
Omedical records Patient medical records
Odoctor notes Doctor notes
Opatient personal info Patient personal information in the system
OLA Legal agreement
OCF Consent form
OAPPOINTMENT appointment with the doctor
Oprivate notes Doctors private notes
Table 5.1: Objects description table
5.2.3 Action in the GPS:













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































GENERAL PRACTICE SYSTEM (GPS)
5.3 Past time
In this Section, in order to evaluate the introduced past time operators of interval
temporal logic ITLp, it has been used to reason about general practice system GPS
to show that it is convinced choice.
5.3.1 Access control policy specification:
The specification of policy reflects the informal description of the GPS System.
We define the policy as a combination of simple policies that correspond to the
requirements of each policy. The objective of the scenario is to show how poli-
cies are composed to yield a structured specification against which the composi-
tional verification approach can be applied. The rules that refer to history such as
R1, R2, R6, R9, R10, R13 and R16 are applied in this case study.
We are going to model a GPS policy that consists of three simple policies, Nurse,
Patient, and the Doctor. The Nurse’s policy is a simple policy containing the rules
from R1 to R5. The Patient’s policy is a simple policy containing the rules from R6
to R12. The Doctor’s policy is a simple policy containing the rules from R13 to R18.
In addition, we are going to specify the policy rules using the future operators to
make a comparison between the past time operators and the future time operators.
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5.3.2 Specification with past time
Explanation
Figure 5.1 shows the graphical meaning of the formula:
true chopp alwaysp(registered(SPATIENT ))
Figure 5.1: AlwaysPastChop
The meaning of this formula is that the past interval is chopped into two interval
using chopp, the first interval satisfies the formula alwaysp(registered(SPATIENT ))
and before that the second interval satisfies true with the common state in between.
Nurse Rules:
• R1 :A nurse has no access to the system before she has registered on
the system.
allow(SNURSE, GPS, access) when true chop
p alwaysp( registered(SNURSE))
• R2 : A nurse can view the patient medical record when a patient is
admitted.
allow(SNURSE, GPS, view(Omedical record)) when
( true chopp alwaysp(admit(SPATIENT ))) and
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medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )
• R3 : A nurse cannot alter the medical records and doctor’s notes.
deny(SNURSE, GPS, alter(O))when 0 : (O = Omedical records orO = Odoctor notes)
• R4 : The nurse cannot sign the legal agreement on behalf of a pa-
tient.
deny(SNURSE, GPS, sign(OLA)) when true
• R5 : Action is only granted to the nurse if there is a positive autho-
risation and no negative authorisation.
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Patient Rules:
• R6 : A patient should be registered to the system before (s)he can
access the system.
allow(SPATIENT , GPS, access) when true chop
p alwaysp(registered(SPATIENT ))
• R7 : A patient can update his/her own personal information stored
in the system.
allow(SPATIENT , GPS, update(Opatient info)) when 0 :
patient info(Opatient info, SPATIENT )
• R8 : A patient cannot alter the medical records in the system.
deny(SPATIENT , GPS, alter(Omedical records)) when true
• R9 : The patient should sign the consent form and the legal agree-
ment once before any treatment.
allow(SPATIENT , GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) when true chop
p alwaysp
( sign(SPATIENT , OLA) and sign(SPATIENT , OCF ))
• R10 : The patient can book an appointment with the chosen doctor
if (s)he has not an appointment.
allow(SPATIENT , GPS, book(OAPPOINTMENT )) when
true chopp alwaysp not booking(SPATIENT , OAPPOINTMENT ) chop
p skipp
• R11 : A patient can view his/her medical record in the system.
allow(SPATIENT , GPS, view(Omedical record)) when 0 :
medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )
• R12 : Action is only granted to the patient if there is a positive au-
thorisation and no negative authorisation.
decide(SPATIENT , GPS,A) when 0 : (allow(SPATIENT , GPS,A)
and not deny(SPATIENT , GPS,A))
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Doctor Rules:
• R13 : A doctor has no access to the system before (s)he is registered
to the system.
allow(SDOCTOR, GPS, access) when true chop
p alwaysp (registered(SDOCTOR))
• R14 : The doctor can alter all of the medical records of his patients.
allow(SDOCTOR, GPS, alter(Omedical record)) when 0 :
doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) and medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )
• R15 : Doctors can also add private notes about a patient.
allow(SDOCTOR, GPS, add(Oprivate notes)) when 0 :
doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) and private notes(Oprivate notes, SPATIENT )
• R16 :A doctor can treat a patient who is not his/her patient if the
patient agrees.
allow(SDOCTOR, GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) when ( true chop
p alwaysp
(agree(SPATIENT )))and(SDOCTOR1 6= SDOCTOR) and
alwaysp(doctor(SDOCTOR1 , SPATIENT )) and
alwaysp(not doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ))
• R17 : The doctor can view his patient’s personal information.
allow(SDOCTOR, GPS, view(Opatient info)) when 0 : doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) and
patient info(Opatient info, SPATIENT )
• R18 : Action is only granted to the doctor if there is a positive au-
thorisation and no negative authorisation.
decide(SDOCTOR, GPS,A) when 0 : (allow(SDOCTOR, GPS,A)
and not deny(SDOCTOR, GPS,A))
126 Sami Alsarhani
CHAPTER 5. SCENARIO:
GENERAL PRACTICE SYSTEM (GPS)
5.3.3 Policies summary
Nurse policy
The nurse policy is a simple policy containing the rules from R1 to R4 with the
decision rule R5:
Policy Nurse::
R1 : allow(SNURSE, GPS, access) when true chop
p alwaysp( registered(SNURSE))
R2 : allow(SNURSE, GPS, view(Omedical record)) when
( true chopp alwaysp(admit(SPATIENT ))) and
medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )
R3 : deny(SNURSE, GPS, alter(O))when 0 : (O = Omedical records orO = Odoctor notes)
R4 : deny(SNURSE, GPS, sign(OLA)) when true
R5 : decide(SNURSE, GPS,A) when 0 :
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Patient policy
The patient policy is a simple policy containing the rules from R6 to R11 with the
decision rule R12:
Policy Patient::
R6 : allow(SPATIENT , GPS, access) when true chop
p alwaysp(registered(SPATIENT ))
R7 : allow(SPATIENT , GPS, update(Opatient info)) when 0 :
patient info(Opatient info, SPATIENT )
R8 : deny(SPATIENT , GPS, alter(Omedical records) when true
R9 : allow(SPATIENT , GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) when true chop
p alwaysp
( sign(SPATIENT , OLA) and sign(SPATIENT , OCF )
R10 : allow(SPATIENT , GPS, book(OAPPOINTMENT )) when
true chopp alwaysp not booking(SPATIENT , OAPPOINTMENT ) chop
p skipp
R11 : allow(SPATIENT , GPS, view(Omedical record)) when 0 :
medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )
R12 : decide(SPATIENT , GPS,A) when 0 : (allow(SPATIENT , GPS,A)




GENERAL PRACTICE SYSTEM (GPS)
Doctor policy
The doctor policy is a simple policy containing the rules from R13 to R17 with the
decision rule R18 :
Policy Doctor::
R13 : allow(SDOCTOR, GPS, access) when true chop
p alwaysp (registered(SDOCTOR))
R14 : allow(SDOCTOR, GPS, alter(Omedical record)) when 0
doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) and medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )
R15 : allow(SDOCTOR, GPS, add(Oprivate notes)) when 0 :
doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) and private notes(Oprivate notes, SPATIENT )
R16 : allow(SDOCTOR, GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) when ( true chop
p alwaysp
(agree(SPATIENT )))and(SDOCTOR1 6= SDOCTOR) and
alwaysp(doctor(SDOCTOR1 , SPATIENT )) and
alwaysp(not doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ))
R17 : allow(SDOCTOR, GPS, view(Opatient info)) when 0 : doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) and
patient info(Opatient info, SPATIENT )
R18 : decide(SDOCTOR, GPS,A) when 0 : (allow(SDOCTOR, GPS,A)
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5.3.4 Semantics of GPS policies
The following is a mapping from the SANTA policy language used to express the
GPS policies into their formal ITLp semantics. The proofs in Section (5.6) are
using the semantic representation of policies.
Semantics of PNURSE
JPNURSEK ≡ J R1...R5 K ≡ J R
′
1 K ∧ J R
′
2 K ∧ J R
′
3 K ∧ J R
′
4 K where:






 (fNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
fNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J true chopp alwaysp( registered(SNURSE))K (SNURSE,GPS, access) 1
and gNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
gNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SNURSE, GPS, access) 1
and hNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
hNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SNURSE,GPS, access) and not deny(SNURSE,GPS, access)K (SNURSE,GPS, access) 5
130 Sami Alsarhani
CHAPTER 5. SCENARIO:
GENERAL PRACTICE SYSTEM (GPS)
and J R2 ∧ R5 K ≡ J R
′
2 K
where fNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
fNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J ( true chopp alwaysp(admit(SPATIENT )))
and medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )K (SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) 2
and gNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
gNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) 2
and hNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
hNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
and not deny(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))K (SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) 5
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and J R3 ∧ R5 K ≡ J R
′
3 K
where fNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
fNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) 3
and gNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
gNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : (O = Omedical records) or (O = Odoctor notes)K (SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) 3
and hNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
hNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : deny(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) and not allow(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))K (SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) 5
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and J R4 ∧ R5 K ≡ J R
′
4 K
where fNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
fNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SNURSE,GPS, sign(O)) 4
and gNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
gNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J true K (SNURSE,GPS, sign(OLA)) 4
and hNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
hNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : deny(SNURSE,GPS, sign(O)) and not allow(SNURSE,GPS, sign(O))K (SNURSE,GPS, sign(O)) 5
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Semantics of PPATIENT
JPPATIENT K ≡ J R6...R12K ≡ J R
′
6 K ∧ J R
′
7 K ∧ J R
′
8 K ∧ J R
′
9 K ∧ J R
′
10 K ∧ J R
′
11 K
where J R′6 K, J R
′
7 K, J R
′
8 K, J R
′
9 K, J R
′
10 K, J R
′
11 K
are defined in Appendix B Part 1.
Semantics of PDOCTOR
JPDOCTORK ≡ J R13...R18 K ≡ J R
′
13 K ∧ J R
′
14 K ∧ J R
′
15 K ∧ J R
′
16 K ∧ J R
′
17 K
where J R′13 K, J R
′
14 K, J R
′
15 K, J R
′
16 K, J R
′
17 K are defined in Appendix B Part 2.
5.3.5 Safety property:
A safety property informally expresses that nothing bad will happen during execu-
tion of a program or formally:
ψ =̂ 2̂h
We will give a specific safety property for every member of the GPS and prove that
this property holds for each member.
Nurse Safety Property:
The safety property can be defined as:
It is never the case that the nurse can use GPS without being registered in the
system.
Let ψ1 =̂ 2̂((Aut(SNURSE,GPS, a)) ⊃ true ;̂ 2̂(registered(SNURSE)))
denote the nurse safety property and let a ∈ {access , view , alter}
The proof that the GPS policy satisfies ψ1 can be done by proving that each of
the nurse rules in this policy which affect the safety property will not invalidate this
property ψ1, i.e. JR1...R5K ⊃ ψ1.
We have to prove that JR1 ∧ R5K ⊃ ψ1, JR2 ∧ R5K ⊃ ψ1, JR3 ∧R5K ⊃ ψ1.
Here JRiK denotes only the rules that affect the safety property so the rules JR4 andR5K ⊃
ψ1 are not included because they cannot affect (invalidate) ψ1.
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1 : A nurse has no access to the system before she has registered on the system.
allow(SNURSE,GPS, access) when true chop
p alwaysp( registered(SNURSE))
1. From the semantics of PNURSE we have:






 (fNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

true ;̂ 2̂( registered(SNURSE)) ↔ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access)
∧ false ↔ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access)
∧ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access) ∧ ¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access) ↔
Aut(SNURSE,GPS, access)
2. from the definition of (↔) we have:
h ↔ w =̂ 2̂(h ≡ w)
3. true ;̂ 2̂( registered(SNURSE)) ≡ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access)
∧ false ≡ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access)
∧ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access) ∧ ¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access) ≡
Aut(SNURSE,GPS, access)
4. so, we have:
2̂(Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access) ∧ ¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access)
≡ Aut(SNURSE,GPS, access))
5. but we know that:
false ↔ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access)
so, step 3 can be written as:
2̂(Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access) ≡ Aut(SNURSE,GPS, access))
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6. from above we have:
2̂(true ;̂ 2̂( registered(SNURSE)) ≡ Aut(SNURSE,GPS, access))
7. using ITLp reasoning, we have:
2̂(Aut(SNURSE,GPS, access) ⊃ true ;̂ 2̂( registered(SNURSE)))
8. and this is ψ1.
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2 : A nurse can view the patient’s medical records when a patient is admitted.
allow(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical records)) when
true chopp alwaysp((admit(SPATIENT )) and medical record(SPATIENT ))
1. From the semantics of PNURSE we have:






 (fNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

true ;̂ 2̂((admit(SPATIENT )) ∧ medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )) ↔
Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
∧ false ↔ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
∧Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) ∧ ¬Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
↔ Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
2. from the definition of (↔) we have:
h ↔ w =̂ 2̂(h ≡ w)
3. true ;̂ 2̂((admit(SPATIENT )) ∧ medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )) ≡
Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
∧ false ≡ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
∧Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) ∧ ¬Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
≡ Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
4. so, we have:
2̂(Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) ∧ ¬Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
≡ Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)))
5. but we know that:
false ↔ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
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6. so, we can write it as:
2̂(Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) ≡ Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)))
7. and we have:
2̂(true ;̂ 2̂((admit(SPATIENT )) ∧medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )) ≡
Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)))
8. this is equal to:
2̂(Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) ≡
true ;̂ 2̂((admit(SPATIENT )) ∧ medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )))
9. we assume that view can only be after registration, so we can say that:
2̂(Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) ≡ true ;̂ 2̂( registered(SNURSE)))
10. and from it we have:
2̂(Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) ⊃ true ;̂ 2̂( registered(SNURSE)))











3 : A nurse cannot alter the medical records and doctor’s notes.
deny(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))when 0 : (O = Omedical records or O = Odoctor notes)
1. From the semantics of PNURSE we have:
JR3 ∧R5 K ≡ J R
′
3 K ≡






 (fNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

false ↔ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))
∧ O = (Omedical records ∨ Odoctor notes)↔ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))
∧ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) ∧ ¬ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))
↔ Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))
2. from the definition of (↔) we have:
h ↔ w =̂ 2̂(h ≡ w)
3. false ≡ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))
∧ O = (Omedical records ∨ Odoctor notes) ≡ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))
∧ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) ∧ ¬ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))
≡ Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))
4. so, we have:
2̂(Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) ∧ ¬ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) ≡
Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)))
5. We know that:
false ≡ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))
So, we can simplify it to:
2̂(Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) ≡ Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)))
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6. this yields to:
2̂(true ;̂ (len(0) ∧ (O = Omedical records ∨ O = ODoctor notes)) ≡
Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)))
7. and from the reasoning of ITLp we have:
2̂((O = Omedical records ∨O = ODoctor notes) ≡ Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)))
8. this is equal to:
2̂(Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) ≡ (O = Omedical records ∨ O = Odoctor notes))
9. by assume that alter can be after registration, so we can say that:
2̂(Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) ⊃ (O = Omedical records ∨ O = Odoctor notes))





GENERAL PRACTICE SYSTEM (GPS)
Patient Safety Property:
It is never the case that the patient can alter the medical records in the system.
Let ψ2 =̂ 2̂(¬Aut(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
denote the safety property.
A compositional proof that patient policy satisfies ψ2 can be done using proof rules





We have to prove that JR′6∧R
′
11K ⊃ ψ2. Here JR
′
iK denotes only rules that can affect








11K cannot invalidate ψ2.
We can prove that the patient policy satisfies the safety property by proving that
R
′






8 : A patient cannot alter the medical records in the system.
deny(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records) when true
1. From the semantics of PPATIENT we have:







 (fPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

false ↔ Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))
∧ true ↔ Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))
∧ Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))
∧ ¬ Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ↔
Aut(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))
2. from the definition of (↔) we have:
h ↔ w =̂ 2̂(h ≡ w)
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3. false ≡ Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))
∧ true ≡ Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))
∧ Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))
∧ ¬ Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ≡
Aut(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))
4. and from ITLP reasoning, we have:
2̂(Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))
∧ ¬ Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ≡
Aut(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
5. which can be simplified to:
2̂(true ≡ Aut(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
6. which can be written as:
2̂(¬Aut(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
7. which is ψ2.
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Doctor Safety Property:
It is never the case that anyone can modify the patient medical records without
being a doctor of this patient.
Let ψ3 =̂ 2̂(Aut(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ⊃
doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) ∧ medical records(SPATIENT ))
denote the safety property.
A compositional proof that any policy satisfies ψ3 can be done using proof rules by
proving that each of the rules in this policy satisfies the safety property or formally:
JR13...R18K ⊃ ψ3.
We have to prove that JR14 ∧ R18K =̂ JR
′
14K ⊃ ψ3.







ψ3 because they cannot affect ψ3 .
We can prove that the doctor policy satisfies the safety property by proving that
R
′






14 : The doctor can alter all of the medical records of his/her patients.
allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)) when 0 :
doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) and medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )
1. From the semantics of PDOCTOR we have:






 (fDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) ∧ medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT ) ↔
Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))
∧ false ↔ Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))
∧ Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))
∧ ¬ Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)) ↔
Aut(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))
2. from the definition of (↔) we have:
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h ↔ w =̂ 2̂(h ≡ w)
3. and from the reasoning of ITLp, so we have:
2̂(Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))
∧ ¬ Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)) ≡
Aut(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)))
4. which can be simplified to:
2̂(Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)) ≡
Aut(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)))
5. and we can write as:
2̂(doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) ∧medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT ) ≡
Aut(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)))
6. so we have:
2̂(Aut(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)) ⊃ (doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) ∧
medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )))
7. which is ψ3.
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Proof summary
We can proof that any policy satisfies the safety property, this can be done using
the proof rules in (Section 4.5.1) by proving that each of the rules in this policy
satisfies the property.
NURSE
The nurse policy consists from simple policies which is from R1 to R5:
and from the semantics of PNURSE we have:













so each rule that affect the safety property in nurse policy satisfies ψ1 and from the





3 K ⊃ ψ1
and from above, we can say that:
JPNURSEK ⊃ ψ1
PATIENT
The patient policy consists from simple policies which is from R6 to R12:
and from the semantics of PPATIENT we have:














J R′8 K ⊃ ψ2
so each rule that affect the safety property in patient policy satisfies ψ2 and from
the proof rule 2 we can say that:
JPPATIENT K ⊃ ψ2
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DOCTOR
The doctor policy consists from simple policies which is from R13 to R18:
and from the semantics of PDOCTOR we have:












J R′14 K ⊃ ψ3
so each rule that affect the safety property in doctor policy satisfies ψ3 and from the




GENERAL PRACTICE SYSTEM (GPS)
5.4 Future time
In this Section, the future time operators of ITL have been used to reason about
general practice systemGPS and compare it with the introduced past time operators
to evaluate it.
5.4.1 Specification with future time
Nurse Rules:
• R1 :A nurse has no access to the system before she has registered on
the system.
allow(SNURSE,GPS, access) when 0 : true chop always( registered(SNURSE))
• R2 : A nurse can view the patient medical record when a patient is
admitted.
allow(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) when 0 :
( true chop always(admit(SPATIENT ))) and
medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )
• R3 : A nurse cannot alter the medical records and doctor’s notes.
deny(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))when 0 : (O = Omedical records orO = Odoctor notes)
• R4 : The nurse cannot sign the legal agreement on behalf of a pa-
tient.
deny(SNURSE,GPS, sign(OLA)) when true
• R5 : Action is only granted to the nurse if there is a positive autho-
risation and no negative authorisation.




GENERAL PRACTICE SYSTEM (GPS)
Patient Rules:
• R6 : A patient should be registered to the system before (s)he can
access the system.
allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, access) when 0 : true chop always(registered(SPATIENT ))
• R7 : A patient can update his/her own personal information stored
in the system.
allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, update(Opatient info)) when 0 :
patient info(Opatient info, SPATIENT )
• R8 : A patient cannot alter the medical records in the system.
deny(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) when true
• R9 : The patient should sign the consent form and the legal agree-
ment once before any treatment.
allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) when 0 : true chop always
( sign(SPATIENT , OLA) and sign(SPATIENT , OCF ))
• R10 : The patient can book an appointment with the chosen doctor
if (s)he has not an appointment.
allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, book(OAPPOINTMENT )) when 0 :
true chop always not booking(SPATIENT , OAPPOINTMENT ) chop skip
• R11 : A patient can view his/her medical record in the system.
allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, view(Omedical record)) when 0 :
medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )
• R12 : Action is only granted to the patient if there is a positive au-
thorisation and no negative authorisation.
decide(SPATIENT ,GPS, A) when 0 : (allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, A)
and not deny(SPATIENT ,GPS, A))
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Doctor Rules:
• R13 : A doctor has no access to the system before (s)he is registered
to the system.
allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, access) when 0 : true chop always (registered(SDOCTOR))
• R14 : The doctor can alter all of the medical records of his patients.
allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)) when 0 :
doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) and medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )
• R15 : Doctors can also add private notes about a patient.
allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, add(Oprivate notes)) when 0 :
doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) and private notes(Oprivate notes, SPATIENT )
• R16 :A doctor can treat a patient who is not his/her patient if the
patient agrees.
allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) when 0 : ( true chop always
(agree(SPATIENT )))and(SDOCTOR1 6= SDOCTOR) and
always(doctor(SDOCTOR1 , SPATIENT )) and
always(not doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ))
• R17 : The doctor can view his patient’s personal information.
allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, view(Opatient info)) when 0 : doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) and
patient info(Opatient info, SPATIENT )
• R18 : Action is only granted to the doctor if there is a positive au-
thorisation and no negative authorisation.
decide(SDOCTOR,GPS, A) when 0 : (allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, A)
and not deny(SDOCTOR,GPS, A))
149 Sami Alsarhani
CHAPTER 5. SCENARIO:
GENERAL PRACTICE SYSTEM (GPS)
Rules comparison
The nurse policy is a simple policy containing the rules from R1 to R4 with the
decision rule R5. Next, we specify the history rules using future time operators.
In the nurse policy, we have the rules R1 and R2 which are assumed to be history
rules; we specify these using past time operators and future time operators to make
a comparison between the rules.
R1 :A nurse has no access to the system before she has registered on the
system.
Using past operators:
allow(SNURSE,GPS, access) when true chop
p alwaysp( registered(SNURSE))
Using future operators:
allow(SNURSE,GPS, access) when 0 : true chop always( registered(SNURSE))
R2 : A nurse can view the patient medical record when a patient is ad-
mitted.
Using past operators:
R2 : allow(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) when
( true chopp alwaysp(admit(SPATIENT ))) and
medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )
Using future operators:
allow(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) when 0 :
( true chop always(admit(SPATIENT ))) and
medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )
The patient policy is a simple policy containing the rules from R6 to R11 with
the decision rule R12. Next, we specify the history rules using future time operators.
In the patient policy, we have the rules R6, R9 and R10 which are assumed to be
history rules; we specify these using past operators and future time operators to
make a comparison between the rules.
R6 : A patient should be registered to the system before (s)he can access
the system.
Using past operators:
allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, access) when true chop
p alwaysp(registered(SPATIENT ))
Using future operators:
allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, access) when 0 : true chop always(registered(SPATIENT ))
R9 : The patient should sign the consent form and the legal agreement
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once before any treatment.
Using past operators:
allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) when true chop
p alwaysp
( sign(SPATIENT , OLA) and sign(SPATIENT , OCF )
Using future operators:
allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) when 0 : true chop always
( sign(SPATIENT , OLA) and sign(SPATIENT , OCF ))
R10 : The patient can book an appointment with the chosen doctor if
(s)he has not an appointment.
Using past operators:
allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, book(OAPPOINTMENT )) when
true chopp alwaysp not booking(SPATIENT , OAPPOINTMENT ) chop skip
p
Using future operators:
allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, book(OAPPOINTMENT )) when 0 :
true chop always not booking(SPATIENT , OAPPOINTMENT ) chop skip
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The doctor policy is a simple policy containing the rules from R13 to R17 with
the decision rule R18. Next, we specify the history rules using future time operators.
In the Doctor policy, we have the rules R13 and R16 which are assumed to be history
rules; we specify these using past operators and future time operators to make a
comparison between the rules.
R13 : A doctor has no access to the system before (s)he is registered
on the system.
Using past operators:
allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, access) when true chop
p alwaysp (registered(SDOCTOR))
Using future operators:
allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, access) when 0 : true chop always (registered(SDOCTOR))
R16 :A doctor can treat a patient who is not his/her patient if the
patient agrees.
Using past operators:
allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) when ( true chop
p alwaysp
agree(SPATIENT )))and(SDOCTOR1 6= SDOCTOR) and
alwaysp(doctor(SDOCTOR1 , SPATIENT )) and
alwaysp(not doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ))
Using future operators:
allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) when 0 : ( true chop always
agree(SPATIENT )))and(SDOCTOR1 6= SDOCTOR) and
always(doctor(SDOCTOR1 , SPATIENT )) and
always(not doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ))
Conclusion of rules comparison
As has been shown above, it can be concluded the past time operators of ITLp are
valid to reason about history based access control policy such as GPS. Also, it
can be concluded that it is not clear that the specification when using past time
operators is easier to express (simplicity) than the specification when using future
time operators. Additionally, the formula with past is not shorter (succinctness)
than the formula with future time operators, so it can be said succinctness and
simplicity are not achieved in the specification level.
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5.4.2 Semantics of GPS policies using future time
The following is a mapping from the SANTA policy language used to express the
GPS policies into their formal ITL semantics. The proofs in Section (5.10) are
using the semantic representation of policies.
Semantics of PNURSE
JPNURSEK ≡ J R1...R5 K ≡ J R
′
1 K ∧ J R
′
2 K ∧ J R
′
3 K ∧ J R
′
4 K where:






 (fNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
fNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J true chop always( registered(SNURSE)) K (SNURSE,GPS, access) 1
and gNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
gNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SNURSE,GPS, access) 1
and hNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
hNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SNURSE,GPS, access) and not deny(SNURSE,GPS, access)K (SNURSE,GPS, access) 5
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and J R2 ∧ R5 K ≡ J R
′
2 K
where fNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
fNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J ( true chop always(admitt(SPATIENT )))
and medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )K (SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) 2
and gNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
gNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) 2
and hNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
hNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
and not deny(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))K (SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) 5
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and J R3 ∧ R5 K ≡ J R
′
3 K
where fNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
fNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) 3
and gNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
gNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J O = Omedical records) or O = Odoctor notes K (SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) 3
and hNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
hNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : deny(SNURSE ,GPS, alter(O)) and not allow(SNURSE ,GPS, alter(O))K (SNURSE ,GPS, alter(O)) 5
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and J R4 ∧ R5 K ≡ J R
′
4 K
where fNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
fNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SNURSE,GPS, sign(O)) 4
and gNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
gNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J true K (SNURSE,GPS, sign(OLA)) 4
and hNURSE(s, o, a) is defined as:
hNURSE(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : deny(SNURSE,GPS, sign(O)) and not allow(SNURSE,GPS, sign(O))K (SNURSE,GPS, sign(O)) 5
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Semantics of PPATIENT
JPPATIENT K ≡ J R6...R12K ≡ J R
′
6 K ∧ J R
′
7 K ∧ J R
′
8 K ∧ J R
′
9 K ∧ J R
′
10 K ∧ J R
′
11 K
where J R′6 K, J R
′
7 K, J R
′
8 K, J R
′
9 K, J R
′
10 K, J R
′
11 K are defined in Appendix C
Part 1.
Semantics of PDOCTOR
JPDOCTORK ≡ J R13...R18 K ≡ J R
′
13 K ∧ J R
′
14 K ∧ J R
′
15 K ∧ J R
′
16 K ∧ J R
′
17 K
where J R′13 K, J R
′
14 K, J R
′
15 K, J R
′
16 K, J R
′
17 K are defined in Appendix C part 2.
5.4.3 Safety property:
A safety property informally express that nothing bad will happen during execution
of a program or formally:
ψ =̂ 2i f
We will give a specific safety property for every member of the GPS and prove that
this property holds for each member.
Nurse Safety Property:
The safety property can be defined as:
It is never the case that the nurse can use GPS without being registered on the
system.
Let ψ1 =̂ 2i (fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, a)) ⊃ true ; 2(registered(SNURSE)))
denote the nurse safety property and let a ∈ {access , view , alter}
The proof that GPS policy satisfies ψ1 can be done by proving that each of the
nurse rules in this policy which affect the safety property will not invalidate this
property ψ1, i.e. JR1...R5K ⊃ ψ1.
We have to prove that JR1 ∧ R5K ⊃ ψ1, JR2 ∧ R5K ⊃ ψ1, JR3 ∧R5K ⊃ ψ1.
HereJRiK denotes only the rules that affect the safety property.JR4...R5K ⊃ ψ1 be-
cause they cannot affect (invalidate) ψ1.
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1 : A nurse has no access to the system before she has registered on the system.
allow(SNURSE,GPS, access) when 0 true chop always( registered(SNURSE))
1. From the semantics of PNURSE we have:






 (fNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

(true ; 2( registered(SNURSE))) ↔ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access)
∧ false ↔ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access)
∧ 0 : (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access) ∧ ¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access)) ↔
Aut(SNURSE,GPS, access)
2. from the definition of(↔), we have:
f ↔ w =̂ 2i (f ≡ fin (w))
3. which can be written as:
2i ((true ; 2( registered(SNURSE))) ≡ fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access)))
∧ 2i (false ≡ fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access)))
∧2i ((true;(len(0)∧Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access) ∧ ¬Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access))) ≡
fin Aut(SNURSE,GPS, access))
4. By definition, we know that:
true ; (len(0)∧(Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access) ∧ ¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access)))
≡ fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access) ∧ ¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access))
5. so, we can write the first one as:
2i (true ; 2( registered(SNURSE))) ≡ fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access))
∧ 2i (false ≡ fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access)))
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6. so, we have:
2i (fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access) ∧ ¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access)) ≡
fin Aut(SNURSE,GPS, access))
7. we know that:
fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access) ∧ ¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access)) ≡
fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access)) ∧ fin (¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access))
8. also, we know that:
fin (¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access)) ≡ ¬ fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access))
9. so, we have:
2i (fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access)) ∧ ¬ fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access))
≡ fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, access)))
10. we know that false ≡ fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access))
11. so, we can write:
2i (fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access)) ≡ fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, access)))
12. and from above we have:
2i (true ; 2( registered(SNURSE)) ≡ fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, access)))
13. using ITL reasoning, we have:
2i (fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, access)) ⊃ true ; 2( registered(SNURSE)))
14. and this is ψ1.
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2 : A nurse can view the patient’s medical records when a patient is admitted.
allow(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical records)) when 0 :
true chop always((admitt(SPATIENT )) and medical record(SPATIENT ))
1. From the semantics of PNURSE we have:






 (fNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

true ; 2((admitt(SPATIENT )) ∧medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )) ↔
Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
∧ false ↔ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
∧ 0 : Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) ∧
¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
↔ Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
2. from the definition of(↔) we have:
f ↔ w =̂ 2i (f ≡ fin (w))
3. we have:
2i (true ; 2((admitt(SPATIENT )) ∧medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )) ≡
fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))))
∧ 2i (false ≡ fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))))
∧ 2i (true ; (len(0) ∧ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
∧ ¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)))
≡ fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))))
4. By definition, we have:
true ; (len(0) ∧ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) ∧
¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))) ≡
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fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) ∧
¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)))
5. so, we can substitute it, and we have:
2i (true ; 2((admitt(SPATIENT )) ∧medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )) ≡
fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))))
∧ 2i (false ≡ fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))))
∧ 2i (fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) ∧
¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)))
≡ fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))))
6. so, we have:
2i (fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) ∧
¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)))
≡ fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))))
7. we know that:
fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)) ∧
¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))) ≡
fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))) ∧
fin (¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)))
8. also, we know that:
fin (¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))) ≡
¬ fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)))
9. so, we have:
2i (fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))) ∧
¬ fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)))
≡ fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))))
10. but we know that false ≡ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))
11. substitute it, we can write it as:
2i (fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record)))
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≡ fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))))
12. and we have:
2i (fin (true ; 2((admitt(SPATIENT )) ∧
medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT ))) ≡
fin ( Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))))
13. this is equal to:
2i (fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))) ≡
true ; 2((admitt(SPATIENT )) ∧ medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )))
14. we assume that view can only be after registration, so we can say that:
2i (fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))) ≡ true ; 2( registered(SNURSE)))
15. and from it we have:
2i (fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, view(Omedical record))) ⊃ true ; 2( registered(SNURSE)))











3 : A nurse cannot alter the medical records and doctor’s notes.
deny(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))when 0 : (O = Omedical records or O = Odoctor notes)
1. From the semantics of PNURSE we have:
JR3 ∧R5 K ≡ J R
′
3 K ≡






 (fNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hNURSE(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

false ↔ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))
∧ O = (Omedical records ∨ Odoctor notes)↔ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))
∧ 0 : Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) ∧ ¬ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))
↔ Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))
2. from the definition of(↔) we have:
f ↔ w =̂ 2i (f ≡ fin (w))
3. we have:
2i (false ≡ fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))))
∧2i (O = (Omedical records ∨Odoctor notes) ≡ fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))))
∧ 2i (0 : Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) ∧ ¬ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))
≡ fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))))
4. So, we have:
2i (false ≡ fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))))
∧2i (O = (Omedical records ∨Odoctor notes) ≡ fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))))
∧2i (true;(len(0)∧Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) ∧ ¬Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)))
≡ fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))))
5. By definition, we have:
true;(len(0)∧Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) ∧ ¬Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))) ≡
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fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) ∧ ¬ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)))
6. So, we have:
2i (false ≡ fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))))
∧2i (O = (Omedical records ∨Odoctor notes) ≡ fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))))
∧ 2i (fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) ∧ ¬ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)))
≡ fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))))
7. So, we have:
2i (fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) ∧ ¬ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)))
≡ fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))))
8. We know that:
fin ((Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) ∧ ¬ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)))) ≡
fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))) ∧ fin (¬ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)))
9. Also, we know that:
fin (¬Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))) ≡ ¬ fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)))
10. So, we have:
2i (fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)))∧ ¬ fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)))
≡ fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))))
11. We know that false ≡ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)) so we can write:
2i (fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))) ≡ fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))))
12. we know that:
(O = (Omedical records ∨ Odoctor notes)) ≡ fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O)))
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13. so, we have:
2i ((O = (Omedical records ∨ Odoctor notes)) ≡ fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))))
14. this yields to:
2i (fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))) ≡ (O = (Omedical records ∨ Odoctor notes)))
15. which can be written as:
2i (fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))) ⊃ (O = (Omedical records ∨ Odoctor notes)))
16. by assume that alter can be after registration, so we can say that:
2i (fin (Aut(SNURSE,GPS, alter(O))) ⊃ (O = (Omedical records ∨ Odoctor notes)))
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Patient Safety Property:
It is never the case that the patient can alter the medical records in the system.
Let ψ2 =̂ 2i (fin (¬Aut(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
denote the safety property.
A compositional proof that patient policy satisfies ψ2 can be done using proof rules




We have to prove that JR′8∧R
′
11K ⊃ ψ2. Here JR
′
iK denotes only rules that can affect
the safety property. The rules JR′9...R
′
11K cannot invalidate ψ2.
We can prove that the patient policy satisfies the safety property by proving that
R
′






8 : A patient cannot alter the medical records in the system.
deny(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records) when 0 : true
1. From the semantics of PPATIENT we have:







 (fPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

false ↔ Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))
∧ true ↔ Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))
∧ 0 : Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))
∧ ¬ Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ↔
Aut(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))
2. from the definition of(↔) we have:
f ↔ w =̂ 2i (f ≡ fin (w))
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3. we have:
2i (false ≡ fin (Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
∧ 2i (true ≡ fin ( Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
∧ 2i (0 : Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ∧
¬ Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))
≡ fin (Aut(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
4. so, we have:
2i (false ≡ fin (Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
∧ 2i (true ≡ fin (Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
∧ 2i (true ; (len(0) ∧ Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ∧
¬ Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
≡ fin (Aut(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
5. By definition, we have:
true ; (len(0) ∧ Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ∧
¬ Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))) ≡
fin (Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ∧
¬ Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
6. so, we have:
2i (false ≡ fin (Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
∧ 2i (true ≡ fin (Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
∧ 2i (fin (Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ∧
¬ Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
≡ fin (Aut(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
7. which can be written as:
2i (fin (Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ∧
¬ Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
≡ fin (Aut(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
8. We know that:
fin (Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ∧
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¬ Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))) ≡
fin (Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))) ∧
fin (¬ Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
9. Also, we know that:
fin (¬ Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))) ≡
¬ fin (Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
10. So, we have:
2i (fin (Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))) ∧
¬ fin (Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
≡ fin (Aut(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
11. We know that:
false ≡ fin (Aut+(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
12. So, we have:
2i (fin (Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
≡ fin (Aut(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
13. we know that:
true ≡ fin ( Aut−(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
14. so, we have:
2i (true ≡ fin (Aut(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
15. which can be written as:
2i (fin (¬Aut(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
16. which is ψ2.
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Doctor Safety Property:
It is never the case that anyone can modify the patient medical records without
being a doctor of this patient.
Let ψ3 =̂ 2i (fin (Aut(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records))) ⊃
doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) ∧ medical records(SPATIENT ))
denote the safety property.
A compositional proof that any policy satisfies ψ3 can be done using proof rules by
proving that each of the rules in this policy satisfies the safety property ψ3.
JR13...R18K ⊃ ψ3.
We have to prove that JR14 ∧ R18K ⊃ ψ3.







ψ3 because they cannot affect ψ3 .
We can prove that the doctor policy satisfies the safety property by proving that
R
′






14 : The doctor can alter all of the medical records of his/her patients.
allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)) when 0 :
doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) and medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )
1. From the semantics of PDOCTOR we have:






 (fDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) ∧ medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT ) ↔
Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))
∧ false ↔ Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))
∧ 0 : Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))
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2. from the definition of(↔) we have:
f ↔ w =̂ 2i (f ≡ fin (w))
3. we have:
2i (doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) ∧medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT ) ≡
fin (Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))))
∧ 2i (false ≡ fin (Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))))
∧ 2i (0 : Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ∧
¬ Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records))
≡ fin (Aut(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
4. so, we have:
2i (doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) ∧medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT ) ≡
fin (Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))))
∧ 2i (false ≡ fin (Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))))
∧ 2i (true ; (len(0) ∧ Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ∧
¬ Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
≡ fin (Aut(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
5. By definition, we have:
true ; (len(0) ∧ Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ∧
¬ Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records))) ≡
fin (Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ∧
¬ Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
6. so, we have:
2i (doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) ∧medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT ) ≡
fin (Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))))
∧ 2i (false ≡ fin (Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))))
∧ 2i (fin (Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ∧
¬ Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
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≡ fin (Aut(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
7. which can be written as:
2i (fin (Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ∧
¬ Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
≡ fin (Aut(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
8. We know that:
fin (Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) ∧
¬ Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records))) ≡
fin (Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records))) ∧
fin (¬ Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
9. Also, we know that:
fin (¬ Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records))) ≡
¬ fin (Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
10. we know that:
false ≡ fin (Aut−(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)))
11. so, we have:
2i (fin (Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
≡ fin (Aut(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
12. which can be written as:
2i (fin (Aut(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
≡ fin (Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records))))
13. we know that:
doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) ∧ medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT ) ≡
fin (Aut+(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)))
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14. so, we can write it as:
2i (fin (Aut(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical records)))
≡ doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) ∧ medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT ))
15. which is ψ3.
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5.5 Comparison between the two proofs
In this Section, we will compare the proofs when using the past time operators with
the one when using the future time operators.
First, let us take the proof of safety property of the nurse policy with the past time
operators:
ψ1 =̂ 2̂((Aut(SNURSE, GPS, a)) ⊃ true ;̂ 2̂(registered(SNURSE))) (5.1)
Then, the proof of safety property of the nurse policy with the future time op-
erators:
ψ1 =̂ 2i (fin (Aut(SNURSE, GPS, a)) ⊃ true ; 2(registered(SNURSE))) (5.2)
The difference between the first formula (5.1) and the second one (5.2) is the
operator fin which is an additional operator in the second formula (5.2). As we see
in the Nurse Safety Property, in Section (5.6.1) with the past time operators and in
Section (5.10.1) with the future time operators, when comparing between the two
proofs, it is clear that one is shorter and contains less symbols. For instance, the
proof that rule R
′
1 satisfies the safety property, when using the proposed verification
rules with the past time operators and is much shorter (only 8 steps) than the proofs
when using the future time (14 steps). Also, the proof that the rule R
′
2 satisfies the
safety property, when using the past time operators is done with only 11 steps;
however, the same proof is done with 16 steps when using future time. In the next
table we will list the rules which we have proved satisfy the safety property and in
how many steps the proof is done.
Rules number Steps with the past Steps with the future
R
′
1 8 steps 14 steps
R
′
2 11 steps 16 steps
R
′
3 10 steps 17 steps
R
′
8 7 steps 16 steps
R
′
14 7 steps 15 steps
Table 5.3: Rules proof comparison
Table 5.3 shows that all the proofs with the past time operators have been done
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with fewer steps compared to the proofs with future time.
Also, if we compare between the starting proof step, which is the third step of the
past time proof:
true ;̂ 2̂( registered(SNURSE)) ≡ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access)
∧ false ≡ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access)
∧ Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access) ∧ ¬ Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access) ≡
Aut(SNURSE,GPS, access)
For the future time proof, the third step is:
2i ((true ; 2( registered(SNURSE))) ≡ fin (Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access)))
∧ 2i (false ≡ fin (Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access)))
∧2i ((true;(len(0)∧Aut+(SNURSE,GPS, access) ∧ ¬Aut−(SNURSE,GPS, access))) ≡
fin Aut(SNURSE,GPS, access))
It can be seen that the proof with past time is much shorter and has less number
of symbols and this makes the proof easier to express (simpler) than the future
time proof. As we have said before, the reason is the additional two operators fin
and 2i which are used in the future time proof. This affects the remaining of the
proof and hence it has more steps. So, it can be said that future time uses more
operators, fin and 2i , than the past time in the verification process and this make
the verification of the safety property with the past time much shorter as it has a
less number of symbols (more succinct) than the proof with future time; also it can
be said it is easier to express (simpler) regarding succinctness. Consequently, it can
be concluded that the succinctness and simplicity are achieved in the verification
step.
5.6 Chapter Summary
In order to evaluate the past time operators of ITLp, the scenario of GPS system
is given and specified using the past time operators of ITLp as well as the existing
future time operators of ITL.
The proof rules which have been proposed in Section 4.5.1, have been used to verify
the safety property of the GPS scenario and this show the benefits of the proof
system ofITLp. Also, we have used the existing proof rules of ITL to verify the
safety property of the GPS system. A comparison between the specification and
verification when using past time operators with the specification and verification
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of future time operators has been made to evaluate the past time operators. This
Chapter evaluates the work done in the contribution Chapters (3 and 4) and shows
that the past time operators of ITLp can be used to reason about history-based
access control policy. Additionally, the proposed verification rules (Section 4.3.1)






• Comparison with related work.
• Original contributions.







The aim of this work is to contribute the development of interval temporal logic
with past time operators ITLp as formal specification and verification language and
use it to reason about history based access control policies.
Towards this goal, this research has explored in the literature review the specifi-
cation, temporal logic history including the time models and the classification of
temporal logic and finally, the access control policies where the policy languages
and models to reason about history based access control systems are discussed in
order to support our choice of ITLp. It has been shown that these languages and
models are not appropriate to reason about this class of policies except SANTA and
the proposed model.
Interval temporal logic with future time ITL and with past time ITLp have been
introduced with their syntaxes and semantics, and the proof systems. Moreover,
SANTA operators such as always-followed-by have been given a history semantics
using past time operators of ITLp to use in the Scenario Chapter. In the Sce-
nario Chapter, the specification of GPS system has been described using ITLp and
SANTA operators with the history semantics; however, the verification rules pro-
posed in Section 4.5 has been used to verify the safety property of GPS.
In order to evaluate ITLp, the specification of the GPS system has been described
using ITL and the existing SANTA operators, and the verification rules have been
used to verify the safety property of the given scenario. There has then been a com-
parison between the specification of GPS using past time operators of ITLp and
using the future time operators of ITL to show the advantages of the introduced
past time operators.
6.2 Comparison with related work
This thesis presents the past time operators of ITLp which are different from the
interval temporal logic ITL proposed by Moszkowski [98] since the past time oper-
ators such as past chop (̂;), and past chopstar (∗̂) have been proposed instead of the
future one.
Duan’s [37] and Bowman’s [19] approaches to interval temporal logic are the closest
ones to ours. However, there are many differences between these two works com-
pared to our work in this thesis. The first one is that Duan and Bowman combine
the use of past operators with the future one. This use may be accepted in the
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syntax level but in the semantics level it will lead the model to become complicated
and not clear as the current state is swinging between the future and the past. Also,
the two works have used the past time operators of ITL, but they do not have the
same semantics. To explain that, take the past chop operators proposed by Duan.
First, Duan has used the interpretation notation (σ, i, k, j) rather than an interval
in the original ITL where σ is fixed and the formula p interpreted over it. The
chop operator is used to partition the whole interval σ to some subintervals where
the sub formula p is interpreted over. The notations i, k, j are used to specify the
subintervals σ(i...j) of σ where σk is the current state and a sub formula of p. The
sub formula may involve next and previous operators in arbitrary order, so σk may
swing between σi and σj. Also, when using the chop operator in the sub interval
σ(i...j), this produces two subintervals σ(i...h) where the current position is σk, and
σ(h...j) where the current position is σh as shown in Figure 6.1.
| < —- subinterval1 —- > | < —- subinterval2 —- > |
| | | |
σi σk σh σj
• • • •
current state1 current state2
Figure 6.1: Duan Chop
However, Bowman in Multimedia in Executable Interval Temporal Logic (Mex-
itl), includes the past chop operators (̃;). To explain the chop operators in Mexitl,
assume that we have A ;̃B which is satisfied by an interval such that:
1. A holds over the larger interval resulting from moving the start of the interval
into the past, and
2. B holds over the original interval according to a past history that is truncated
at the start of the interval over which A holds.
The intervals are assumed to be line segments with three reference points. Starting
from the left hand side, the start of time is at the leftmost point, the start of the
current interval is at the next point and the end of the current interval is at the final
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point. Therefore, time is divided into a past history interval and a current interval
as shown in Figure 6.2.
σi σk σj
• < —— past —— • —— future —— > •
time start current state interval end
Figure 6.2: Mexitl Chop
In addition, Duan’s chop behaves differently to Bowman’s chop which also behave
differently to the past chop proposed in this work. As we see from above, the two
works in additional to our work has incorporated past operators, However, these
operators have different semantics as is explained above. Also, they incorporate
the uses of past time operators with the future time and this make these operators
difficult to understand and to use because the reference point is not fixed.
6.3 Original Contributions
With the massive improvement of all the systems in the science area and in computer
science in particular, this necessitates the specification languages such as Interval
Temporal Logic ITL to develop to specify history based access policies; these are
a very expressive class of policies that can define policy decisions dependent on
previously observed behaviours within the system and one of these developments
includes the past.
So far, most languages incorporate only future time operators and exclude the use
of past time operators. The reason behind this is that in various relevant cases
the addition of past operators does not increase the expressiveness power of these
temporal languages.
However, supporters reply that the succinctness is achieved whether the expressive
power is added or not according to the fact that there are many properties can
be expressed by means of much shorter formulas. What is more, when using past
operators many statements become easier to express (simplicity) because of a less
number of symbols and therefore it can be said that the use of temporal logic when
referring to the past is much easier as we will show in simple examples.
As a result, past time operators of ITLp such as past chop (̂;) and past chop star
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(∗̂) and past skip (ŝkip) were defined to enable more simplicity and succinctness in
specifications. Our research work has been to include the past time operators of
ITLp and define the syntax and semantics of these operators. Then, the complete
set of axioms and rules of ITLp are proposed and have proved sound. What is more,
the past time operators have been used to give a history semantics to the SANTA
operators always-followed-by and the strong version of it in (Section 4.3.3).
Additionally, we proposed the verification rules in (Section 4.5.1); these rules have
been used to verify that a system satisfies a property. We have used these verification
rules to prove that the GPS policies satisfy the safety property.
The past time operators of ITLp have been used to reason about history based
access control policies of GPS. A scenario of GPS is given to illustrate the use of
past time operators of ITLp in a history based access control systems where the
policy decision depends on previously observed behaviour to show the application
of these operators and the proposed proof rules.
6.4 Success Criteria Revisited
In order to measure the success of our research, success criteria were formulated in
Chapter 1. These criteria are revisited here:
• The past time operators of interval temporal logic are suitable to reason about
and express history based access control policies.
As we have shown in the GPS scenario, the past time Interval Temporal Logic
ITLp is appropriate and suitable to reason about history based access control
policies and this give us all the advantages of using ITLp, e.g., the use of the
proof rules to verify the safety property of history interval. This can be seen
in the specification of the scenario and the verification of the safety property
of the GPS policies.
• The change of numbering of states with past time operators of interval tem-
poral logic make the reasoning about history easier.
In the problem statement and research motivation (Section 1.2), it has been
discussed how the “ numbering of states” is changed when the past time op-
erators are used, also in the comparison between the two proofs (Section 5.5),
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it has been shown that this change makes the fin operator redundant and
simplify the reasoning about history.
• The formal specification and verification of history based access control policies
when using past time operators of ITL is more succinct and thus, easier to
express (simpler).
In the given GPS scenario, we have used the past time operators to proof the
safety property as it is shown in Sections 5.3.5, then, in Section 5.4.3, we have
used the future time operators to proof the same safety property.
As it has been shown in the comparison between the two proofs (Section 5.5),
it can be said that is the use of the past time operators to proof the safety
property making it much shorter (succinct) and easier to prove (simplicity)
6.5 Conclusion
The interval temporal logic with past time operators ITLp has been investigated:
past modalities, past chop (̂;), past chopstar (∗̂) and past skip (ŝkip) that allows us
to reason about the past has been introduced. Once we used the past time opera-
tors we found out that they helped us to clarify several issues. In particular they
contribute to reason about a very expressive security scenario such as history based
access control policies, where the policy decisions depend on previously observed
behaviours within the system. It is known that past time operators of interval tem-
poral logic ITLp do not increases the expressive power of interval temporal logic
ITL; that is, all the property which can be expressed using past time operators can
be expressed using future time operators. Also, the specification of the GPS policies
using the past time operators (Section 5.3.2) is the same as the specification with
the future time (Section5.4.1). However, there are classes of property proof that
can be expressed by means of much shorter formulas and also with less symbols
(succinctness), hence, the formula is easier to express (simplicity).
This is clear in the safety property with the past time (Section 5.3.4) and in the
safety property with the future time (Section 5.4.3).
Succinctness is achieved due to all the safety property proofs having been done in
fewer steps as has been shown in Table 5.3; also, all the proof formulas with past
time operators are much shorter than the proof formulas with the future time, as
is show in the comparison between the proof (Sections 5.5). Also, Succinctness and




If we want to express that “every request is eventually granted” one finds it natural
to write it as:
2(request ⊃ 3grant) (6.1)
But, if we would like to express that “every grant is preceded by a request”
2̂(grant ⊃ 3̂request) (6.2)
formula (6.2) can be expressed without past time operators as:
2(fin (grant) ⊃ 3 request) (6.3)
This example shows that the interval temporal logic formula with past operators
(6.2) is shorter than the future one (6.3). Thus, it can be said that the specifications
of history with the past time interval temporal logic can be more succinct and thus
simpler as has been shown in the example provided.
In conclusion, while this research is looking at the possible advantages of using
the past time operators of interval temporal logic to reason about security policies,
where the policy decisions depend on previously observed behaviours within the
system known as history based access control policy, the introduced operators can
be applied to several applications such as log file analysis (Section 6.8.2). Past time
operators of interval temporal ITLp and particularly the two operators past Chop
(̂;) and past Chopstar (∗̂) have the ability to express any system consisting of phases;
and these phases consist of sequence of states such as history based access control
policies.
This thesis has made a useful contribution to enable ITLp to be used in nontrivial
scenario such as GPS. However, the area of ITL and particularly ITLp needs
further developments and it is hoped that it will see a growing number and wider
spectrum of researchers.
6.6 Limitations
Any class of interval based temporal logic over linear orderings that contain at least
one linear ordering with an infinite ascending or descending chain of points such as
ITL is suffers from a will-known weakness that is undecidability since the formula
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of these logic are evaluated over intervals, that is, pairs of points. As a conse-
quence, formula translated into binary relation over the underlying ordering and,
respectively, the validity and satisfiability problems translate into dyadic second-
order logic [94]. This situation had discouraged attempts for practical applications
and further research on interval temporal logics. The formula is satisfiable if there
exists an interpretation of the formula as true, whereas a formula is valid if for every
interpretation the formula is true, it can be said that the presence of chop operator
makes the satisfiability of ITL formulas undecidable.
However, there are some additional limitations when using the past time operators;
one of the these limitations is that we are not combining the use of past time op-
erators together with the future time operators; according combining the past time
and future time operators are suffer from the current state problem and this is clear
in the work proposed by Duan in [37] and Bowman in [19]. Also, the executable
subset AnaTempura interpreter does not include the use of past time operators so,
we cannot execute these operators and benefits from the executability advantages.
6.7 Future Work
In the future, we plan to add the past operators to AnaTempura interpreter itself and
this give us the choice to use the past operators or not. We also hope to describe the
operational semantics of these operators in Tempura to execute the past operators
and benefit from the advantages of executing ITL formula and this will enable us
to formalize the relation between various execution strategies.
6.8 Future impact
6.8.1 Academic impact
Adding the past time operators to AnaTempura interpreter and benefiting from the
advantages of executing ITL formula has a future academic impact in the back-
tracking which is a well-known technique used when exploring logical properties. In
this technique, whenever we reach a point, we have a choices, for example between
disjuncts, and we make a selection. If we later find that our choice led to some
inconsistency or not a good choice we stop and use the past operators to revert back
to the last point where the choice has been made and select a different option. If
we find that all the choices form this point where the choice was made have been
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explored and each leads to an inconsistency, then the past operators can be used to
go back to the last choice before this one and so on. If we eventually get back to
our initial starting point, then we know that the formula is inconsistent because we
have explored all potential models. The past operators in this technique are used
instead of the normal procedure which is writing down all the possible choices and
trying them one by one; if we find that the choice is a wrong choice we go back
to the point where the choice has been made and try another one manually. If the
explored logical properties are simple then this process can be done manually, but
if the logical properties are too long and we have many choices, then this process
cannot be done manually and the past operators should be used to perform the
backtracking.
6.8.2 Industrial impact
Current software application often produces some auxiliary text files known as log
files. These files, reports all the events that have occurred during the running of
programs continuously.
Typically, log files are used by programs in the following way:
The log file is an auxiliary output file, distinct from other outputs of the program
and almost all log files are plain text files. On start-up of the program, the log file
is either empty, or contains whatever was left from previous runs of the program.
During program operation, lines (or groups of lines) are gradually appended to the
log file, never deleting or changing any previously stored information. Each record
in a log file is caused by a given event in the program, like user interaction, function
call, input or output procedure. Records in log files are often parameterized, i.e.
they show current values of variables, return values of function calls or any other
state information. The information reported in log files is the information that
programmers consider important or useful for program monitoring and/or locating
faults.
The proposed verification rules when using past time operators (Section 4.5 and
Section 4.5.1) can be applied to check that the log files records satisfy a property
such as safety property because we can use these records as execution history.
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In this appendix, the soundness proof of the propositional axioms and rules of past
time ITLp which are listed in Table 3.13 in Section(3.4.2).
PastChopAssoc
PastChopAssoc ` (h0 ;̂ h1) ;̂ h2 ≡ h0̂; (h1 ;̂ h2)
• PastChopAssoc is valid iff
for all τ . Mτ [[(h0 ;̂ h1) ;̂ h2]]= tt iffMτ [[h0 ;̂ (h1 ;̂ h2)]] = tt
at the L.H.S. we have:
• Mτ [[ (h0 ;̂ h1)̂; h2]]= tt iff exists k where 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t.
Mτk←τ0 [[h2]] = tt andMτ|τ |←τk [[(h0 ;̂ h1)]]= tt
• Mττ←τk [[(h0 ;̂ h1)]]= tt iff exist j where k ≤ j ≤ |τ |, s.t.
Mτj←τk [[h1]] = tt andMτ|τ |←τj [[h0]] = tt and
• so we have:
Mτk←τ0 [[h2]] = tt and Mτj←τk [[h1]] = tt and Mτ|τ |←τj [[h0]] = tt.
at the R.H.S. we have:
• Mτ [[ h0 ;̂ (h1̂; h2)]]= tt iff exists j where 0 ≤ j ≤ |τ |, s.t.
Mτj←τ0 [[(h1 ;̂ h2)]]= tt and Mτ|τ |←τj [[h0]] = tt and
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• Mτj←τ0 [[(h1 ;̂ h2)]]= tt iff exists k where 0 ≤ k ≤ j, s.t.
Mτk←τ0 [[h2]] = tt andMτj←τk [[h1]] = tt
We have that the R.H.S. is equal to the L.H.S., so we have prove a:
` (h0 ;̂ h1) ;̂ h2 ≡ h0̂; (h1 ;̂ h2)
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PastEmptyChop
PastEmptyChop ` (h ;̂ êmpty) ≡ h
• PastEmptyChop is valid iff
for all τ Mτ [[ĥ; êmpty]] = tt iffMτ [[h]] = tt
• Mτ [[h ;̂ êmpty]] = tt iff exists k :0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t.
Mτk←τ0 [[êmpty]] = tt andMτ|τ |←τk [[h]] = tt
we have:
• Mτk←τ0 [[êmpty]] = tt
which is a past interval with only one state, so k = 0 and then
Mτ|τ |←τ0 [[h]]




PastChopEmpty ` (êmpty ;̂ h) ≡ h
• PastChopEmpty is valid iff
for all τMτ [[êmpty ;̂ h]] = tt iffMτ [[h]] = tt
• Mτ [[êmpty ;̂ h]] = tt iff exists k :0 ≤ k ≤ |τ | s.t.
Mτk←τ0 [[h]] = tt and Mτ|τ |←τk [[êmpty]] = tt
since we have:
• Mτ|τ |←τk [[êmpty]] = tt







PastNextImpNotNextNot ` ©̂h ⊃ ¬ ©̂¬h
• we know that: ©̂wh =̂ ¬ ©̂¬h
• we need to show:
for all τ Mτ [[©̂h]] = tt implies Mτ [[¬ ©̂¬h]] = tt
• first we take the L.H.S :
Mτ [[©̂h]] = tt iff 0 < |τ | and Mτ|τ |←τ1 [[h]] = tt
• for the R.H.S. we have:
Mτ [[©̂wh]] = tt iff |τ | = 0 or Mτ|τ |←τ1 [[h]] = tt
• |τ | = 0 or Mτ|τ |←τ1 [[h]] = tt iff|τ | = 0 or (|τ | > 0 and Mτ|τ |←τ1 [[h]] =
tt)because|τ | ≥ 0
• L.H.S implies R.H.S
• so: ` ©̂h ⊃ ¬ ©̂¬ h
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PastOrChopImp
` h2 ;̂ (h1 ∨ h0) ⊃ (h2 ;̂ h1) ∨ (h2 ;̂ h0)
• for all τ Mτ [[h2 ;̂ (h1 ∨ h0)]] = tt implies Mτ [[(h2 ;̂ h1) ∨ (h2 ;̂ h0)]] = tt
• On the L.H.S. we have: Mτ [[h2 ;̂ (h1 ∨ h0)]] = tt
• Mτ [[h2 ;̂ (h1 ∨ h0)]]= tt iff exists k: 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t.
Mτk←τ0 [[h1 ∨ h0]] = tt and Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2]] = tt
• Mτk←τ0 [[h1 ∨ h0]] = tt iff
Mτk←τ0 [[h1]] = tt orMτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt
• so we have: exsits k: 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ | s.t.
(Mτk←τ0 [[h1]] = tt orMτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt) and Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2]] = tt
• 0n the R.H.S. we have: Mτ [[(h2 ;̂ h1) ∨ (h2 ;̂ h0)]] = tt
which is :Mτ [[h2 ;̂ h1]] = ttorMτ [[h2 ;̂ h0]] = tt
• Mτ [[h2 ;̂ h0]] = tt iff exists k :0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t.
Mτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt and Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2]]= tt
• Mτ [[h2 ;̂ h1]] = tt iff exists k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t.
Mτk←τ0 [[h1]] = tt and Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2]]= tt
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• so we have:
exists k :0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t.
Mτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt and Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2]] = tt
or
exists k :0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t.
Mτk←τ0 [[h1]] = tt andMτ|τ |←τk [[h2]] = tt
• so we have:
exists k :0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t.(
(Mτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt orMτk←τ0 [[h1]] = tt) andMτ|τ |←τk [[h2]] = tt
)
which is equal to
exists k :0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t.(
(Mτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt andMτ|τ |←τk [[h2]] = tt)or(Mτk←τ0 [[h1]] = tt andMτ|τ |←τk [[h2]] = tt)
)
which implies(
exists k :0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t.Mτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt andMτ|τ |←τk [[h2]] = tt
)
or(
exists k :0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t.Mτk←τ0 [[h1]] = tt andMτ|τ |←τk [[h2]] = tt
)
which is the R.H.S.
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PastChopOrImp
PastChopOrImp ` (h2 ∨ h1) ;̂ h0 ⊃ (h1 ;̂ h0) ∨ (h2 ;̂ h0)
• for all τ Mτ [[(h2 ∨ h1) ;̂ h0]] = tt implies Mτ [[(h1 ;̂ h0) ∨ (h2 ;̂ h0)]] = tt
• On the L.H.S. we have: Mτ [[(h2 ∨ h1) ;̂ h0]] = tt
• Mτ [[(h2 ∨ h1) ;̂ h0]] = tt iff exists k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t.
Mτk←τ0 [[h0]]= tt and Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2 ∨ h1]]= tt
• Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2 ∨ h1]]= tt iff
Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2]]= tt or Mτ|τ |←τk [[h1]]= tt.
• so we have: exists k :0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t
Mτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt and
(
Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2]] = tt or Mτ|τ |←τk [[h1]] = tt.
)
• now take the R.H.S., we have:
• Mτ [[(h1 ;̂ h0) ∨ (h2 ;̂ h0)]] = tt iff
Mτ [[h1 ;̂ h0]] = tt or Mτ [[h2 ;̂ h0]] = tt.
• exists k: 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t
Mτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt and Mτ|τ |←τk [[h1]] = tt
or exists k: 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t
Mτk←τ0 [[h0]]= tt and Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2]]= tt
207 Sami Alsarhani
• so we have for the L.H.S.:
exists k: 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t
Mτk←τ0 [[h0]]= tt and
(
Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2]] = tt or Mτ|τ |←τk [[h1]] = tt
)
which is equal to
exists k :0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t
(
Mτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt andMτ|τ |←τk [[h2]] = tt
)
or(
Mτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt andMτ|τ |←τk [[h1]] = tt
)
which implies
exists k :0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t(
Mτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt andMτ|τ |←τk [[h2]] = tt
)
or
exists k :0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t
(
Mτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt andMτ|τ |←τk [[h1]] = tt
)
which is the R.H.S.
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PastStateImpBi
PastStateImpBi ` P ⊃ 2̂i P
• for all τ Mτ [[P ⊃ 2̂i P ]] = tt.
• Mτ [[P ⊃ 2̂i P ]] = tt iff
Mτ [[P ]] = tt implies Mτ [[2̂i P ]] = tt
• Mτ [[P ]] = tt iff Mτ0 [[P ]] = tt because P is state formula.
• Mτ [[2̂i P ]] = tt iff for all k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t.
Mτk←τ0 [[P ]] = tt.
• (for all k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.tMτk←τ0 [[P ]] = tt) iff Mτ0 [[P ]] = tt because P is
state formula
which is the L.H.S., so
` P ⊃ 2̂i P
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PastBiGen
PastBiGen ` h0 implies ` 2̂i h0
• (for all τ Mτ [[h0]] = tt) implies (for all τ Mτ [[2̂i h0]] = tt )
• take the R.H.S., we have:
for all τ, Mτ [[2̂i h0]] = tt iff
for all τ, k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |Mτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt.
• but we know from the L.H.S. that:
for all τ, Mτ [[h0]] = tt.
• Instantiate in L.H.S. for τ, τk ← τ0 so we have:
` h0 ⇒ ` 2̂i h0
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PastBoxGen
PastBoxGen ` h0 implies ` 2̂h0
• (for all τ, Mτ [[h0]] = tt) implies (for all τ, Mτ [[2̂h0]] = tt )
• take the R.H.S., we have:
for all τ, Mτ [[2̂h0]] = tt iff
for all τ,k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |,Mτ|τ |←τk [[h0]]= tt
• but we know from the L.H.S. that:
for all τ, Mτ [[h0]] = tt.
• Instantiate in L.H.S. for τ, ττ ← τk so we have:
` h0 ⇒ ` 2̂h0
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PastChopStarEqv
PastChopStarEqv ` h∗̂0 ≡ ((h∗̂0 ;̂ (h0 ∧ m̂ore)) ∨ êmpty)
PastChopStarEqv is valid iff
for all τ, Mτ [[h∗̂0]] = tt iff Mτ [[(h∗̂0 ;̂ (h0 ∧ m̂ore)) ∨ êmpty]] = tt.
• Mτ [[(h∗̂0 ;̂ (h0 ∧ m̂ore)) ∨ êmpty]] = tt iff
Mτ [[h0∗̂ ;̂(h0 ∧m̂ore )]] =tt
or Mτ [[êmpty]]= tt
• Mτ [[êmpty]]= tt iff|τ | = 0
• Mτ [[h∗̂0 ;̂ (h0 ∧ m̂ore)]] = tt iff exists k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ | , s.t.
Mτk←τ0 [[(h0 ∧ m̂ore)]] = tt and Mτ|τ |←τk [[h∗̂0]] = tt
• Mτk←τ0 [[(h0 ∧ m̂ore)]] = tt iff
Mτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt and Mτk←τ0 [[m̂ore]] = tt
• Mτk←τ0 [[m̂ore]] = tt iff k ≥ 1
• Mτ|τ |←τk [[h∗̂0]] = tt
exists l0,....ln, such that l0 = 0 and ln = |τ | and
for all l 0 ≤ i <n, li≤ li+1 and Mτli→τli+1 [[h0]] . . . = tt
PastChopStarEqv ` h∗̂0 ≡ ((h∗̂0 ;̂ (h0 ∧ m̂ore)) ∨ êmpty)
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PastBiBoxChopImpChop
PastBiBoxChopImpChop ` 2̂i (h0 ⊃ h1)∧ 2̂(h2 ⊃ h3) ⊃ (h2 ;̂ h0) ⊃ (h3 ;̂ h1)
• PastBiBoxChopImpChop is valid iff
• for all τ, Mτ [[2̂i (h0 ⊃ h1) ∧ 2̂(h2 ⊃ h3)]] = tt
implies
(Mτ [[h2 ;̂ h0]] = tt implies Mτ [[h3 ;̂ h1]] = tt)
• take the L.H.S., we have:
Mτ [[2̂i (h0 ⊃ h1) ∧ 2̂(h2 ⊃ h3)]] = tt iff
Mτ [[2̂i (h0 ⊃ h1)]] = tt and Mτ [[2̂(h2 ⊃ h3)]] = tt.
• Mτ [[2̂i (h0 ⊃ h1)]] = tt iff
for all k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |,Mτk←τ0 [[h0 ⊃ h1]] = tt
• Mτk←τ0 [[h0 ⊃ h1]] = tt iffMτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt implies Mτk←τ0 [[h1]] = tt
• for the second part:
Mτ [[2̂(h2 ⊃ h3)]] = tt iff
for all k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |,Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2 ⊃ h3]] = tt
• Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2 ⊃ h3]] = tt iff
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Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2]] = tt implies Mτ|τ |←τk [[h3]] = tt.
• so, we have:
for all k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, if Mτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt then Mτk←τ0 [[h1]] = tt.
and
for all k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, if Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2]] = tt then Mτ|τ |←τk [[h3]] = tt.
• for the R.H.S. we have:
Mτ [[h2 ;̂ h0]] = tt implies Mτ [[h3 ;̂ h1]] = tt
• take the first part, we have:
Mτ [[h2 ;̂ h0]] = tt iff exists k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ, |
Mτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt and Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2]]
• take the second part, we have:
Mτ [[h3 ;̂ h1]] = tt iff exists k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |,
Mτk←τ0 [[h1]] = tt and Mτ|τ |←τk [[h3]]
• so on the R.H.S. we have:
exists k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, (Mτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt and Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2]]) implies
exists k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, (Mτk←τ0 [[h1]] = tt and Mτ|τ |←τk [[h3]])
• we know that from L.H.S.
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Mτk←τ0 [[h0]] = tt implies Mτk←τ0 [[h1]] = tt
and
Mτ|τ |←τk [[h2]] = tt implies Mτ|τ |←τk [[h3]] = tt
So the R.H.S. holds and therefore
` 2̂i (h0 ⊃ h1) ∧ 2̂(h2 ⊃ h3) ⊃ (h2 ;̂ h0) ⊃ (h3 ;̂ h1)
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PastBoxInduct
PastBoxInduct ` h0 ∧ 2̂(h0 ⊃ ©̂wh0) ⊃ 2̂h0
PastBoxInduct is valid iff
for all τ Mτ [[h0 ∧ 2̂(h0 ⊃ ©̂wh0)]] = tt implies Mτ [[2̂h0]] = tt
• take the L.H.S., we have:
Mτ [[h0 ∧ 2̂(h0 ⊃ ©̂wh0)]] = tt iff
Mτ [[h0]] = tt and Mτ [[2̂(h0 ⊃ ©̂wh0)]] = tt
for all τ Mτ [[h0]] = tt is given (*)
• Mτ [[2̂(h0 ⊃ ©̂wh0)]] = tt iff
for all k : 0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |,Mτ|τ |←τk [[h0 ⊃ ©̂wh0]] = tt.
• Mτ|τ |←τk [[h0 ⊃ ©̂wh0]] = tt iff
Mτ|τ |←τk [[h0]] = tt implies Mτ|τ |←τk [[©̂wh0]] = tt
• Mτ|τ |←τk [[©̂wh0]] = tt iff
k = |τ |Mτ|τ |←τk [[=]]0 or Mτ|τ |←τk+1 [[h0]] = tt
so we have for L.H.S.
Mτ [[h0]] = tt and for all k,0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |,
Mτ|τ |←τk [[h0]] = tt implies
216 Sami Alsarhani
k = |τ |orMτ|τ |←τk+1 [[h0]] = tt
Mτ [[h0]] = tt and
k = 0 :
• Mτ|τ |←τ0 [[h0]] = tt implies
0 = |τ | orMτ|τ |←τ1 [[h0]] = tt
0 = |τ | orMτ|τ |←τ1 [[h0]] = tt
k = 1 :
• Mτ|τ |←τ1 [[h0]] = tt implies
1 = |τ | orMτ|τ |←τ2 [[h0]] = tt







k = |τ | :
• Mτ|τ |←τk [[h0]] = tt implies
|τ | = |τ | orMτ|τ |←|τ |+1[[h0]] = tt
so we have
Mτ [[h0]] = tt and
for k
• Mτ|τ |←τk [[h0]] = tt which is the R.H.S.
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1 = |τ | orMτ|τ |←τ2 [[h0]] = tt
` h0 ∧ 2̂(h0 ⊃ ©̂wh0) ⊃ 2̂h0
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PastChopEmptyAnd
PastChopEmptyAnd ` h ∧ w0 ≡ h ;̂ (êmpty ∧ w0)
• To prove this formula is sound, take the R.H.S. we have:
Mτ [[h ;̂ (êmpty ∧ w0)]] = tt iff exists k where
0 ≤ k ≤ |τ |, s.t.
• Mτk←τ0 [[êmpty ∧ w0]] = tt and
Mτ|τ |←τk [[h)]] = tt
• Mτk←τ0 [[êmpty ∧ w0]] = tt iff
Mτk←τ0 [[êmpty]] = tt and Mτk←τ0 [[w0]] = tt
• Mτk←τ0 [[êmpty]] = tt which is past interval with only one state, so k = 0
• from the past empty , we know that k = 0, so Mττ0 [[w0]] = tt
• because w0 is state formula, we can write:
Mτ [[h]] = tt so in R.H.S. we have:
Mτ [[h]] = tt and Mττ0 [[w0]] = tt
• for the L.H.S. we have Mτ [[h ∧ w0]] = tt
• we know that w0 is state formula, so we can write the L.H.S. as:
Mτ [[h]] = tt and Mττ0 [[w0]] = tt which the R.H.S.
• PastChopEmptyAnd ` h ∧ w0 ≡ h ;̂ (êmpty ∧ w0)
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Appendix B Part 1:
In this appendix, the complete semantics of general practice system policy GPS for
the Patient and the Doctor policies are listed here.






The semantics of Patient policy






 (fPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
fPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J true chopp alwaysp(registered(SPATIENT )) K (SPATIENT ,GPS, access) 6
and gPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
gPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SPATIENT ,GPS, access) 6
and hPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
hPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, access) and not deny(SPATIENT ,GPS, access)K (SPATIENT ,GPS, access) 12
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 (fPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
fPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : patient info(Opatient nfo, SPATIENT )K (SPATIENT ,GPS, update(Opatient info)) 7
and gPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
gPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SPATIENT ,GPS, update(Opatient info)) 7
and hPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
hPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, update(Opatient info)) and not
deny(SPATIENT ,GPS, update(Opatient info))K (SPATIENT ,GPS, update(Opatient info)) 12
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 (fPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
fPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) 8
and gPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
gPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J true K (SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) 8
and hPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
hPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : deny(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))
and not allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))K (SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) 12
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 (fPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
fPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J true chopp alwaysp( sign(SPATIENT , OLA) and sign(SPATIENT , OCF )) K (SPATIENT ,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) 9
and gPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
gPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SPATIENT ,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) 9
and hPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
hPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, treat(SPATIENT ))
and not deny(SPATIENT ,GPS, treat(SPATIENT ))K (SPATIENT ,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) 12
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 (fPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
fPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J true chopp alwaysp not booking(SPATIENT , OAPPOINTMENT )
chop skipp K (SPATIENT ,GPS, book(OAPPOINTMENT )) 10
and gPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
gPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J falseK (SPATIENT ,GPS, book(OAPPOINTMENT )) 10
and hPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
hPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, book(OAPPOINTMENT ))
and not deny(SPATIENT ,GPS, book(OAPPOINTMENT ))K (SPATIENT ,GPS, book(OAPPOINTMENT )) 12
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 (fPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
fPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J 0 : medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT ) K (SPATIENT ,GPS, view(Omedical record)) 11
and gPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
gPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J falseK (SPATIENT ,GPS, view(Omedical record)) 11
and hPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
hPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, view(Omedical record))
and not deny(SPATIENT ,GPS, view(Omedical record))K (SPATIENT ,GPS, view(Omedical record)) 12
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Appendix B Part 2:
In this part we will list the semantics of Doctor policy which is a part from the GPS
policy.
The Doctor policy consists from the rules from rule R
′
13 to rule R
′
17.
The semantics of Doctor policy






 (fDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
fDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J true chopp alwaysp (registered(SDOCTOR)) K (SDOCTOR,GPS, access) 13
and gDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
gDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SDOCTOR,GPS, access) 13
and hDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
hDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, access) and not deny(SDOCTOR,GPS, access)K (SDOCTOR,GPS, access) 18
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 (fDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
fDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) and medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )K (SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)) 14
and gDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
gDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)) 14
and hDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
hDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))
and not deny(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))K (SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)) 18
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 (fDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
fDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) and private notes(Oprivate notes, SPATIENT )K (SDOCTOR,GPS, add(Oprivate notes)) 15
and gDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
gDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SDOCTOR,GPS, add(Oprivate notes)) 15
and hDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
hDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, add(Oprivate notes))
and not deny(SDOCTOR,GPS, add(Oprivate notes))K (SDOCTOR,GPS, add(Oprivate notes)) 18
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 (fDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
fDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J ( true chopp alwaysp(agree(SPATIENT )))and(SDOCTOR1 6= SDOCTOR)
always(doctor(SDOCTOR1 , SPATIENT ))and always(notdoctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT )) K (SDOCTOR,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) 16
and gDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
gDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SDOCTOR,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) 16
and hDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
hDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, treat(SPATIENT ))
and not deny(SDOCTOR,GPS, treat(SPATIENT ))K (SDOCTOR,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) 18
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 (fDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
fDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J 0 : doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) and
patient info(Opatient info, SPATIENT ) K (SDOCTOR,GPS, view(Opatient info)) 17
and gDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
gDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SDOCTOR,GPS, view(Opatient info)) 17
and hDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
hDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, view(Opatient info))
and not deny(SDOCTOR,GPS, view(Opatient info))K (SDOCTOR,GPS, view(Opatient info)) 18
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Appendix C Part 1:
In this appendix, the complete semantics of general practice system policy using the
future time operators are listed here.
In the first part, we will list the patient policy rules which consists from the rules
from rule R
′
6 to rule R
′
11
The semantics of Patient policy using future operators






 (fPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
fPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J true chop always(registered(SPATIENT )) K (SPATIENT ,GPS, access) 6
and gPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
gPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SPATIENT ,GPS, access) 6
and hPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
hPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, access) and not deny(SPATIENT ,GPS, access)K (SPATIENT ,GPS, access) 12
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 (fPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
fPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : patient info(Opatient nfo, SPATIENT )K (SPATIENT ,GPS, update(Opatient info)) 7
and gPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
gPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SPATIENT ,GPS, update(Opatient info)) 7
and hPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
hPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, update(Opatient info)) and not
deny(SPATIENT ,GPS, update(Opatient info))K (SPATIENT ,GPS, update(Opatient info)) 12
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 (fPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
fPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) 8
and gPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
gPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J trueK (SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) 8
and hPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
hPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : deny(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))
and not allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records))K (SPATIENT ,GPS, alter(Omedical records)) 12
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 (fPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
fPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J true chop always( sign(SPATIENT , OLA) and sign(SPATIENT , OCF )) K (SPATIENT ,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) 9
and gPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
gPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SPATIENT ,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) 9
and hPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
hPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, treat(SPATIENT ))
and not deny(SPATIENT ,GPS, treat(SPATIENT ))K (SPATIENT ,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) 12
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 (fPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
fPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J true chop always not booking(SPATIENT , OAPPOINTMENT )
chop skip K (SPATIENT ,GPS, book(OAPPOINTMENT )) 10
and gPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
gPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J falseK (SPATIENT ,GPS, book(OAPPOINTMENT )) 10
and hPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
hPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, book(OAPPOINTMENT ))
and not deny(SPATIENT ,GPS, book(OAPPOINTMENT ))K (SPATIENT ,GPS, book(OAPPOINTMENT )) 12
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 (fPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hPATIENT (s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
fPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J 0 : medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT ) K (SPATIENT ,GPS, view(Omedical record)) 11
and gPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
gPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J falseK (SPATIENT ,GPS, view(Omedical record)) 11
and hPATIENT (s, o, a) is defined as:
hPATIENT (s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SPATIENT ,GPS, view(Omedical record))
and not deny(SPATIENT ,GPS, view(Omedical record))K (SPATIENT ,GPS, view(Omedical record)) 12
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Appendix C Part 2:
As a part of general practice system policies, the complete semantics of the doctor
policy rules using future time are listed here. The doctor policy consists from the
rules from rule R
′
13 to rule R
′
17
The semantics of Doctor policy






 (fDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
fDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J true chop always (registered(SDOCTOR)) K (SDOCTOR,GPS, access) 13
and gDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
gDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SDOCTOR,GPS, access) 13
and hDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
hDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, access) and not deny(SDOCTOR,GPS, access)K (SDOCTOR,GPS, access) 18
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 (fDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
fDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) and medical record(Omedical record, SPATIENT )K (SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)) 14
and gDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
gDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)) 14
and hDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
hDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))
and not deny(SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record))K (SDOCTOR,GPS, alter(Omedical record)) 18
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 (fDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
fDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) and private notes(Oprivate notes, SPATIENT )K (SDOCTOR,GPS, add(Oprivate notes)) 15
and gDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
gDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SDOCTOR,GPS, add(Oprivate notes)) 15
and hDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
hDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, add(Oprivate notes))
and not deny(SDOCTOR,GPS, add(Oprivate notes))K (SDOCTOR,GPS, add(Oprivate notes)) 18
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 (fDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
fDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J ( true chop always(agree(SPATIENT )))and(SDOCTOR1 6= SDOCTOR)
always(doctor(SDOCTOR1 , SPATIENT ))and always(notdoctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT )) K (SDOCTOR,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) 16
and gDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
gDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SDOCTOR,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) 16
and hDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
hDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, treat(SPATIENT ))
and not deny(SDOCTOR,GPS, treat(SPATIENT ))K (SDOCTOR,GPS, treat(SPATIENT )) 18
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 (fDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut
+(s, o, a))∧
(gDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut−(s, o, a))∧
(hDOCTOR(s, o, a)↔ Aut(s, o, a))

where fDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
fDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J 0 : doctor(SDOCTOR, SPATIENT ) and
patient info(Opatient info, SPATIENT ) K (SDOCTOR,GPS, view(Opatient info)) 17
and gDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
gDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J false K (SDOCTOR,GPS, view(Opatient info)) 17
and hDOCTOR(s, o, a) is defined as:
hDOCTOR(s, o, a) (s, o, a) R
J0 : allow(SDOCTOR,GPS, view(Opatient info))
and not deny(SDOCTOR,GPS, view(Opatient info))K (SDOCTOR,GPS, view(Opatient info)) 18
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